City of Coronado v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com.

• Decision Date: 09 May 1977
• Citation: 138 Cal.Rptr. 241,69 Cal.App.3d 570
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CITY OF CORONADO, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, Respondent, CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 14763.

Page 241

138 Cal.Rptr. 241

69 Cal.App.3d 570

CITY OF CORONADO, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, Respondent CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 14763.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

May 9, 1977.

Haskins, Lewis, Nugent & Newnham and Gerald J. Lewis, San Diego, for petitioner and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Carl Boronkay, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Joel S. Moskowitz, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent and real party in interest.

STANIFORTH, Associate Justice.

The California State Department of Parks and Recreation (Real Party) seeks to convert a day-use parking lot located at the Silver Strand State Beach in the City of Coronado to an overnight camping area for use by approximately 115 recreational vehicles. The parking lot (#1) sought to be converted is directly across State Scenic Highway No. 75 from the posh residential community of Coronado Cays. Over the objection of the City of Coronado (City), the Real Party sought and obtained, after traversing an obstacle-strewn course, the necessary permit from the California Coastal Zone Conversation Commission (Coastal Commission). ¹ The battle scene then moved to the superior court, where the City sought a peremptory writ of mandate (Code Civ.Proc. § 1094.5) directing to Coastal Commission to set aside its permit. The court refused to issue the writ of mandate, reasoning that (1) the permit-granting function of the Coastal Commission is quasi-legislative in nature and therefore the judicial review was limited to a determination of whether the Coastal Commission's action was 'arbitrary, capricious or entirely lacking in evidentiary support'; (2) the Coastal Commission's failure to act upon the decision of the San Diego Regional Commission (Regional Commission) within the 60-day time limitation of section 27423(b) did not result in a void act; (3) the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) was not violated by the issuance of the permit without first obtaining an environmental impact report (EIR); and, finally, (4) the findings of the Coastal Commission in issuing the permit in question were supported by substantial evidence. The City appeals the denial of the writ of mandate, contending the trial court erred in its determinations. We agree.

Preliminary, we dispose of the question whether the Coastal Commission action on application for a permit is quasi-legislative in nature as found by the trial court, in which event the decision of the Coastal Commission must be upheld unless it is found to be arbitrary, capricious or totally lacking in evidentiary support, or (b) quasi-judicial in nature, in which event the decision of the Coastal Commission is to be judicially reviewed by one of the two standards found in Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(c). ²

The writ here sought had as its purpose the inquiry into the validity of a final order of the Coastal Commission. The permit was issued in a procedure which, by law, required a hearing, and a de novo hearing, at the Coastal Commission level. Evidence was required to be taken, and discretion in fact determination was vested in the Coastal Commission. The requisites of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 review are met precisely by these actions. The procedures are essentially adjudicatory in nature, although the hearings do not have the trappings of judicial process. They are nonetheless adversary in fact. Competing interests are being determined. The aggrieved party has access to the courts. The Coastal Commission is engaged in applying rules to a specific set of existing facts. It is not engaged in the formulation of rules to be applied to all future cases, that litmus test of quasi-legislative function (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn., 11 Cal.3d 28, 35, fn. 2, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520, P.2d 29). We join in a chorus of cases holding 'beyond any doubt' the permit-issuing functions of the Coastal Commission are quasi-judicial in nature (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com., 57 Cal.App.3d 76, 83, 129 Cal.Rptr. 57; Davis v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com., 57 Cal.App.3d 700, 705, 707, 129 Cal.Rptr. 417; Patterson v. Central Coast etc. Conservation Com., 58 Cal.App.3d 833, 839, 841, 130 Cal.Rptr. 169).

We need not examine the consequences of this procedural error, this wrong choice of standard of review by the trial court, in view of our conclusion that errors substantive in nature occurred which require reversal. To these critical issues we now attend.

The Coastal Commission did not act upon--'affirm, reverse or modify'--the decision of the Regional Commission within 60 days, as required by section 27423(b). This section provides:

'The commission may affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the regional commission. If the commission fails to act within 60 days after notice of appeal has been filed, the regional commission's decision shall become final.'

