City of Maumee v. Gabriel

• Decision Date: 27 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-406,87-406
• Citation: 35 Ohio St.3d 60,518 N.E.2d 558
• Parties: CITY OF MAUMEE, Appellant, v. GABRIEL, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 60

35 Ohio St.3d 60

518 N.E.2d 558

CITY OF MAUMEE, Appellant, v. GABRIEL, Appellee.

No. 87-406.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Jan. 27, 1988.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles' procedures implementing the Nonresident Violator Compact of 1977, R.C. 4511.95, satisfy due process requirements by providing a postlicense suspension hearing.

2. A postsuspension hearing, if requested pursuant to the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles' procedures, is mandatory.

On April 2, 1986, Gary E. Gabriel (hereinafter "Gabriel") was issued a citation by the Maumee Police Department for operating a vehicle while his operator's license was under suspension. ¹ Gabriel's license had been suspended pursuant to the Nonresident Violator Compact of 1977 (hereinafter "Compact"), R.C. 4511.95, when Gabriel did not appear in court pursuant to an earlier traffic citation received in Kentucky.

The Ohio citation included a summons for Gabriel to appear before the Maumee Municipal Court on April 15, 1986. The trial date was subsequently moved to May 6, 1986.

Gabriel filed a motion to dismiss with the municipal court on April 9, 1986. In his motion, Gabriel urged the court to declare unconstitutional the procedures used by the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter "BMV") to suspend one's driver's license. The questioned procedures permit the BMV to suspend one's driver's license without a presuspension hearing. A postsuspension hearing is permitted, however, upon written request. Gabriel argued that this procedure contravenes the due process provisions of the Constitution of the United States and the due course of law provisions of the Ohio Constitution. Gabriel asked the court to dismiss the charge of operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended and overturn his suspension based on the unconstitutionality of the BMV procedures. The motion to dismiss was denied. Thereupon, Gabriel pleaded no contest and was found guilty of driving under suspension.

The court of appeals reversed the municipal court's ruling. The majority held the administrative suspension of a person's driver's license by the BMV pursuant to R.C. 4511.95 violates Section 7, Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution to the extent that no presuspension hearing was provided, ² and reversed Gabriel's conviction of driving under suspension.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Sheilah H. McAdams and Kathryn A. Reckley, Toledo, for appellant.

Gary E. Gabriel, Toledo, pro se.

WRIGHT, Justice.

The principal issue presented in this action is whether an administrative suspension of a person's driver's license without a prior hearing violates due process. We find it does not.

The Compact is a uniform Act adopted by at least thirty-seven states. ³ The purpose of the Compact is to remove dangerous and uncooperative drivers from the road and to allow a nonresident motorist to accept a traffic citation for minor infractions and proceed without the entanglements of posting bond or being taken directly to court for trial. ⁴

A careful reading of the Compact reveals it does not state what kind of suspension hearing is to be provided for individuals who do not resolve out-of-state citations. The Compact provides in pertinent part:

"Article IV, Procedures for Home Jurisdiction

"(A) Upon receipt of a report of a failure to comply from the licensing authority of the issuing jurisdiction, the licensing authority of the home jurisdiction shall notify the motorist and initiate a suspension action, in accordance with the home jurisdiction's procedures, to suspend the motorist's driver's license until satisfactory evidence of compliance with the terms of the traffic citation has been furnished to the home jurisdiction licensing authority. Due process safeguards will be accorded."

Because the Compact specifically provides that suspension procedures must be followed pursuant to the home jurisdiction's procedures, the constitutionality of the Compact itself is technically not in question. Rather, Gabriel's due process complaint challenges the validity of the procedures that implement the suspension hearing. We now turn our attention to those procedures.

The BMV adopted procedures to implement the Compact in Ohio Department of Highway Safety Bureau of Motor Vehicles[,] Nonresident Violator Compact Procedures (hereinafter "BMV procedures"), effective January 1, 1985. Part V of the BMV procedures provides: "In keeping with the due process safeguards within the Compact a motorist * * * has the option of requesting a show cause hearing with the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles." ⁵ (Emphasis sic.)

The BMV procedures thus provide for a postsuspension hearing. Gabriel contends he is guaranteed a presuspension hearing by due process. Our interpretation of the applicable case precedent leads us to conclude the BMV's stated procedures satisfy due process.

In Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, the United States Supreme Court set forth the criteria used to determine whether administrative procedures conform with due process. According to the court:

"[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id. at 334-335, 96 S.Ct. at 902-903.

The Mathews case specifically involved the termination of Social Security disability benefits by administrative procedures. The balancing test is, nevertheless, applicable to other administrative adjudications. Therefore, we must balance the factors set forth in Mathews to decide whether Gabriel has been denied his due process rights.

The private interest affected is, of course, a license to operate a motor vehicle. The Supreme Court previously has held a driver's license is not so great a privilege as to require a departure " 'from the ordinary principle * * * that something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.' " Dixon v. Love (1977), 431 U.S. 105, 113, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 1728, 52 L.Ed.2d 172, citing to Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. at 907. We agree with this reasoning and find that the right to possess a driver's license is not a substantial private interest. ⁶

According to the second Mathews factor, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of an operator's license absent a presuspension hearing must be determined. According to the appellant, the issuing jurisdiction obtains the identity of the violator directly from the motorist. If the citation is not resolved, the issuing jurisdiction forwards the information directly to the home jurisdiction. The home jurisdiction subsequently contacts the violator and informs him that his license has been suspended.

In any bureaucratic undertaking, there remains a possibility of clerical error. However, we do not believe the risk of error is high enough to outweigh the interests of the state, discussed below. Furthermore, the appellee fails to show any additional or substitute procedures that would reduce this risk.

The stated governmental interests to be considered pursuant to the third Mathews factor are to insure compliance with the terms of an issued citation and to remove from the road those drivers who fail to obey the procedural laws or regulations of the respective jurisdictions. R.C. 4511.95 (Article I). We consider the stated interests to be substantial.

A...