City of Beaumont v. West

• Decision Date: 21 September 1972
• Docket Number: No. 7398,7398
• Citation: 484 S.W.2d 789
• Parties: The CITY OF BEAUMONT, Appellant, v. Lucille Monsur WEST, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 789

484 S.W.2d 789

The CITY OF BEAUMONT, Appellant, v. Lucille Monsur WEST, Appellee.

No. 7398.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,

Beaumont.

Sept. 21, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 28, 1972.

Anthony Brocato, Beaumont, for appellant.

W. G. Walley, Jr., Beaumont, for appellee.

KEITH, Justice.

City appeals from an order granting a temporary injunction which restrained City from 'condemning or taking possession of any part of the property and premises of Plaintiff' which were described in the order. Plaintiff instituted suit in the County Court of Jefferson County at Law No. 2, alleging that she was the owner of the premises described and that she was operating a beauty shop therein as she had done for many years before the controversy arose.

She alleged that City had made plans for the construction of a street along a tract of land formerly occupied by the Missouri Pacific Railroad as a right-of-way and that the proposed street would extend over and across the property which she was using in her business. She alleged that City had wholly failed to negotiate with her for payment of any amounts or sums which she claimed to be due under the provisions of the Relocation Assistance Program set out in Art. 3266b, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St., hereinafter the 'Act'.* Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the provisions of the Act were applicable to the contemplated condemnation proceedings which City had notified her would be instituted if she refused its monetary offer. She alleged that she would suffer irreparable injury and damage if City instituted the condemnation proceedings without compliance with the Act and that the court should restrain City from beginning condemnation proceedings before the entry of a final judgment in the declaratory judgment suit.

Upon the hearing it was established that City had offered plaintiff a substantial sum of money for the property to be taken and had advised her that upon her refusal to accept such offer by a day certain, eminent domain proceedings would be instituted by City. It was also shown without question that City refused to recognize the applicability of the Act in the eminent domain proceedings and had not offered her any sum under the provisions of the Act. City's position is clear: It contended that the provisions of the Act were not applicable to City since the street project was one financed wholly by City from its own funds and no federal or state funds were involved in the project. We express no opinion upon this question.

The parties submitted briefs tendering the issues as to the applicability of the Act to the threatened condemnation proceedings; but this court, sua sponte, raised the question of jurisdiction of the trial court to hear and determine the issues presented by the parties in their pleadings below. At our request, additional briefs confined to the jurisdictional issue were filed and the cause advanced upon our docket. Being of the opinion that the trial court did not have jurisdiction of the cause as presented by plaintiff's pleadings below, we dissolve the temporary injunction and dismiss the cause. Our reasons for such action are now stated.

Although there were no pleadings challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court and the matter has not been raised directly by the parties, we must first determine our jurisdiction over the controversy. As was said in Able v. Bloomfield, 6 Tex. 263, 264 (1851), 'Want of jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit, will arrest a cause at any stage of the proceedings.'

Jurisdiction of a court is conferred only by the constitution and the statutes and a court without jurisdiction cannot render a valid judgment. Nevitt v. Wilson, 116 Tex. 29, 285 S.W. 1079, 1084, 48 A.L.R. 355 (1926); Daniel v. Dallas Independent School District, 351 S.W.2d 356, 359 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso, 1961, error ref. n.r.e.). If at any time during its progress it becomes apparent that the court has no authority under the law to adjudicate the issues presented, it becomes the duty of the court to dismiss it. Snyder v. Wiley & Porter, 59 Tex. 448, 449 (1883); Galley v. Hedrick, 127 S.W.2d 978, 981 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1939, no writ).

Although it is clear from our record that City intended to commence a condemnation proceeding against plaintiff to acquire the land described in her petition, no such proceeding had been filed at the time plaintiff instituted her suit or at the time the trial court entered the order granting the temporary injunction. There was no administrative or judicial proceeding involving condemnation pending before the trial court when the order was entered. Cf. City of Houston v. Plantation Land Company, 440 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston--14th, 1969, error ref. n.r.e.), and Sanders v. City of Beaumont, 470 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont, 1971, error ref. n.r.e.).

The trial court could acquire jurisdiction of the condemnation proceedings only by the filing of the petition for condemnation and notice to the landowner served in accordance with Art. 3264, V.A.C.S. City of Houston v. Kunze, 153 Tex. 42, 262 S.W.2d 947, 951 (1953).

The county court has power, under the provisions of Art. 5, § 16 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann.St., to issue writs of injunction only when 'necessary to the enforcement of the jurisdiction of said Court.' This constitutional provision is carried forward in almost identical language into Art. 1957, V.A.C.S. In City of Lubbock v. Green, 312 S.W.2d 279, 283 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1958, no writ), the court said:

'(U)nder Article 5, Section 16 of the Texas Constitution the jurisdiction of the county courts to issue an injunction and mandamus is extended only to those cases where it is Necessary to enforce jurisdiction which was already been acquired by virtue of the subject matter or amount in controversy'. (emphasis supplied)

See also 12 Tex.Law Rev. 457 to 469 inclusive (1934).

However, by an unbroken line of decisions, this constitutional power is not limited to instances necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of the county courts. See Repka v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 143 Tex. 542, 186 S.W.2d 977, 980 (1945), and cases therein cited. Thus, the county court has general authority to issue injunctions 'where a money demand or its equivalent is involved wherein the amount in controversy exceeds $200 and does not exceed $1,000, exclusive of interest.' Repka, supra. Cf. Gottschalk v. Gottschalk, 212 S.W.2d 223 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin, 1948, no writ); Guerra v. Weatherly, 291 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1956, no writ).

The plaintiff had no allegations or proof as to the jurisdictional amounts so as to bring herself within the reach of the decisions just noted. Consequently, the exception so noted is not applicable to the case at bar. Pounds v. Callahan, 337 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont, 1960, no writ). Instead, plaintiff seeks to support jurisdiction upon the proposition that a condemnation proceeding would be filed in the County Court at Law and that the court, consequently, had potential jurisdiction of the declaratory judgment suit.

But, as Justice Walker observed in Winfrey v. Chandler, 159 Tex. 220, 318 S.W.2d 59, 61 (1958), 'A court which is authorized to issue extraordinary writs to enforce its jurisdiction may not exercise that power in aid of its potential jurisdiction. It is only after that jurisdiction has been invoked in the manner prescribed by law and has thus become active that the court may act to enforce or protect the same.'

The injunction which we review in this case is ancillary to the suit for declaratory judgment that the Act is applicable to the contemplated proceedings. Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Village Mills Co., 109 Tex. 169, 202 S.W. 725 (1918); Lowe and Archer, Remedies, § 331, p. 345 (1957).

The narrow question which we face is whether or not the county court had Any jurisdiction to hear and determine the questions presented at the time it entered the order enjoining City from prosecuting its proposed condemnation proceeding. Such power to enjoin a condemnation suit is extremely limited for, as was said in Tonahill v. Gulf States Utilities Company, 446 S.W.2d 301, 302 (Tex.1969), 'The right of appeal affords petitioner an adequate remedy for anything that may occur in the condemnation proceedings up to and including the award of the special commissioners.'

Nor do the provisions of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act confer jurisdiction upon the trial court. In Donald v. Carr, 407 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1966, original proceedings), the court said, 'It has often been held that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is not intended to give jurisdiction where none exists, or to...