City of East Point v. Crosby & Stephens, Inc., 43453

• Decision Date: 13 March 1968
• Docket Number: No. 3,No. 43453,43453,3
• Citation: 117 Ga.App. 392,160 S.E.2d 839
• Parties: CITY OF EAST POINT et al. v. CROSBY & STEPHENS, INC
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 839

160 S.E.2d 839

117 Ga.App. 392

CITY OF EAST POINT et al. v. CROSBY & STEPHENS, INC.

No. 43453.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 3.

March 13, 1968.

Ezra E. Phillips, East Point, for appellants.

Richardson & Chenggis, Platon P. Constantinides, Chamblee, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

JORDAN, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal by the City of East Point and B. W. Addis, its building inspector, from a judgment of Fulton Superior Court dismissing an appeal to that court from a decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals of East Point granting a variance on application of Crosby & Stephens, Inc. The lower court dismissed the appeal for the stated reason that in his opinion the appellants, not acting in any capacity as proprietors, are not aggrieved persons entitled to appeal to the court under the applicable statute. Held:

The 1957 statute providing for an appeal to a board of zoning appeals authorizes such an appeal by 'any person aggrieved, or by any officer, department, board, or bureau of the municipality * * * affected by any decision of the administrative officer' whereas the 1964 statute providing for an appeal to the superior court authorizes an appeal by '(a)ny person or persons severally or jointly aggrieved by any decision of the board.' Ga.L.1957, pp. 420, 429; 1964, pp. 259, 260; Code Ann. §§ 69-1211, 69-1211.1. 'It is presumed that the legislature knows and enacts statutes with reference to the existing law, including the decisions of the courts.' Buckhead Doctors' Building, Inc. v. Oxford Finance Companies, Inc. et al., 115 Ga.App. 52, 55, 153 S.E.2d 650. If the legislature in 1964 had intended to allow an appeal to the identical persons allowed an appeal to a board of zoning appeals under the 1957 statute, it would have been a simple matter to enact the 1964 amendment in language expressing such an intent, but instead the legislature expressly limited the appeal to the superior court to a person or persons 'aggrieved' by the board's decision, omitting any reference in terms of public officials or agencies 'affected' by a decision of the board. The words 'aggrieved' and 'affected' are not synonymous; only the former clearly denotes actual or potential injury. Accordingly, we think an appeal to the superior court is limited to an 'aggrieved' person within the meaning of this term as construed by the courts at the time of the 1964 amendment. In 1960 this court, in determining the meaning of the term 'substantial interest' in a 1946 statute held that such term is synonymous with 'aggrieved' as used in similar statutes in other jurisdictions, and that for one to show a substantial interest (i.e., that he is an aggrieved...