City of Richardson v. Bowman

• Decision Date: 27 June 2018
• Docket Number: No. 05-16-01126-CV,05-16-01126-CV
• Citation: 555 S.W.3d 670
• Parties: CITY OF RICHARDSON, Appellant v. Russell J. BOWMAN, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

555 S.W.3d 670

CITY OF RICHARDSON, Appellant

v.Russell J. BOWMAN, Appellee

No. 05-16-01126-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Opinion Filed June 27, 2018

Braden Metcalf, Peter G. Smith, Victoria Thomas, Nichols, Jackson, Dillard, Hager, and Smith, LLP, 500 N. Akard, Suite 1800, Dallas, TX 75201, for Appellant.

Russell J. Bowman, Attorney at Law, Scott A. Stewart, Law Office of Scott A. Stewart, 800 West Airport, Freeway, Suite 860, Irving, TX 75062-6287, for Appellee.

Before Justices Lang -Miers, Fillmore, and Stoddart

Opinion by Justice StoddartAfter receiving a notice of violation of the red light camera ordinance, Russell J. Bowman filed suit in district court to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance and for a declaration that the ordinance and enabling statute are unconstitutional. Alternatively, he alleged the City of Richardson failed to comply with the enabling statute when it installed the red light camera at issue. The City filed a partial plea to the jurisdiction and both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied the City’s partial plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment and granted Bowman’s motion.

The City appeals arguing (1) Bowman failed to exhaust administrative remedies on the claim for failure to comply with the enabling statute, (2) the City was not required to comply with the provision of the enabling statute cited by Bowman, and (3) the ordinance and enabling statute are constitutional. We conclude Bowman was required to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding compliance with the enabling statute and that the ordinance and enabling statute are constitutional. Accordingly, we vacate the denial of the partial plea to the jurisdiction, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and render judgment dismissing Bowman’s claim based on non-compliance with the enabling statute for want of jurisdiction and denying Bowman’s claim for a declaration that the ordinance and enabling statute are unconstitutional.

BACKGROUND

In 2005, the City entered into a contract with Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. to install the red light camera system involved in this case. In 2007, the Legislature enacted Chapter 707 of the transportation code authorizing municipalities to adopt red light camera systems. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 707.001 –.019 (West 2011 & Supp. 2017). Pursuant to this enabling statute, the City adopted a red light camera ordinance on September 10, 2007. Richardson, Tex., Code of Ordinances art. VII, §§ 22.185–.193 [hereinafter Ordinance]. For convenience, we refer to Chapter 707 and the Ordinance collectively as the Camera Laws. The Camera Laws provide that an owner has the right to contest the imposition of a civil penalty in an administrative adjudicative hearing. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 707.011(c)(10), .014; Ordinance §§ 22-187(c)(10), 22-189. The owner may appeal a finding of liability by the hearing officer to the municipal court for trial de novo. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 707.016 ; Ordinance § 22-191.

On November 12, 2012, a red light camera recorded Bowman’s vehicle entering an intersection when the traffic signal was red. According to his summary judgment evidence, Bowman did not know about the violation until December 1, 2014, when he was notified of a registration hold on his vehicle for failing to pay the civil penalty associated with the 2012 violation. Bowman contacted the City and received a notice of the November 12, 2012 violation on December 4, 2014.¹ The notice stated that, as owner of the vehicle, Bowman was responsible for a civil penalty of $75 and a $25 fee for late payment.

In response, on December 12, 2014, Bowman sent a letter to the City requesting an administrative hearing as authorized by section 707.015 of the transportation code.² Bowman requested that the hearing be before a jury and that the hearing officer declare Chapter 707 unconstitutional on several grounds. Bowman also requested the City produce several documents about the red light camera system, including an engineering study for the intersection at issue and reports to a citizens advisory committee.

Before an administrative hearing was scheduled, Bowman filed this suit for declaratory judgment and an injunction against enforcement of the Ordinance. Bowman sought a declaration that the Camera Laws and government code section 29.003(g) are unconstitutional.³ See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 29.003(g) (West Supp. 2017). In the alternative, Bowman alleged the City could not enforce the Ordinance against him because the City failed to comply with subsections 707.003(c) and (e), which require the City to conduct an engineering study and present the study to a citizens advisory committee before installing a red light camera. We refer to the alternative claims as the Compliance Claims.

The City filed a partial plea to the jurisdiction regarding the Compliance Claims. It argued the trial court did not have jurisdiction over those claims because Bowman failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by raising the claims with the hearing officer. In addition, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Without specifying the grounds for its decision, the trial court denied the City’s partial plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, granted Bowman’s motion for summary judgment, and rendered judgment that (1) Bowman is not liable for the civil penalty, (2) the City notify the department of motor vehicles to remove the registration hold on Bowman’s vehicle, and (3) Bowman recover attorney’s fees from the City.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts affirmatively showing the court’s jurisdiction. Id. We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiffs and look to the pleader’s intent. Id. When the parties submit evidence regarding the jurisdictional question, we consider the evidence under a summary judgment type standard. See id. at 228.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C. , 331 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2010). A party moving for traditional summary judgment has the burden to prove that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) ; Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). "When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor." Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett , 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).

When both parties move for summary judgment, each party bears the burden of establishing it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News , 22 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2000). When the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we review the summary judgment evidence presented by both parties and determine all questions presented. S. Crushed Concrete, LLC v. City of Houston , 398 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. 2013).

ANALYSIS

A. Plea to the Jurisdiction

In its first issue, the City argues Bowman failed to exhaust his administrative remedies relating to the Compliance Claims because the administrative hearing officer has exclusive jurisdiction to determine Bowman’s liability for the civil penalty. The City contends that because Bowman did not exhaust these administrative remedies, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider Bowman’s Compliance Claims and should have granted the partial plea to the jurisdiction. The City argues in its second issue that, if the trial court had jurisdiction over the Compliance Claims, the City was not required to comply with section 707.003 because the contract for the installation of the red light camera system was entered into before the effective date of Chapter 707.

1. Exclusive Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The concepts of exclusive jurisdiction and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies are closely related. When the Legislature expressly or impliedly grants an administrative agency sole authority to make an initial determination in a matter, the agency has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez , 487 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2016) ; Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc. , 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex. 2002). "[I]f an agency has exclusive jurisdiction, a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the agency’s action." Subaru of Am. , 84 S.W.3d at 221. This is commonly known as the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine. See Marquez , 487 S.W.3d at 544. Until a complaining party has exhausted administrative remedies, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss without prejudice those claims within the agency’s exclusive jurisdiction. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tex. v. Duenez , 201 S.W.3d 674, 675 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); Subaru of Am. , 84 S.W.3d at 221. Only after exhaustion has occurred may a plaintiff seek judicial review of the administrative decision, and then he may do so "only at the time and in the manner designated by statute." Cash Am. Int'l, Inc. v. Bennett , 35 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Tex. 2000).

An agency has exclusive jurisdiction when a pervasive regulatory scheme indicates that the Legislature "intended for the regulatory process to be the exclusive means of remedying the problem to which the regulation is addressed." In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co. , 235 S.W.3d 619, 624–25 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding); see also In re Entergy Corp. , 142 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) ("An agency has exclusive jurisdiction when the Legislature has granted that agency the sole authority to make an initial determination...