State v. Hochhausler

• Decision Date: 30 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-1365,95-1365
• Citation: 668 N.E.2d 457,76 Ohio St.3d 455
• Parties: , 65 USLW 2159 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. HOCHHAUSLER et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 455

76 Ohio St.3d 455

668 N.E.2d 457, 65 USLW 2159

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. HOCHHAUSLER et al., Appellants.

No. 95-1365.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Feb. 7, 1996.

Decided July 30, 1996.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. The administrative license suspension provisions of R.C. 4511.191 do not violate the right to procedural due process.

2. The "no stay" provision of R.C. 4511.191(H)(1) is unconstitutional as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers and is severable from the rest of the statute.

3. R.C. 4511.195 is unconstitutional as applied to the owner of a vehicle that has been seized and immobilized because the vehicle was being operated by a third person when that person was arrested on a drunk-driving charge.

On December 3, 1993, appellant Thomas J. Hochhausler was arrested and charged with his second offense within five years of driving while intoxicated in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A). Hochhausler's consent to a breath-alcohol test resulted in a reading of .105 grams of alcohol by weight per two hundred ten liters of breath. Pursuant to R.C. 4511.191(F)(2), the police immediately placed Hochhausler under an administrative license suspension ("ALS") for a period of one year.

At the time of the arrest, Hochhausler was driving a Ford pick-up truck owned by appellant Omni Fireproofing, Inc. ("Omni"). Omni is a closely held corporation in which Hochhausler is the president and majority shareholder. The vehicle was seized and the license plates were impounded pursuant to R.C. 4511.195.

On December 9, at his initial appearance before the trial court, Hochhausler entered a plea of not guilty and made the following motions: (1) to dismiss the ALS on the ground that the suspension violated the Ohio and United States Constitutions; (2) to appeal the ALS pursuant to R.C. 4511.191(H)(1); and (3) to stay the ALS pending appeal. An employee of Omni also appeared at the hearing and moved the trial court to release the seized vehicle pursuant to R.C. 4511.195(C)(2)(a). Subsequently, on December 14, the trial court denied all four motions.

On December 16, Hochhausler appealed the denial of his motions to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, arguing that R.C. 4511.191(H)(1) unconstitutionally infringes upon both the doctrine of separation of powers by denying

jurisdiction to any court to stay an ALS suspension, and the right to procedural due process by failing to provide a prompt and meaningful postdeprivation hearing. Likewise, on December 20, Omni appealed the denial of its motion to regain possession of its motor vehicle, arguing that R.C. 4511.195 violates the right to procedural due process

The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that R.C. 4511.191(H)(1) and 4511.195 do not violate the Due Process Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. Further, the court of appeals interpreted the "no stay" provision of R.C. 4511.191(H)(1) as "merely prohibiting a municipal court, county court, mayor's court or other court of original jurisdiction from staying a license suspension imposed under R.C. 4511.191(E) or (F) pending an ALS appeal." In order to preserve the constitutionality of the statute, the court of appeals interpreted the "no stay" provision as not precluding a court of appeals or the Ohio Supreme Court from staying an administrative license suspension pending appeal. Finally, the court of appeals reversed the dismissal of Hochhausler's ALS appeal and remanded the cause for a hearing on the ALS pursuant to R.C. 4511.191(H). Both Hochhausler and Omni appealed the adverse judgments to this court.

[668 N.E.2d 462] This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

Timothy A. Oliver, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, Carolyn A. Duvelius, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney; Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Jeffery S. Sutton, State Solicitor, Susan E. Ashbrook and Andrew S. Bergman, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

Rittgers & Mengle, W. Andrew Hasselbach and Charles H. Rittgers, Lebanon, for appellants.

Baker & Hostetler, Richard W. Siehl and Anthony J. Franze, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Mothers Against Drunk Driving.

Baker & Hostetler, William W. Falsgraf and Shilpa Shah, Cleveland, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities.

James M. Looker, Cincinnati, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Gump & Slyman Co., L.P.A., Jeffrey D. Slyman and Dennis E. Gump, Trotwood, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers.

MOYER, Chief Justice.

