Patterson v. Central Coast Regional Com.

• Decision Date: 02 June 1976
• Citation: 130 Cal.Rptr. 169,58 Cal.App.3d 833
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: J. D. PATTERSON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CENTRAL COAST REGIONAL COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMMISSION and California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 36949.

Page 169

130 Cal.Rptr. 169

58 Cal.App.3d 833

J. D. PATTERSON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CENTRAL COAST REGIONAL COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMMISSION and California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission, Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 36949.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

June 2, 1976.

As Corrected June 18, 1976.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Carl Boronkay, Asst. Atty. Gen., Roderick E. Walston, William M. Chamberlain, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for defendants and appellants.

Noland, Hamerly, Etienne & Hoss, Myron E. Etienne, Jr., James D. Schwefel, Jr., Salinas, for plaintiff and respondent.

CALDECOTT, Presiding Justice.

Central Coast Regional Coastal Zone Conservation Commission (hereinafter1 regional commission) and the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission (state commission) appeal from a judgment of the superior court granting respondent Patterson a peremptory writ of mandate ordering appellants to issue a coastal permit to Patterson for four single family dwellings.

The facts are not in dispute.

Respondent is owner and developer of certain real property in the City of Carmel-By-The-Sea (hereinafter 'city'). The property is immediately adjacent to a public beach owned by the city. Respondent purchased the property in 1965. Prior to 1971, four houses had been constructed on the property; in that year, respondent received final approval from the city planning commission to create a nine-lot subdivision thereon. Four of the nine lots corresponded to the existing structures; the remaining five lots were vacant.

During 1971, 1972 and part of 1973, respondent proceeded with grading of the five lots and installing underground utilities and driveways. Prior to the effective date of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972 (Pub.Res.Code, §§ 27000--27650; hereinafter 'Act') some of these improvements were completed and the others were in the process of construction, including one home on one of the five remaining lots.

In March of 1973, respondent applied to the regional commission for an exemption for the subdivision. The respondent's application treated the subdivision as a single, interdependent development. On April 23, 1973, the commission approved the exemption, describing the development for which the exemption was granted as 'completion of lot improvements on 9 lot subdivision . . . and completion of a single family residence on Lot 1 in said subdivision.' The commission found that respondent had obtained a vested right as to that described development, and was entitled to complete the project without securing a permit from the commission. ¹

Respondent did not appeal the exemption decision. Instead, on June 188 1973, he filed an application for a permit to construct four single-family dwellings on the remaining four lots in the subdivision. The application stated, inter alia, that the proposed project (the four single-family dwellings) conformed to local plans and zoning, but that building permits had not yet been applied for although the subdivision had been approved and a permit had been granted for construction of the exempted house on Lot 1.

On January 21, 1974, the regional commission hearing was held on the permit application. The regional commission determined that, pursuant to Public Resources Code sections 27400 and 27401, subdivision (b), ² approval of the permit application would require a two-thirds vote of the total authorized membership of 16. The commission then voted on the permit application with the understanding that permit denial would also constitute adoption of the findings of the commission staff's executive director. Nine commissioners voted for approval, and three for denial; as two-thirds of the total authorized membership was 11, the permit was denied.

The resolution denying the permit states, in accordance with the executive director's recommendations, that the commission finds that the development will have 'substantial adverse environmental and ecological effect,' and that it is not consistent with the findings, declarations and objectives set forth in Public Resources Code sections 27001 and 27302 in that: '1) Construction on a sandy beachdune area adjacent to a public beach prior to adoption of a coastal recreation and open space plan is premature, 2) Public acquisition of this parcel has been contemplated, and, at present, has been rejected for lack of funds on the basis of an appraisal which is based on 4 buildable lots. With the designation as a priority acquisition, funds are likely to be mobilized from other public agencies or private parties. The decision whether or not to acquire these and similar parcels for public use is a mandatory element of the forthcoming Coastal Zone Conservation Plan.'

On February 1, 1974, respondent appealed the permit denial to the state commission, pursuant to section 27423. At a hearing the state commission voted eight to one that no substantial issue was presented and it therefore declined to hear the appeal.

Having exhausted his administrative remedy, respondent petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandamus. The trial court, in granting the writ and ordering the appellants to issue the permit found that: (1) the regional commission's determination that the development would reduce the size of a beach or other area usable for public recreation was not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record; (2) a Majority of the total authorized membership of the regional commission made all of the findings required by Public Resources Code section 27402, ³ and in any event any contrary finding could not be supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. A majority of the commission thereupon voted to grant the permit; (3) even if a two-thirds vote were required, the denial was not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record, and the denial was therefore an abuse of discretion.

The court then found that, in the alternative, respondent had a vested property right, and that if the proper standard for review was therefore for the court to exercise its independent judgment, the weight of the evidence established that the development would not reduce the size of any beach or other area usable for public recreation, the development met the statutory permit requirements, and respondent had met his burden of proof thereon.

Status Of The Permit Function

Appellants first contend that the trial court applied an improper standard in reviewing the permit denial decision. They assert that the permit application procedure created by the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972 is a quasi-legislative function, and not an adjudicatory or quasi-judicial ⁴ determination.

The divergence in the rules of judicial review accorded to administrative actions is clear. The Act itself provides for review by mandate of permit decisions. (§ 27424.) If the agency proceedings are quasi-legislative, a reviewing court must proceed in ordinary mandamus (Code Civ.Proc., § 1085) and limit its examination to a determination of whether the administrative action was "arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether . . . (it) has failed to follow the procedure and give the notice required by law." (Pitts v. Perluss, 58 Cal.2d 824, 833, 27 Cal.Rptr. 19, 24, 377 P.2d 83, 89, quoting Brock v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.App.2d 594, 605, 241 P.2d 283; Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Reimel, 69 Cal.2d 172, 174--175, 179, 70 Cal.Rptr. 407, 444 P.2d 79.) If the administrative proceedings are adjudicatory, the court must proceed under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, and a two-tier rule applies: if the agency decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the trial court must exercise its independent judgment on the evidence and find an abuse of discretion if the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence (§ 1094.5, subd. (c)); otherwise, the trial court's inquiry is limited to a determination of whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. (§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn., supra, 11 Cal.3d 28, 32, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29.)

Although the result of the characterization accorded the particular administrative proceeding is thus evident, the distinction between quasi-legislative and adjudicatory determinations is sometimes difficult to draw. The parties agree that whether a particular action of an administrative agency is quasi-legislative or adjudicatory depends on the nature of the function delegated by the enabling statute, rather than the specific procedures followed.

Generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.' (Strumsky, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 35, fn. 2, 112 Cal.Rptr. at p. 809, 520 P.2d at p. 33; Quinchard v. Board of Trustees, 113 Cal. 664, 670, 45 P. 856; City Council v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.App.2d 389, 393, 3 Cal.Rptr. 796.) 'Wherever an act undertakes to determine a question of right or obligation, or of property, as the foundation upon which it proceeds, such act is to that extent a judicial one, and not the proper exercise of legislative functions. " (Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors, 101 Cal. 15, 24, 35 P. 353, 356, quoting Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 at p. 761, 25 L.Ed. 496; People v. Oak Board of Education, 54 Cal. 375, 376.) Particular procedural characteristics of the administrative process are not necessarily determinative of the classification of the function. (Rivera v. Division of Industrial Welfare, 265 Cal.App.2d 576, 586--587, 71 Cal.Rptr. 739; Wilson v. Hidden Valley Mun. Water Dist., 256 Cal.App.2d 271, 279, 63 Cal.Rptr. 889.) Nor is the breadth or narrowness of the agency's discretion controlling. (...