City Of Dallas v. Turley

• Decision Date: 24 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. 05-09-00791-CV.,05-09-00791-CV.
• Citation: 316 S.W.3d 762
• Parties: CITY OF DALLAS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee,v.Windle TURLEY, Shirley Turley, Steve Aaron, Carol Aaron, B.M. Rankin, Jr., and Ashley Rankin, Appellees and Cross-Appellants.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

316 S.W.3d 762

Court of Appeals of Texas Dallas.

CITY OF DALLAS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee,v.Windle TURLEY, Shirley Turley, Steve Aaron, Carol Aaron, B.M. Rankin, Jr., and Ashley Rankin, Appellees and Cross-Appellants.

No. 05-09-00791-CV.

July 13, 2010.

Rehearing Overruled Aug. 24, 2010.

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Christopher J. Caso, Office of the City Attorney, Barbara E. Rosenberg, City of Dallas Attorney's Office, Michael L. Knapek, Jackson & Walker, Dallas, TX, for Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

Joel Wilson Reese, Arthur J. Anderson, Winstead Sechrest & Minick, P.C., Dallas, TX, PC, David Fowler Johnson, Winstead Sechrest & Minick, P.C., Fort Worth, TX, for Appellees and Cross-Appellants.

Before Justices RICHTER, FRANCIS, and LANG-MIERS.

OPINION

Opinion By Justice LANG-MIERS.

These are interlocutory cross-appeals from the trial court's order on the City's plea to the jurisdiction. The issue before us is whether governmental immunity bars the claims against the City. We conclude that it does. As a result, we affirm in part and reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Background

The appellees and cross-appellants are Windle Turley, Shirley Turley, Steve Aaron, Carol Aaron, B.M. Rankin, Jr., and Ashley Rankin (the landowners). The Turleys and the Aarons own property that shares a boundary at the back of their properties. A street easement and a right-of-way extending a street, referred to as the Ravine Drive extension (the easements),¹ run through the boundary area at the back of their properties. The easements have been fenced off, landscaped, improved, and maintained as part of their yards. The Rankins own property that adjoins the Turleys' and contains a floodway easement. Richard and Nona Barrett, who are defendants below,² also own real property adjoining the Turleys' and Aarons' tracts. The Barretts want to access their property through the easements and install a storm water pipe that crosses the boundary at the back of the Turleys' and the Aarons' properties. The storm water pipe will empty into a creek within the floodway easement on the Rankins' property.

The Ravine Drive extension was included as a proposed dedication on a plat filed in 1973. A water line, a sewer line, and a fire hydrant were installed there in 1973 and were accepted by the Dallas City Council. The street easement was shown on a plat approved by the City in 1977. A portion of the street easement was abandoned in 1980 through the adoption of a City ordinance, but the City contends the remainder of the street easement at issue in this case has not been abandoned. The easements have never been used as a public street.

The landowners filed this lawsuit seeking an injunction and other relief to keep the Barretts and the City from opening the easements to traffic, constructing any public utilities in the easements, or making any other public use of them. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming that it was immune from suit and asked the court to dismiss the landowners' claims against the City for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

In their “Third Amended Petition and Application for Injunction,” the landowners alleged a claim for adverse possession and sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as attorney's fees. They pleaded for declaratory relief as follows:

23. Plaintiff [sic] seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act ... that the proffered dedication and/or accepted dedication for Ravine Drive shown on Exhibit “A” and the street easement shown on Exhibit “B” have never been accepted.

24. Plaintiff [sic] seeks a declaratory judgment ... that the City's alleged acceptance of dedication of Nondedicated Ravine Drive shown as Exhibit “A” and the street easement shown on Exhibit “B” have been abandoned.

25. Plaintiff [sic] seeks a declaratory judgment ... that the proposed storm water runoff onto the Rankins' lot will violate the Texas Water Code.

The trial court granted part of the City's plea to the jurisdiction, dismissing the landowners' claims for injunctive relief, adverse possession, and declaratory judgment with respect to the Texas Water Code, but denied part as to the landowners' “other remaining requests for declaratory judgment,” and their “request for attorney's fees under the declaratory judgment act.” The City appeals, alleging the trial court should have granted the plea in its entirety. The landowners also appeal, claiming that the trial court erred to the extent it granted the plea. After the cross-appeals were filed, we granted temporary relief pursuant to appellate rule 29.3 “to preserve the parties' rights until disposition of the appeal.” See Tex.R.App. P. 29.3. The parties filed additional motions which we resolve today as well.

Issues

The City contends that the trial court erred because it denied the City's plea to the jurisdiction as to the landowners' requests under the Declaratory Judgments Act to declare that the City had abandoned its easements and had not accepted the easement dedications. In its second issue, the City also contends that the trial court erred because it denied the City's plea to the jurisdiction as to the landowners' request for attorney's fees. In their cross-appeal, the landowners contend that the trial court erred because it granted the City's plea to the jurisdiction as to the landowners' claims for injunctive relief, adverse possession, and declaratory judgment under the Texas Water Code.

Standard of Review

Governmental immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction and is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. See Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex.2004); see also Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex.2006). The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law and we review the trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226, 228. A plea to the jurisdiction can be based on the pleadings or on evidence. Id. When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. We must look to the allegations in the pleadings, construe them in the plaintiff's favor, and look to the pleader's intent. See Cnty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex.2002); Peek v. Equip. Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex.1989). The plaintiff bears the burden to allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction to hear a case. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties to determine if a fact issue exists. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. The standard of review for a jurisdictional plea based on evidence “generally mirrors that of a summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c).” Id. at 228.

Immunity

“[S]overeign immunity deprives a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction for lawsuits in which the state or certain governmental units have been sued unless the state consents to suit.” Id. at 224. Political subdivisions of the state, including cities, are entitled to immunity (referred to as governmental immunity) unless it has been waived. Reata Constr. Corp., 197 S.W.3d at 374. “[A] statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.” Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.034 (Vernon Supp. 2009). The plaintiff bears the burden to plead facts that affirmatively demonstrate that governmental immunity has been waived and that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction. McMahon Contracting, L.P. v. City of Carrollton, 277 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied).

The Texas Supreme Court recently explained governmental immunity in City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex.2009). In Heinrich, a police officer's widow brought a declaratory judgment action against several governmental entities and officials after her pension benefits were reduced. Id. at 369. The defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction which the trial court denied. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order. Id. The supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that “while governmental immunity generally bars suits for retrospective money relief, it does not preclude prospective injunctive remedies in official-capacity suits against government actors who violate statutory or constitutional provisions.” Id. at 368-69. As to suits against governmental entities, however, the court concluded, “[n]evertheless as a technical matter, the governmental entities themselves-as opposed to their officers in their official capacity-remain immune from suit,” unless the claim challenges the validity of an ordinance or statute. Id. at 372-73. The court explained, “[f]or claims challenging the validity of ordinances or statutes, ... the Declaratory Judgment Act requires that the relevant governmental entities be made parties, and thereby waives immunity.” Id. at 373 n. 6. If the claim challenges actions taken under an ordinance or statute rather than the validity of the ordinance or statute itself, the governmental entity is immune from suit on the claim. Id.

Analysis

The trial court concluded that the City was not immune from the landowners' requests for a judgment declaring that the City had not accepted, or had abandoned, public dedication of the easements. The landowners argue that the trial court ruled correctly because the Declaratory Judgments Act permits suits against the government “to clarify a person's legal rights in relation to the government,” see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 37.001-.011 (Vernon 2008), and that they ought to be able to sue the City to have their...