City of Iowa City v. Westinghouse Learning Corp., 60091
| Decision Date | 19 April 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 60091,60091 |
| Citation | 264 N.W.2d 771 |
| Parties | 17 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 741, 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8478 CITY OF IOWA CITY et al., Appellants, v. WESTINGHOUSE LEARNING CORPORATION, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Angela Ryan, Asst. City Atty., Iowa City, for appellants.
Ahlers, Cooney, Dorweiler, Haynie & Smith, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by MOORE, C. J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, LeGRAND, and REYNOLDSON, JJ.
This is an appeal from an order sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' petition asking for relief from certain discriminatory practices by defendant Westinghouse Learning Corporation. The trial court held the Iowa City ordinance under which the action was brought was invalid. Plaintiffs appeal and we affirm.
The suit was brought by the city of Iowa City and Mary Akin. The petition stated it was a class action started for the benefit of persons similarly situated who are "so numerous that it is impractical to join them all." For convenience, we refer to the defendant as Westinghouse and to all the plaintiffs simply as the city.
Stated briefly, the petition alleges that defendant's insurance program for its employees excludes benefits for disability resulting from pregnancy, childbirth, or complications therefrom. This is alleged to be a prohibited discriminatory act based on sex under the city's human relations ordinance.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on a number of grounds, one of which is as follows:
"The ordinance is invalid for the reason that it is inconsistent with the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, Code of Iowa, Ch. 601A, and is therefore beyond the authority of the municipality."
The trial court dismissed the motion on this ground. We believe the trial court was right, and we limit our discussion to that single issue.
Perhaps we should first state what this case is not about. There is no dispute concerning the city's authority to create a local human rights commission. We recognized such authority in Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission v. Cedar Rapids Community School District, 222 N.W.2d 391, 399 (Iowa 1974). There we said the city's authority came both from the 1968 Home Rule Amendment to the Iowa Constitution (Art. III, § 38A) and from the Iowa Civil Rights Act itself (§ 601A.17, The Code).
The pertinent provision of the constitutional amendment states:
"Municipal corporations are granted home rule power and authority, not inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly, to determine their local affairs and government * * * ."
Section 601A.17 contains this:
"Nothing contained in any provision of this chapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the general assembly to occupy the field in which this chapter operates to the exclusion of local laws not inconsistent with this chapter that deal with the same subject matter."
In considering this matter, we said in the Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission case, 222 N.W.2d at 399:
"It is the conclusion of this court a city has the authority under home rule power and under § 601A.12, The Code (now § 601A.17), to create this type of commission, assuming adequate standards and guidelines govern the delegation of any quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative powers."
Acting upon this conceded authority, the city adopted an ordinance providing for a local civil rights commission (Ch. 10.2, Municipal Code of Iowa City). The narrow issue before us is whether this ordinance is inconsistent with Ch. 601A, The Code. If it is, it may not stand.
Chapter 601A establishes a complete and comprehensive legislative plan for processing complaints concerning discriminatory practices. It provides for the filing of a complaint, preliminary investigation to determine probable cause, efforts to conciliate, notice and hearing, and, finally, an appropriate order on the merits of the cause. See § 601A.14. The chapter (§ 601A.15) then authorizes judicial review of the administrative order.
We believe this detailed, complete and all-embracing enactment discloses the clear legislative intent to vest in an administrative body the original duty and power to determine the existence of discriminatory practices, removing that function from the courts except for review purposes.
In disclaiming any purpose to pre-empt the field by authorizing the establishment of local commissions, the legislature attached the condition that any action taken under § 601A.17 must "not (be) inconsistent with this chapter." We hold this to mean any municipal plan must be faithful to the legislative scheme adopted by the General Assembly in Chapter 601A.
The ordinance now before us violates this mandate. It provides for the filing of a complaint, investigation to determine probable cause, and conciliation. §§ 10.2.13-10.2.18. At this point, the ordinance repudiates the underlying purpose of the legislature by transferring to the courts the task of originally deciding whether a discriminatory practice exists. This is precisely what the legislature sought to avoid by making...
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