City of Pensacola v. King

• Decision Date: 28 February 1950
• Citation: 47 So.2d 317
• Parties: CITY OF PENSACOLA v. KING et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 317

47 So.2d 317

CITY OF PENSACOLA v. KING et al.

Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.

Feb. 28, 1950.

On Rehearing July 18, 1950.

Ausley, Collins & Truett, Tallahassee, for relator.

Lewis W. Petteway, Tallahassee, D. Fred McMullen, Tampa, and Guyte P. McCord, Jr., Tallahassee, for respondents.

TERRELL, Justice.

Pursuant to Section 323.03, F.S. 1941, F.S.A., Yellow Cab and Rental Company of Pensacola, Inc., applied to the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate as a common carrier of passengers between the City of Pensacola and designated points in the adjoining suburban territory. The Commission scheduled a hearing on the application. The City of Pensacola then applied for writ of prohibition from this Court to enjoin the Commission from entertaining said application or proceeding with the scheduled hearing. There was a motion to strike and a return to the suggestion for writ of prohibition. Both challenge the validity of Chapter 24806, Acts of 1947.

The preliminary question presented is whether or not the Commission can lawfully challenge the constitutional validity of Chapter 24806.

Section 35, Article V of the Constitution, F.S.A., authorizes the legislature to clothe the Commission with judicial powers in 'all matters connected with the functions of their office.' Such an authorization would not permit the Commission to adjudicate the constitutional validity of Chapter 24806 and so far as the record discloses, it has not attempted to do so, nor has it expressed any intention so to do. It called a hearing on the application of Yellow Cab and Rental Company but the city brought this proceeding in prohibition before the date set for the hearing arrived. There is certainly no reason why the Commission should not proceed to the consideration and administration of other matters scheduled for the hearing.

The circumstances under which an executive or an administrative officer may challenge the constitutional validity of a legislative act has provoked a great deal of litigation in this country. In State ex rel. Harrell v. Cone, 130 Fla. 158, 177 So. 854, this Court held that if such an act requires an officer to perform duties affecting him personally or imposes duties on him that he fears will cause him to violate his oath of office, or where he is charged with the control and disbursement of public funds, his official capacity gives him an interest in its execution that he may challenge the validity of the act.

In Steele v. Freel et al., 157 Fla. 223, 25 So.2d 501, we held the rule to be well settled in this jurisdiction that a ministerial officer may not question the constitutionality of a legislative act without a showing that he will be injured in person, property or some material right by its enforcement. The Cone case points out other conditions under which a ministerial officer may raise the constitutionality of an act of the legislature. State ex. rel. Florida Portland Cement Co. v. Hale, 129 Fla. 588, 176 So. 577, points out another case in which it may be done.

Section 350.63, F.S. 1941, F.S.A., clothes the Commission with such judicial powers as are essential to enforce or perform any function, duty or power conferred upon them as Commission. It appears that for the purpose of the act, Chapter 24806, among other things, authorizes the Commission to determine that a greater or lesser area then ten miles from the corporate limits of the city constitutes its adjoining suburban territory. To determine this and perhaps other questions, it may become necessary for the Commission to have a hearing requiring the expenditure of public funds. The Commission may determine when it is necessary to conduct a hearing for this or any other purpose contemplated by the law and we think these are such as to bring it within the rule stated and authorize it to challenge the validity of the Act.

The crucial question in the case is whether or not Chapter 24806, Acts of 1947, is constitutional.

Chapter 24806 authorizes the City of Pensacola to regulate firms, corporations and auto transportation companies operating motor vehicles, other than taxicabs, engaged in the business of transporting passengers within the corporate limits of the city and in the adjoining territory. The adjoining suburban territory is defined as that within a distance of ten miles from the corporate limits of the city, unless a different determination is made by the Commission, such determination to be subject to judicial review. The authority and jurisdiction of the city in this does not impair the power of the Commission to regulate the business of transporting passengers to or from points outside said suburban territory to and from fixed terminals within the city and the adjoining suburban territory.

It is first contended that Chapter 24806 is a local law, violative of Sections 20 and 21, Article III of the Constitution in that it regulates the duties and jurisdiction of a class of officers other than municipal officers. In fine, the Commission contends that the effect of Chapter 24806 is to divest it of jurisdiction to regulate transportation in the area around Pensacola and vest that authority in the city. State ex rel. Reese v. Carter, 160 Fla. 180, 34 So.2d 35, is relied on to support this contention.

In State ex rel. Reese v. Carter this Court was confronted with Chapter 24992, Special Acts of 1947, which created a taxicab commission for the City of Tampa and clothed...