City of Bloomfield v. Davis County Community School Dist., 50872

• Decision Date: 12 February 1963
• Docket Number: No. 50872,50872
• Parties: CITY OF BLOOMFIELD, Iowa, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee, v. DAVIS COUNTY COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Board of Directors of Davis County Community School District, and Robert H. Boatman, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 909

119 N.W.2d 909

254 Iowa 900

CITY OF BLOOMFIELD, Iowa, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee, v. DAVIS COUNTY COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Board of Directors of Davis County Community School District, and Robert H. Boatman, Appellants.

No. 50872.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 12, 1963.

Barnes, Schlegel & McGiverin, Ottumwa, for appellants.

D. W. Harris, Bloomfield, for appellee.

GARFIELD, Chief Justice.

This is an action in equity by the City of Bloomfield to enjoin defendants, Davis County Community School District, and its contractor, Boatman, from installing in a restricted residence district in plaintiff city a bulk storage tank for gasoline and a pump to supply its school buses therewith. (For convenience we disregard the fact the board of school directors is also a defendant.) By cross-petition defendants sought to enjoin the city from interfering with their construction of the 'facility' and, if a permit therefor is necessary, to compel its issuance by mandamus. Following trial to the court there was a decree for plaintiff from which defendants appeal.

On September 19, 1933, the council of plaintiff city passed ordinance 84 designating and establishing a restricted residence district in the city. Section 2 of the ordinance provides: 'That no buildings or other structures, except residences, school houses, churches, and other similar structures shall hereafter be erected, reconstructed, altered, repaired or occupied within said district without first securing from the city council permit therefor; * * *.'

Section 3 of the ordinance provides: 'Any building or structure erected, altered, repaired or used in violation of any of the provisions of this ordinance, is hereby declared to be a nuisance, * * *.'

The ordinance is closely patterned after the one upheld against vigorous attack on constitutional and other grounds in City of Des Monies v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 1099-1100, 184 N.W. 823, 188 N.W. 921, 23 A.L.R. 1322, 1326-1327. Practically identical ordinances are also upheld in Marquis v. City of Waterloo, 210 Iowa 439, 440-441, 228 N.W. 870, and Scott v. City of Waterloo, 223 Iowa 1169, 1171, 274 N.W. 897. See also Cecil v. Toenjes, 210 Iowa 407, 228 N.W. 874, and Yeanos v. Skelly Oil Co., Inc., 220 Iowa 1317, 263 N.W. 834.

Defendant school district covers most of Davis and part of Van Buren counties. It is required by statute to provide transportation to the pupils within the district who are entitled to it (section 285.10, subd. 1, Codes 1958, 1962, I.C.A.). For such purpose the district owns 38 buses, 16 of which come into Bloomfield every day. (The district conducts a school in seven places other than Bloomfield.) About 450 pupils are transported by bus to the high school in Bloomfield. In the past the buses have been supplied with gasoline at privately owned filling stations throughout the district.

To service its buses in the future the district proposes to install on vacant ground owned by it a gasoline storage tank and a pump like those at filling stations. The location is in the restricted residence district ordinance 84 designates. The tank is to be 25 feet long, 9 feet in diameter, with a capacity of 12,000 gallons. Top of the tank would be three feet below ground. A concrete platform would 'carry' the buses. An architect prepared plans and specifications for the facility. A contract for the construction was awarded defendant Boatman. When he applied to the city council for a permit for the construction it was refused. When Boatman commenced the construction without securing the permit this action was commenced.

The tract on which defendants propose to locate the facility is 290 feet long and 177.5 feet deep. It faces south on an east and west street north of the high school football field which in turn is east of the high school. West of the tract just referred to, between it and the north and south street along the west side of the high school, are six residences and no vacant lots. East of the tract is a vacant lot, then a residence and then a swimming pool and park. This part of the city is only sparsely built up with residences.

The only contention of defendants we find it necessary to consider is that ordinance 84 should not be held applicable to them to prevent installation on this school-owned site of this gasoline facility for servicing its school buses because the school district is an arm of the state and proposes to use its property for a governmental purpose.

The ordinance was obviously enacted under the authority of what are now sections 415.1-3, Codes 1958, 1962, I.C.A. and is an exercise of the police power delegated to the city. City of Le Mars v. Fisch, 251 Iowa 149, 152, 100 N.W.2d 14, 17, and citations. The Le Mars case properly refers to such an ordinance as a zoning ordinance (page 152 of 251 Iowa, page 16 of 100 N.W.2d).

The law seems quite well settled that a municipal zoning ordinance is not applicable to the state or any of its agencies in the use of its property for a governmental purpose unless the legislature has clearly manifested a contrary intent. City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court, 90 Ariz. 393, 368 P.2d 637, 639; Town of Atherton v. Superior Court, 159 Cal.App.2d 417, 324 P.2d 328; Pruett v. Dayton, Del.Ch., 168 A.2d 543, 544-545; City of Medford v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., Mass., 181 N.E.2d 584, 587-588, and citations; Nehrbas v. Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145, 140 N.E.2d 241, 61 A.L.R.2d 965, 968, and Anno. 970; Stiger v. Village of Hewlett Bay Park, 283 App.Div. 827, 129 N.Y.S.2d 38; State ex rel. Ohio Turnpike Comm. v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d 345, 350; Green County v. City of Monroe, 3 Wis.2d 196, 87 N.W.2d 827, 828-829; 2 Metzenbaum Law of Zoning, Second Ed., chapter X-i-(2), page 1280; McQuillin Munl. Corps., Third Ed., section 25.15; Rhyne Municipal Law, section 12-8.

Rhyne, 32-35, pages 925-926, states: 'As a general proposition the state, its agencies, counties and other subordinate governments need not comply with municipal zoning regulations, * * *. School districts, too, in performance of state functions, are not subject to a municipal zoning amendment excluding the erection of schools within the municipality.'

101 C.J.S. Zoning, § 135 says, 'Ordinarily, a governmental body is not subject to zoning restrictions in its use of property for governmental purposes.'

The underlying logic of some of these authorities is, in substance, that the legislature could not have intended, in the absence of clear expression to the contrary, to give municipalities authority to thwart the state, or any of its agencies in performing a duty imposed upon it by statute.

There can be no doubt the school district is an arm or agency of the state and that the maintenance of public schools, including providing transportation to the pupils entitled to it as required by statute, is a governmental function. Certainly it is not a proprietary one. See Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 252 Iowa 205, 208, 106 N.W.2d 655, 657, and citations; Waddell v. Board of Directors, 190 Iowa 400, 406, 175 N.W. 65; Nehrbas v. Lloyd Harbor, supra, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145, 140 N.E.2d 241, 61 A.L.R.2d 965, 968; 78 C.J.S., Schools and School Districts, section 12.

We will refer to statutes which we think clearly require the school district not only to provide transportation to all pupils legally entitled to it but to do so in the most economical manner. Some of these laws, however, may bear on the question only indirectly.

Article IX, section 15, of our state constitution confers power on the General Assembly to provide for the educational interest of the state.

Section 274.1, Codes 1958, 1962, I.C.A. provides each school district shall 'exercise...