City of Madisonville v. Hernandez

• Decision Date: 07 December 2022
• Docket Number: 10-22-00151-CV
• Parties: CITY OF MADISONVILLE, Appellant v. IVAN ARISTIDES CRUZ HERNANDEZ, ANDREW DIAZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF APOLO ESTRADA DIAZ, AND MARIA DIAZ, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF APOLO ESTRADA DIAZ, Appellees
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

1

CITY OF MADISONVILLE, Appellant v. IVAN ARISTIDES CRUZ HERNANDEZ, ANDREW DIAZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF APOLO ESTRADA DIAZ, AND MARIA DIAZ, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF APOLO ESTRADA DIAZ, Appellees

No. 10-22-00151-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Tenth District

December 7, 2022

From the 278th District Court Madison County, Texas Trial Court No. 21-17145

Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Johnson, and Justice Smith

MEMORANDUM OPINION

STEVE SMITH, JUSTICE

In one issue, appellant, the City of Madisonville ("City"), challenges the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss filed under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a asserting that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

Background

In the early morning hours of June 14, 2021, a crash occurred at the Madisonville Municipal Airport after an aircraft struck trees near the runway on the airport grounds during an attempted nighttime landing. The pilot of the aircraft, Apolo Estrada Diaz, was killed on impact, but the passenger, Ivan Aristides Cruz Hernandez, who is an appellee in this case, survived. Hernandez sustained extensive bodily injuries as a result of the crash.

Hernandez filed suit against the City, among others. In his live pleading, Hernandez asserted a premises-defect claim against the City. Specifically, Hernandez contended that the City was grossly negligent for poorly maintaining vegetation and for failing to provide sufficient lighting near the runway. Hernandez alleged that the City: (1) create unsafe conditions for landing; (2) failed to maintain the airport and associated equipment in a reasonably safe manner; (3) failed to properly repair and maintain the landing area at the airport; (4) failed to inspect the municipal airport to uncover and eliminate unreasonably dangerous conditions; (5) hired and maintained employees that were unqualified to operate and maintain the airport facilities; (6) failed to maintain a reasonably safe premises; (7) failed to warn of and/or eliminate unreasonably dangerous premises conditions and (9) failed to adhere to federal, state, local and municipal codes, statutes, and rules applicable to the maintenance and operation of an airport. Hernandez also argued that the City's immunity was waived by the Texas Tort Claims Act ("TTCA").

In response, the City filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 91a arguing that Hernandez's claims should be dismissed as not having any basis in law or in fact because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case based on Hernandez's failure to demonstrate a waiver of immunity under the TTCA for any claim.^[1] The City also contended that the Recreational Use Statute applies, and that Hernandez failed to plead facts demonstrating the City breached a duty owed to a licensee.

The trial court initially granted the City's Rule 91a motion to dismiss. However, the trial court reconsidered and ultimately denied the City's Rule 91a motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the City filed its notice of interlocutory appeal.

Appellate Jurisdiction

The City filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, and the trial court's order states that "The City of Madisonville's Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 91a is denied." The characterization of the City's motion and the trial court's subsequent denial is important because nothing permits an interlocutory appeal of a denial of a Rule 91a motion to dismiss. See Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014; Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001) (noting that a party may not appeal an interlocutory order unless authorized by statute); Koenig v. Blaylock, 497 S.W.3d 595, 598 n.4 (Tex. App.- Austin 2016, pet. denied) (observing that no statute permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a Rule 91a motion); see also S. Cent. Houston Action v. Stewart, No. 14-15-00088-CV, 2015 Tex.App. LEXIS 3084, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 31, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (holding that an appellate court has no jurisdiction over an interlocutory order denying a Rule 91a motion to dismiss); cf. In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (holding that a denial of a Rule 91a motion to dismiss is subject to mandamus review).

However, despite the foregoing, several Texas courts have determined that an order denying a Rule 91a motion to dismiss may be the subject of an interlocutory appeal if its component rulings fall within the categories of appeals authorized by section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014; see also Bass v. Waller Cnty. Sub-Regional Planning Comm'n, 514 S.W.3d 908, 912 & n.14 (Tex. App.-Austin 2017, no pet.) (noting that "the Legislature has thus far not seen fit to authorize-at least categorically-appeal of interlocutory orders . . . denying Rule 91a motions" but that such orders "can conceivably include component rulings that have been made appealable").

In its Rule 91a motion to dismiss, the City asserted that Hernandez's claims lacked a basis in law or in fact because Hernandez failed to plead facts establishing a waiver of the City's immunity under the TTCA and the Recreational Use Statute. The City further asserted that because Hernandez's pleadings do not establish a waiver of the City's immunity, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. In its brief, the City construes its Rule 91a motion to dismiss as a plea to the jurisdiction, and at oral argument, the City contended that this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (providing for an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a plea to the jurisdiction filed by a governmental unit).

The Texas Supreme Court "considers 'plea to the jurisdiction' not to refer to a 'particular procedural vehicle,' but rather to the substance of the issue raised." City of Magnolia 4A Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Smedley, 533 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (noting also that immunity from suit implicates subject-matter jurisdiction and is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction (citing Dep't of Crim. Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 349 (Tex. 2004)). Furthermore, a few Texas courts have construed a denial of a Rule 91a motion to dismiss that challenged the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction as a plea to the jurisdiction under section 51.014(a)(8) for the purpose of affording the governmental unit the right to an interlocutory appeal. See San Jacinto River Auth. v. Lewis, 572 S.W.3d 838, 839-40 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (per curiam); City of Austin v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 431 S.W.3d 817, 822 (Tex. App.-Austin 2014, no pet.); see also City of Houston v. Gonzales, No. 14-19-00768-CV, 2021 Tex.App. LEXIS 5017, at **2-3 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 24, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Because we look to the substance of the City's Rule 91a motion and not the title of the motion, and because the City's Rule 91a motion to dismiss challenges the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction over this appeal from the denial of the City's Rule 91a motion to dismiss under section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8); City of Magnolia 4A Econ. Dev. Corp., 533 S.W.3d at 299; Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004) ("If the trial court denies the governmental entity's claim of no jurisdiction, whether it has been asserted by a plea to the jurisdiction, a motion for summary judgment, or otherwise, the Legislature has provided that an interlocutory appeal may be brought.")^[2]; San Jacinto River Auth., 572 S.W.3d at 839-40; City of Austin, 431 S.W.3d at 822; see also City of Houston, 2021 Tex.App. LEXIS 5017, at **2-3.

Standards of Review and Applicable Law

PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court's jurisdiction to decide a case. City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013). A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d at 638; see TitleMax of Tex., Inc. v. City of Austin 639 S.W.3d 240, 245 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.). The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019).

If a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we liberally construe the pleadings to determine if the plaintiff has "alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause." Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). If the plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, which also implicate the merits of the case, "we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties to determine if a fact issue exists." Suarez v. City of Tex. City, 465 S.W.3d 623, 632-33 (Tex. 2015). "We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulge every reasonable inference, and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor." Id. at 633. "If the evidence creates a fact question regarding jurisdiction, the plea must be denied pending resolution of the fact issue by the fact finder." Id. "If the evidence fails to raise a question of fact, however, the plea to the jurisdiction must be granted as a matter of law." Id.; see Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226-28 (Tex. 2004).

We review a trial court's ruling...