The City contends the Coastal Commission issued a void permit when it reversed the decision of the Regional Commission (denying that permit) in a time period beyond the statutory 60-day limit for decision. To understand the nature of the error committed, we must briefly examine the factual and procedural backdrop to the application for the permit.

On August 31, 1973, the Real Party applied for a permit from the Regional Commission to add water, electrical and sewer connections necessary for the proposed conversion of a day-use parking lot on an existing, publicly owned state beach (Silver Strand State Beach) to an overnight camping area for recreational vehicles. A two-page document, entitled 'Environmental Statement on 1973--74 Budget Request Item,' was prepared by the Real Party and submitted with the application. Hearing was held September 21, 1973 and a final vote was taken by the Regional Commission on October 5, 1973, unanimously granting the permit application. However, the Regional Commission invalidated the permit on September 20, 1974, due to inadequate public notice.

On October 25, 1974, the Real Party applied once again for a permit to convert parking lot #1 into an overnight campground site. The 'Environmental Statement on 1973--74 Budget Request Item' was once again attached and the application included an explanation against the conversion of parking lot #4 (located 1/2 mile to the south and that far removed from the Coronado Cays) because lot #1 facilitates a better traffic flow and was the least used lot by the general public. On November 15, 1974, a public hearing was held. In a letter dated November 21, 1974, the Real Party agreed to the moving of the project to lot #4 in light of the local opposition to the conversion of lot #1. The Regional Commission's staff recommended the issuance of the permit for the campground to be located at the site of lot #4 rather than lot #1 as originally proposed. Nevertheless, on December 20, 1974, the Regional Commission again denied the permit.

The Real Party, being aggrieved, sent a notice of appeal to the Coastal Commission by telegram dated December 27, 1974. On January 13, 1975, the Real Party filed a second notice of appeal on the Coastal Commission's required form. ³ By letter dated February 10, 1975, the Real Party purported to waive the 60-day time limitation on the Coastal Commission's time to act on the appeal. The Coastal Commission held hearings and reviewed the appeal, and on March 5, 1975, voted to issue the permit for lot #1.

The trial court determined the Real Party could waive the 60-day time requirement of section 27423(b), and, as consequence, held the Coastal Commission's authorizing the issuance of the permit was a valid, lawful act.

The decision of the Coastal Commission issuing the permit was rendered March 5, 1975, nine days after the 60-day time limitation of section 27423(b). Thus the Coastal Commission reversed the determination by the Regional Commission after it had 'become final' unless the Real Party could waive the statutory directive of finality. To support its conclusion, the trial court relied upon Klitgaard & Jones, Inc. v. San Diego Coast Regional Com., 48 Cal.App.3d 99, 111, 121 Cal.Rptr. 650, where the question was 'whether conduct of Club, at a time within the 60-day period when the State Commission could have acted and was prepared to act, may estop Club from asserting a lack of jurisdiction and the finality of the Regional Commission's decision . . ..' (P. 111, 121 Cal.Rptr. p. 656) Said this Court, at pages 112--113, 121 Cal.Rptr. at pages 658:

'Whether rightly or wrongly, the State Commission has taken the position that the 60-day limit may be extended upon the request of the applicant for whose benefit the time limit was fixed. In good faith, the applicant here requested and obtained such extension with full knowledge of the language of the statute and upon the express representation that the time limit would thereby be extended. Within the time limitation and the requested extensions, the State Commission acted expeditiously. In those circumstances Club is estopped to assert the failure of jurisdiction of the State Commission and the finality of the Regional Commission's decision.'

Not only does Klitgaard & Jones, supra, rely upon the equitable principles of estoppel--a factual issue not here--but it rests upon a totally different factual matrix. In Klitgaard, the decision of the Regional Commission favored the Club. The Regional Commission had granted the Club's application for permit. The objectors to the permit appealed to the Coastal Commission. It was the Regional Commission decision Favoring the Club which would have become final upon the non-action of the Coastal Commission within 60 days. It was the Club's right to final judgment in their favor which they 'waived' or were, by their acts, estopped to claim. Here the City...