Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Nashville

• Decision Date: 10 November 2015
• Citation: 477 S.W.3d 750
• Parties: The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. The Board of Zoning Appeals of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

477 S.W.3d 750

The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee

v.The Board of Zoning Appeals of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, AT NASHVILLE.

June 3, 2015 Session

Filed November 10, 2015

Garrett E. Asher and Jennifer C. Surber, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, CBS Outdoor, Inc.; Felix Z. Wilson II Revocable Living Trust; and Equitable Trust Company.

Saul Solomon, James L. Charles, Lora Barkenbus Fox, and Catherine J. Dundon, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee.

Richard L. Winchester, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, for the Amicus Curiae, Abbington Center.

JEFFREY S. BIVINS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SHARON G. LEE, C.J., and CORNELIA A. CLARK, GARY R. WADE, and HOLLY KIRBY, JJ., joined.

OPINION

JEFFREY S. BIVINS, J.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee ("Metro") has standing to file a petition for a writ of certiorari against The Board of Zoning Appeals of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee ("BZA") in chancery court in order to challenge a BZA decision. We hold that Metro does have standing in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, and this matter is remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Factual and Procedural History

In March 2012, CBS Outdoor, Inc. ("CBS") applied to the Davidson County Metropolitan Department of Codes and Building Safety for two permits, one to replace a static display billboard with a digital display billboard, and the second to add a digital display to an existing static display billboard. The Zoning Administrator denied the permits. CBS appealed the Zoning Administrator's decision to the BZA. On a four to two vote, the BZA overturned the Zoning Administrator's decision and granted the permits.

On June 25, 2012, Metro timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the chancery court of Davidson County seeking the court's review of the BZA's order ("the Petition"). As respondents, Metro named the BZA, CBS, Felix Z. Wilson II Revocable Living Trust ("Wilson Trust"), and Equitable Trust Company ("Equitable Trust"). The latter two parties own the real property which is leased to CBS and upon which CBS seeks to erect or add the digital billboards.

CBS and Wilson Trust filed a motion to dismiss the Petition pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) on the basis that Metro "does not have standing to bring suit seeking to review the final order of [Metro's] own Board." After a hearing, the chancery court granted the motion to dismiss. The chancery court reasoned as follows:

[I]f Metro disagrees with what its own board of zoning appeals likes or dislikes, it can decide on an ad hoc basis of which of those decisions it's going to enforce, which of those decisions it disagrees with and will seek to overturn. There are plenty of avenues by which decisions of the board of zoning appeals are subject to the council's decision. Which, in essence, represents the Metropolitan Government's authority to control what happens in Nashville. They pass all sorts of enactments.

The chancery court also determined that Metro had failed to allege the specific injury necessary to confer standing on a litigant.

Metro sought review of the chancery court's ruling, and the Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court, holding that Metro had the requisite standing to bring this action. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No. M2013–01283–COA–R3–CV, 2014 WL 4364852, at *1 (Tenn.Ct.App. Sept. 3, 2014) (" Metro v. BZA "). CBS, Wilson Trust, and Equitable Trust (collectively "the Permittees")¹ sought permission to appeal to this Court. We granted permission to appeal to address two issues: (1) whether Metro has standing to seek the chancery court's review of the BZA's decision, and (2) whether Metro had the requisite authority to file the Petition.²

Standard of Review

A respondent to a petition for writ of certiorari may file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) based upon the petitioner's lack of standing. See Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn.1976). "A Rule 12.02(6) motion challenges only the legal sufficiency of the [petition], not the strength of the plaintiff's proof or evidence." Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn.2011). Accordingly, for the purposes of this proceeding, the Permittees have admitted "the truth of all of the relevant and material allegations contained in the [petition]." Leach v. Taylor, 124 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Tenn.2004).

A trial court should not dismiss a petition pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) unless it appears that the plaintiff cannot prove the facts necessary to support its claim and warrant relief. Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tenn.1999). On appeal, a trial court's decision to dismiss a petition for failure to state a claim creates a question of law which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id.

Analysis

Allegations of the Petition

Because of the procedural posture of this matter, we deem it helpful to recite, in pertinent part, certain of Metro's allegations set forth in the Petition:

14. The BZA's decisions [to grant the permits] are contrary to law and should be reversed, or, in the alternative, the case should be remanded to the BZA for a correct consideration of the issues.

15. The BZA's decisions of April 26, 2012 would allow a permit for billboards in violation of the Metropolitan Government's zoning code, specifically the distance requirements of M.C.L. § 17.32.050(G) and M.C.L. § 17.32.150(B).³

16. CBS Outdoor, Inc. did not present (and cannot present) a proper justification under the local zoning code or under state law (e.g., T.C.A. § 13–7–208 or other law) for its position that it is not subject to the distance requirements of the Metropolitan Code.

17. The Metropolitan Government is an aggrieved party as contemplated under T.C.A. § 27–9–101 because the BZA's April 26, 2012 decision now interferes with the Metropolitan Government's ability to fulfill its obligations under the local zoning code (which, in turn, is authorized by the state enabling statutes as well as the Metro Charter), in that the distance requirements cannot be enforced at these sites.

18. For the same reasons, the BZA's decision, if left in place, will have a substantial, direct, and adverse effect on the Metropolitan Government in its corporate capacity.

We now turn to our analysis of whether Metro has established its standing to pursue the Petition.

Standing

As this Court previously has recognized:

The doctrine of standing is used to determine whether a particular plaintiff is entitled to judicial relief. Knierim, 542 S.W.2d at 808. It is the principle that courts use to determine whether a party has a sufficiently personal stake in a matter at issue to warrant a judicial resolution of the dispute. SunTrust Bank, Nashville v. Johnson, 46 S.W.3d 216, 222 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000). Persons whose rights or interests have not been affected have no standing and are, therefore, not entitled to judicial relief. Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384, 395 (Tenn.2006).

"The sort of distinct and palpable injury that will create standing must be an injury to a recognized legal right or interest." Wood v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 196 S.W.3d 152, 158 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005). Such a legal right or interest may, but not must, be created or defined by statute. "[I]n cases where a party is seeking to vindicate a statutory right of interest, the doctrine of standing requires the party to demonstrate that its claim falls within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statute in question." Id. (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998) ).

State v. Harrison, 270 S.W.3d 21, 27–28 (Tenn.2008) (some citations shortened); see also West v. Schofield, 468 S.W.3d 482, 489–90 (Tenn.2015) (recognizing that Tennessee's doctrine of justiciability, including the concept of standing, mirrors the federal courts' and limits judicial decisions to legal controversies involving real and existing disputes that are not theoretical or abstract and are between parties with real and adverse interests).

Significantly, we do not consider the likelihood of the plaintiff's success on the merits of its petition in determining whether the plaintiff has standing. Wood, 196 S.W.3d at 158. However, we must carefully examine a petition's allegations "to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted." Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) ).

In this case, Metro is seeking relief pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27–9–101. Accordingly, we focus our standing inquiry "on considerations of judicial restraint, such as whether a complaint raises generalized questions more properly addressed by another branch of the government, and questions of statutory interpretation, such as whether a statute designates who may bring a cause of action or creates a limited zone of interests." City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 98 (Tenn.2013). Moreover, "[w]hen a statute creates a cause of action and designates who may bring an action, the issue of standing is interwoven with that of subject matter jurisdiction and becomes a jurisdictional prerequisite." Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tenn.2004).

Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27–9–101

Metro filed the Petition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27–9–101, which provides as follows:

Anyone who may be aggrieved by any final order or judgment of any board or commission functioning under the laws of this state may have the order or judgment reviewed by

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