City of Shorewood v. Metropolitan Waste Control Com'n, C8-94-824

• Decision Date: 23 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. C8-94-824,C8-94-824
• Citation: 533 N.W.2d 402
• Parties: CITY OF SHOREWOOD, et al., petitioner, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN WASTE CONTROL COMMISSION, Metropolitan Council, Respondents, Hennepin County, et al., Defendants.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 402

533 N.W.2d 402

CITY OF SHOREWOOD, et al., petitioner, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN WASTE CONTROL COMMISSION, Metropolitan Council Respondents Hennepin County, et al., Defendants.

No. C8-94-824.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 23, 1995.

Syllabus by the Court

When a trial court includes in an order of dismissal a direction to enter judgment, counsel are justified in regarding the order as a nonappealable order for judgment and in taking appeal from the judgment even though an appeal from the order would be proper.

The Metropolitan Waste Control Commission's allocation of sewage disposal costs and the Metropolitan Council's subsequent deficiency tax levy against all taxable property within the boundaries of the City of Shorewood are quasi-judicial actions reviewable only by writ of certiorari.

Christopher J. Dietzen, Timothy J. Keane, Daniel W. Voss, Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., Bloomington, for appellant.

Timothy R. Thornton, H. Torbjorn Svensson, Briggs and Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis, for Metropolitan Waste Control Com'n.

Brian W. Ohm, Jay M. Heffern, Metropolitan Council, St. Paul, for Metropolitan Council.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

OPINION

COYNE, Justice.

In this proceeding, which arose out of the Metropolitan Waste Control Commission's estimated billing of sewage disposal costs for calendar year 1993 and the Metropolitan Council's subsequent deficiency tax levy against all taxable property within the boundaries of the City of Shorewood, we review the court of appeals' dismissal of the City of Shorewood's appeal on the ground that the appeal was untimely. We affirm dismissal of the action on other grounds.

Until 1994 the Metropolitan Waste Control Commission operated the sewage disposal system that serves the seven counties--Anoka, Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott, and Washington--of the Metropolitan area. ¹ Under the policy direction of the Metropolitan Council, the regional planning agency, the Waste Control Commission was responsible for allocating sewage disposal costs among all local governmental units which discharge sewage into the system--the allocation to be made pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 473.517 (1992).

For the calendar year 1993, the Waste Control Commission billed the City of Shorewood $554,820, including $432,296 for estimated 1993 costs and $122,825 to cover a shortfall in the 1991 estimated cost. In December 1993 after the City had refused to pay more than approximately $370,000, the Council authorized the levy of a deficiency tax of almost $200,000 against all taxable property within the City of Shorewood in order to collect payment of the past due charges for sewage disposal service.

The City promptly instituted an action for a declaratory judgment that the method the Waste Control Commission used to allocate the 1993 costs of treatment works and interceptors in the metropolitan disposal system and the Council's authorization of the deficiency tax levy were arbitrary, capricious, inequitable and confiscatory. In addition, the City sought a writ of mandamus directing the Commission and the Council to adopt a new method of allocating the costs of the metropolitan disposal system in compliance with Minn.Stat. § 473.517, subd. 8 (1992). ² On motion of the defendants the district judge dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, having concluded that the decisions by the Council and the Waste Control Commission with respect to the allocation of the costs of the metropolitan disposal system and the deficiency tax levy were quasi-judicial determinations reviewable exclusively by certiorari. Unfortunately, the order did not merely grant the defendants' motion to dismiss but also directed the entry of judgment. The order was issued on March 3, 1994, and judgment was entered on March 7. On March 9 the commission served notice of making and filing of the order, and on April 19, 1994 the City of Shorewood served and filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of dismissal.

The court of appeals directed the parties to brief four jurisdictional questions. After reviewing the jurisdictional briefs, the court of appeals dismissed the City's appeal on the ground that despite the entry of judgment, appeal could be taken only from the order of dismissal and, as an appeal from the order, the City's appeal was untimely.

Fifty-five years ago, in Bulau v. Bulau, 208 Minn. 529, 294 N.W. 845 (1940), reh'g denied (Minn., Dec. 12, 1940), this court addressed the converse of the question presented here. In Bulau the appeal was taken from an order dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction. Whether the order was appealable had not been raised, but the court stated that it could not overlook the question because the right of appeal was then governed by statute and appellate jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent. The court allowed the appeal:

[G]enerally, judgment of dismissal would be requisite before appeal could be taken. However, where the gist of the dismissal is want of jurisdiction, we believe an appeal from the order dismissing may be allowed.

Id., 208 Minn. at 531, 294 N.W. at 847.

It is interesting to note that on appeal it was held that the district court had jurisdiction but that inasmuch as the court had "dismissed on the particular, though mistaken, ground of lack of jurisdiction, nothing further was necessary to terminate the proceedings." 208 Minn. at 530, 294 N.W. at 847 (emphasis supplied). In view of the fact that the lower court actually had jurisdiction, had this court held the plaintiff to the general rule, her appeal should have been from a judgment of dismissal. However, the court neither insisted on...