In this case, we are asked to determine several issues relating to the constitutionality of R.C. 4511.191 and 4511.195.

It is a well-settled rule that an Act of the General Assembly is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality. Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163. Moreover, challenged legislation will not be invalidated unless the challenger establishes the unconstitutional nature of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt. Hilton v. Toledo (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 394, 396, 16 O.O.3d 430, 431, 405 N.E.2d 1047, 1049. We apply these principles to both appeals.

I R.C. 4511.191--Procedural Due Process

Hochhausler argues that the administrative suspension of his driver's license pursuant to R.C. 4511.191(F) is unconstitutional because the statute permits the suspension to occur without due process of law.

R.C. 4511.191(F) provides:

"Upon receipt of the sworn report of an arresting officer completed and sent to the registrar and a court pursuant to divisions (D)(1)(c) and (D)(2) of this section in regard to a person whose test results indicate that his blood contained a concentration of ten-hundredths of one per cent or more by weight of alcohol, his breath contained a concentration of ten-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of his breath, or his urine contained a concentration of fourteen-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of his urine at the time of the alleged offense, the registrar shall enter into his records the fact that the person's driver's or commercial driver's license or permit or nonresident operating privilege was suspended by the arresting officer under division (D)(1)(a) of this section and the period of the suspension, as determined under divisions (F)(1) to (4) of this section. The suspension shall be subject to appeal as provided in this section and shall be for whichever of the following periods that applies:

"(1) If the person has not been convicted, within five years of the date the test was conducted of a violation of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code, * * * the period of the suspension or denial shall be ninety days.

"(2) If the person has been convicted, within five years of the date the test was conducted, of one violation of a statute or ordinance described in division (F)(1) of this section, the period of the suspension or denial shall be one year.

"(3) If the person has been convicted, within five years of the date the test was conducted, of two violations of a statute or ordinance described in division (F)(1) of this section, the period of the suspension or denial shall be two years.

"(4) If the person has been convicted, within five years of the date the test was conducted, of more than two violations of a [668 N.E.2d 463] statute or ordinance described in

division (F)(1) of this section, the period of the suspension or denial shall be three years."

R.C. 4511.191(H)(1) permits a person to appeal the administrative license suspension at the initial appearance on the underlying DUI charge, which must be held within five days of arrest. Division (H)(1) further provides that the only issues that may be raised in an ALS appeal are:

"(a) Whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable ground to believe the arrested person was operating a vehicle * * * while under the influence * * * or with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in the blood, breath, or urine and whether the arrested person was in fact placed under arrest;

"(b) Whether the law enforcement officer requested the arrested person to submit to the chemical test * * *;

"(c) Whether the arresting officer informed the arrested person of the consequences of refusing to be tested or of submitting to the test;

"(d) Whichever of the following is applicable:

"(i) Whether the arrested person refused to submit to the chemical test requested by the officer;

"(ii) Whether the chemical test results indicate that [the arrestee's blood, breath, or urine contain alcohol in excess of the statutory limits.]" R.C. 4511.191(H)(1)(a) through (d).

Due process under the Ohio and United States Constitutions demands that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner where the state seeks to infringe a protected liberty or property interest. Greene v. Lindsey (1982), 456 U.S. 444, 102 S.Ct. 1874, 72 L.Ed.2d 249; Boddie v. Connecticut (1971), 401 U.S. 371, 378, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113; Williams v. Dollison (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 297, 299, 16 O.O.3d 350, 351, 405 N.E.2d 714, 716. However, the concept of due process is flexible and varies depending on the importance attached to the interest and the particular circumstances under which the deprivation may occur. Walters v. Natl. Assn. of Radiation Survivors (1985), 473 U.S. 305, 320, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 3189, 87 L.Ed.2d 220, 232.

It is well settled that the Due Process Clause applies to the suspension or revocation of a driver's license. Dixon v. Love (1977), 431 U.S. 105, 112, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 1727, 52 L.Ed.2d 172, 179-180; Bell v. Burson (1971), 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d 90, 94; Maumee v. Gabriel (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 60, 518 N.E.2d 558. Accordingly, we proceed to determine whether the procedural...