City of Sarasota v. Dixon

• Decision Date: 14 March 1941
• Citation: 1 So.2d 198,146 Fla. 369
• Parties: CITY OF SARASOTA et al. v. DIXON.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

1 So.2d 198

146 Fla. 369

CITY OF SARASOTA et al. v. DIXON.

Florida Supreme Court

March 14, 1941

Appeal from Circuit Court, Sarasota County; W. T Harrison, judge.

Frank Redd, of Sarasota, for appellants.

Tom W Butler and Paul C. Albritton, both of Sarasota, for appellee.

BUFORD, Justice.

On appeal we review decree in favor of plaintiff in a suit for accounting and to recover possession of property alleged to be owned by plaintiff and wrongfully withheld from him, for the reasonable rental value of the property for the period for which the property had been so wrongfully withheld and to enforce the payment of the amount so found to be due the plaintiff.

The Chancellor made the following findings of fact:

'1. That it has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter.

'2. That the motion to strike parts of the pleadings and to dismiss the bill of complaint, filed by the defendant Lessie J. Dixon, as Administratrix as aforesaid were overruled and denied; and the motion to dismiss the bill filed by said City of Sarasota was denied.

'3. That the plaintiff's motion to strike certain portions of the Answer of the defendant Lessie J. Dixon, as Administratrix as aforesaid, setting up a counter claim and setoff, was granted.

'4. That the Order dated July 11th, 1928, entered by this Court in the case of D. W. Dixon v. M. W. Dixon (#466, In Chancery) ordered the receiver to deliver up to the City of Sarasota the possession of: Lots 6 and 7, Block 'A' of the resubdivision of Payne Terminal, as recorded in Plat Book 2 page 206 of the public records of Sarasota County, Florida and this Order vested no title in the improvements placed thereon by Dixon Fish Company in the City of Sarasota; that the City of Sarasota never thereafter acquired any title to the improvements placed on said lands by the Dixon Fish Company; and now claims no interest in said buildings.

'5. That the City of Sarasota on the 18th day of June 1924, entered into a lease agreement with Dixon Fish Company, a partnership composed of M. W. Dixon and D. W. Dixon, one of the partners being the same M. W. Dixon who is plaintiff herein, leasing the following described lands, towit: Lots 6 and 7 of Block 'A' of C. N. Payne's Subdivision of Hog Creek Boat Basin, being a subdivision of the fractional part of Section 13, Township 36 South, Range 17 East, lying South of Hog Creek according to a plat thereof as same appears of record in Plat Book One page twenty of the public records of Sarasota County, Florida, to the Dixon Fish Company for a period of ten years from January 1st 1924, which lease provided among other things that the buildings and structures should belong to the Dixon Fish Company and that the lessee had the right to remove the buildings at the termination of the lease; that the said Dixon Fish Company had, prior to the execution of said lease, a similar lease agreement whereby the buildings constructed on the lands should belong to the lessee. And the court finds under the provisions of said lease that the Dixon Fish Company constructed buildings on the land which remained the property of the lessee, the Dixon Fish Company. That at the time the Dixon Fish Company went into the hands of the receiver in 1925 it was not in arrears for any rent. That the minutes of the City Council of the City of Sarasota under date of May 28 and July 2, 1928, show that A. W. Dixon, who was not a member of the Dixon Fish Company appeared before the City Council and sought to take over the lease of the Dixon Fish Company and represented to said City that he would make whatever arrangements were necessary with the Dixon Fish Company (of which he was not a member), that the Council acting on his promise and representation that the necessary arrangements would be made with the Dixon Fish Company, and being agreeable to his taking over the Dixon Fish Company lease under such circumstances caused the said Order of July 11th 1928 to be obtained, and in the further pursuance of this understanding and agreement, in A. W. Dixon taking over the partnership lease, the City entered into a new lease agreement with him for a period of five and a half years so that such lease would expire and terminate concurrently with the Dixon Fish Company's lease, towit: on December 31st, 1933.

'6. That A. W. Dixon had not prior to May 31st 1933, erected any buildings on the leased premises; and the recitation in that quit-claim deed executed on May 31st 1933, from the City of Sarasota to A. W. Dixon, reciting that A. W. Dixon had erected certain buildings on said lands with the understanding that said building would belong to him at the termination of said lease, was a false premise for he had erected no buildings thereon and the buildings then on the premises had been erected by his brothers, D. W. Dixon and M. W. Dixon, trading as Dixon Fish Company; and said quit-claim deed vested no interest in the buildings in said A. W. Dixon as against the rights of the plaintiff herein.

'7. That from all the circumstances and testimony before the Court it conclusively appears that the occupancy of A. W. Dixon in the building of the Dixon Fish Company and the lease tenure of A. W. Dixon in the land described from its inception up to the present time constituted a trust in A. W. Dixon for the owners of the property of the Dixon Fish Company and that Lessie J. Dixon as Administratrix of the estate of A. W. Dixon, deceased, occupies the same relation thereto as A. W. Dixon occupied during his lifetime. And it appears that no adverse claim was made to plaintiff by A. W. Dixon until after the dismissal of the partnership dissolution case of D. W. Dixon vs. M. W. Dixon in July, 1938.

'8. That this Court having by its Order of September 24th 1925, in Chancery case No. 466, wherein D. W. Dixon was plaintiff and M. W. Dixon was defendant, taken charge of the building erected in said leased premises as well as all personal property and effects of the Dixon Fish Company through the medium of a receiver, the said property including the said building remained in custodia legis until the dismissal of the said cause on the motion of this plaintiff, and the plaintiff had no right in and to the said building or the right of occupancy thereof until the dismissal of said cause.

'9. That the plaintiff is not entitled to rent for the buildings prior to the dismissal of the suit for the dissolution of the partnership; but is entitled to rent from the time that he demanded possession of the premises to-wit: from July 19th 1938, to date; and while the testimony shows a reasonable rental for the buildings would have been $50.00 per month; the Court taking into consideration the improvements placed thereon during the long term in which A. W. Dixon and his personal representative have wrongfully held possession of the premises, is of the opinion that $25.00 per month would be a reasonable rental for the buildings since July 19th 1938, as aforesaid, and that the amount due plaintiff by the defendant Lessie J. Dixon as Administratrix as aforesaid is $600.00 to July 19th 1940.

'10. That such improvements as have been made to the original buildings erected by the Dixon Fish Company so as to become attached thereto and are now a part thereof also now belong to the plaintiff without right of setoff in the defendant Lessie J. Dixon, as Administratrix of the Estate of A. W. Dixon, deceased.'

Following such findings of facts, the Chancellor adjudged and decreed that defendant's defense of laches and the statutes of limitations against the plaintiff by a proposed amendment to an answer be denied and overruled; that the defendant as administratrix of the estate of A. W. Dixon, deceased, be permanently enjoined and restrained from disposing of and removing the building erected by Dixon Fish Company together with any permanent improvement or addition thereto located on the described property and any and all leasehold interests or tenure in and to such land held or enjoyed by A. W. Dixon during his lifetime or by the defendant as administratrix from the City of Sarasota; that the title and ownership of the building erected on the premises referred to...