City of Des Moines v. Keller

• Decision Date: 23 January 1902
• Parties: CITY OF DES MOINES v. W. S. KELLER, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

88 N.W. 827

116 Iowa 648

CITY OF DES MOINES v. W. S. KELLER, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

January 23, 1902

Appeal from Polk District Court.--HON. S. F. PROUTY AND W. F CONRAD, Judges.

THE defendant was convicted of a violation of a city ordinance requiring bicycle riders to carry lights after dark when riding on the streets of the city, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

H. E Long for appellant.

J. E Mershon and M. H. Cohen for appellee.

OPINION

SHERWIN, J.

On the second day of July, 1894, the following ordinance was passed by the city council of Des Moines: "An Ordinance to Regulate Bicycles. * * * Section 290. Riding without Light. That it shall be unlawful for any person to ride any bicycle upon the streets after dark and before daylight without carrying or having a sufficient light to be easily seen the distance of at least one block. Any person found guilty of violating this ordinance shall be fined not less than $ 1.00 nor more than $ 20.00, and stand committed to jail until such fine and costs are paid."

The title of this ordinance is expressed with sufficient clearness, and is broad enough to cover the use of bicycles on the streets of the city. Dillon, Municipal Corporation (3d Ed.) section 51; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82; State v. Forkner, 94 Iowa 733, 62 N.W. 683; State v. Barge, 82 Minn. 256 (84 N.W. 911, 53 L. R. A. 428.)

Nor is the ordinance in conflict with and contrary to section 6, of article 1, of the constitution of this state, because it applies only to bicycles, and not to riders or users of other silently running vehicles. It applies to all riders of bicycles, as a class, and is for this reason sufficient and reasonable. Iowa R. Land Co. v. Soper, 39 Iowa 112; Bank v. Rerick, 96 Iowa 238, 64 N.W. 801. In the early history of bicycles, some of the courts were inclined to the view that they were such an innovation on the use of the highways that they were not entitled to the same protection as other vehicles. See State v Yopp, 97 N.C. 477 (2 S.E. 458, 2 Am. St. Rep. 305). But they are now generally treated as vehicles having a common right to the use of the streets and highways. See note (47 L.R.A. 289). And they are subject to all just and reasonable requirements for the safety and convenience of other users of such streets and highways. That a municipal corporation has absolute control of its streets is generally conceded, and it is equally as true that it may enact such ordinances governing the use thereof as shall be necessary, in its judgment, to protect the public, providing they are reasonable; and if it does this without undue discrimination, and all who are subject to the ordinance are treated alike, under similar circumstances and conditions, as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed, equal protection of the laws is not denied. The...