City of Caryville v. Campbell County

• Decision Date: 18 August 1983
• Citation: 660 S.W.2d 510
• Parties: CITY OF CARYVILLE, City of LaFollette, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CAMPBELL COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee, Starling and Earie Kennedy, Willie Q. Marlow and Edna Elliott, Plaintiff-Intervenors-Appellees.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 510

660 S.W.2d 510

CITY OF CARYVILLE, City of LaFollette, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CAMPBELL COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee,

Starling and Earie Kennedy, Willie Q. Marlow and Edna

Elliott, Plaintiff-Intervenors-Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee,

Western Section.

Aug. 18, 1983.

Application for Permission to Appeal

Denied Oct. 24, 1983.

David H. Dunaway, LaFollette, Robert E. Pryor, Knoxville, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Neil G. McBride and William A. Allen, Oak Ridge, for plaintiff-intervenors-appellees.

Frank D. Dossett, LaFollette, Barry K. Maxwell, Knoxville, for defendant-appellee.

CRAWFORD, Judge.

This case involves the construction of part of the coal severance tax law codified in Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 67-5901 through 67-5905 (1976 and 1982 Cum.Supp.). The statutes pertinent to the controversy before us are Sections 67-5901 and 67-5905.

The pertinent part of Tenn.Code Ann. § 67-5901 (1976), is as follows:

There is hereby levied a severance tax on all coal products severed from the grounds in Tennessee. The tax shall be levied for the use and benefit of local governments only and all revenues collected from the tax, except deductions for administration and collection provided for herein, shall be allocated to the county from which such coal products were severed. Administration and collection of this tax shall be by the state of Tennessee in the same manner as other taxes are collected by the state for and on behalf of local governments, and the department of revenue may promulgate all rules and regulations necessary and reasonable for the administration of the provisions of this chapter.

The pertinent part of Tenn.Code Ann. § 67-5905 (1982 Cum.Supp.), is as follows:

(a) All revenues collected under this chapter in a county wherein coal products are severed, less an amount of three per cent (3%) of the tax and all of the penalties and interest collected, which shall be retained by the department of revenue and credited to its current service revenue to cover the expenses of administration and collection, shall be remitted by the commissioner of the department of revenue to that county in which the coal products were severed for the following specific purposes: One-half ( 1/2) of all revenues collected shall be used for the educational system or systems of said county; and the remaining one-half ( 1/2) of all revenues collected shall be used for highway and stream cleaning systems of said county.

The City of Caryville, an incorporated town in Campbell County, filed suit for declaratory judgment against Campbell County for the purposes of determining the City's rights and damages under Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 67-5901 through 67-5905, the coal severance tax law. By amendment, other incorporated cities of Campbell County were allowed to become parties-plaintiffs and parties-defendants. In addition, several citizens of Campbell County were allowed to intervene as plaintiffs.

The issue presented for review as framed by the appellants, the City of Caryville and others, is:

Does the term "local governments" as used in the Gennessee Code [sic] Severance Tax Law, T.C.A. § 67-5901 et seq., mean both municipal governments located within a county and the individual county government?

We perceive the real issue to be whether the municipalities within Campbell County are entitled to a part of the coal severance tax. The court below held that the complaint should be dismissed, basing its decision on its interpretation of the Act that the term "local governments" means counties alone, to the exclusion of municipalities. We agree with the result reached by the trial court for the reasons set out below.

The rule of statutory construction to which all others yield is that the intention of the legislature must prevail. City of Humboldt v. Morris, 579 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tenn.App.1978); see Tidwell v. Collins, 522 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tenn.1975). Legislative intent or purpose is to be ascertained primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, when read in the context of the entire statute, and without any forced or subtle construction to limit or extend the import of the language. Worrall v. Kroger Company, 545 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tenn.1977); see City of Lenoir v. State ex rel. City of Loudon, 571 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn.1978).

It is the duty of the court to reconcile inconsistent or repugnant provisions of a statute and to construe a statute so that no part will be inoperative, superfluous, void or insignificant. It must give effect to every word, phrase, clause and sentence of the act in order to achieve the Legislature's intent, and it must construe a statute so that no section will destroy another. Tidwell v. Collins, supra at 676-677.

Appellant asserts that the statement in Section 67-5901 that "the tax shall be levied for the use and benefit of local governments, coupled with the express earmark of the funds in Section 67-5905 for "educational system or systems of the county" and "highway and stream cleaning system of the county" indicates that the intent of the Legislature was for the municipality, as a local government, to participate in the proceeds. Appellant contends that use of the plural "systems" indicates that the Legislature had in mind more than one...