City of St. Joseph v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
| Decision Date | 20 June 1904 |
| Citation | 81 S.W. 1080,183 Mo. 1 |
| Parties | CITY OF ST. JOSEPH v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Buchanan Criminal Court. -- Hon. Benj. J. Casteel Judge.
Transferred to Kansas City Court of Appeals.
R. L Spencer, Nathan Frank, Richard A. Jones and Max W. Oliver for appellant.
(1) (a) The license fee of $ 50 imposed by the laws of the city of St. Joseph for the non-payment of which the judgment appealed from was entered, is of such amount and levied under such conditions that it is manifestly not simply a charge made for the purpose of defraying the expense of enforcing a police regulation, but is a tax for the purpose of providing revenue. Lamar v. Adams, 90 Mo.App. 40; St Louis v. Spiegel, 75 Mo. 145; Kansas City v. Grush, 151 Mo. 128; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Telegraph Co. v. Medford, 115 F. 202. (b) Being a tax, the ordinance of the city of St. Joseph providing for the levy and collection of this license fee is in conflict with the general law of the State (art. 8, chap. 119) enacted in 1895, in so far as it can be held to apply to foreign insurance companies, and so of non-effect as to them, for this act expressly provides that the two per cent per annum on all premiums which all foreign companies are obliged to pay the State, irrespective of the net amount collected, less loss by return of premiums or under the policies, shall be in lieu of all other taxes. Its language is not limited in its scope to State taxes, nor are those levied by the various municipal subdivisions of the State excluded from its effect. R. S. 1899, sec. 8043. (2) The ordinance is void for the reason that it is in direct conflict with the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Missouri declaring that all property subject to taxation must be taxed in proportion to its value. Const. of Missouri, art. 9, secs. 3 and 4.
Allen & Mayer for respondent.
(1) Respondent's charter gave it the power to license, tax and regulate insurance companies doing business within the city. R. S. 1899, sec. 5508, subd. 17. (2) Unless section 5508, Revised Statutes 1899, has been repealed, it makes no difference whether the ordinance in question imposes the license for revenue, or as a police regulation; the city had the power to license for revenue the occupation of insurance. The same ordinance now in question was, prior to the enactment of Revised Statutes 1899, sec. 8043, held legal and valid by the Supreme Court. St. Joseph v. Ernst, 95 Mo. 360. (3) The ordinance was not rendered invalid by the enactment of sec. 8043, Revised Statutes 1899; or, in other words, sec. 8043 did not repeal sec. 5508, Revised Statutes 1899. City of Lamar v. Adams, 90 Mo.App. 35. (4) Appellant can hardly be serious in its contention that the ordinance is in conflict with article 9, sections 3 and 4 of the State Constitution. The ordinance imposes only an occupation tax, "a tax for the privilege of carrying on the business," and not a property tax. St. Joseph v. Ernst, supra; City of Lamar v. Adams, supra; St. Louis v. Green, 7 Mo.App. 468, 70 Mo. 562.
This is a prosecution under the ordinance of St. Joseph, for doing business without a license. The defendant was fined fifty dollars in the police court, and appealed to the criminal court of Buchanan county. In that court it filed a motion to dismiss the case "for the reason that the ordinance upon which the information is based is unconstitutional and void." The court overruled the motion. Thereupon a jury was waived and the cause was tried before the court upon an agreed statement of facts, which recited that St. Joseph is a city of the second class under the laws of this State; that the defendant is a foreign insurance company organized under the laws of the State of New York, and doing an insurance business in St. Joseph, through an agency, and that it has no license from the city so to do; that there is an ordinance of the city requiring all persons or companies to procure an annual license to do business in the city. The agreed statement then recites: "The defendant for its defense relies on all its legal defenses and especially says that the ordinance set out is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Missouri and the laws of Missouri, and is void, and especially section --, chapter --, Constitution of Missouri." The agreed statement then recites that the defendant has paid the tax upon premiums received, at the rate of two per cent per annum, as required by section 8043, Revised Statutes 1899, and has complied with all the laws of the State, except the payment of the city license required by the city ordinance. The defendant then demurred to the evidence for the reason that it fails to prove an offense against the defendant, and because the ordinance is unconstitutional and void. The court overruled the demurrer and rendered judgment against the defendant for fifty dollars, as a fine. The defendant filed motions for a new trial and in arrest, in which it again challenged the ordinance as unconstitutional and void. These motions being overruled, the defendant appealed to this court.
I.
In its brief in chief the defendant says that the ordinance is void because it is in conflict with sections 3 and 4 of article 9 of the Constitution of this State, which declare that all property subject to taxation must be taxed in proportion to its value.
No examination or elucidation of the point is indulged in, and no authorities are cited to support the point.
The burden of the defendant's brief is that under article V, chapter 199, Revised Statutes 1879, foreign insurance companies were required to pay a State tax of one per cent per annum, upon all premiums received, in cash or in notes, for business done in this State in excess over returned premiums and losses actually paid during the year; that returns were required to be made, by the thirty-first of January of each year, to the superintendent of the Insurance Department of the amount of such premiums and deductions, and such superintendent was required to assess the tax and certify it to the State Treasurer, and the taxes were required to be paid to the State Treasurer by the first of April; that in addition to this State tax, insurance companies were required to make similar returns to the assessor of the county and city or town in which they had agencies, and the county, city or town was authorized to levy county, municipal and school taxes thereon in like manner as upon any other property (R. S. 1879, secs. 6057, 6058, 6060, and 6062); that at that time section 4644, paragraph 15, R. S. 1879, relating to cities of the second class, authorized the mayor and council, by ordinance not inconsistent with the Constitution or any law of this State, to license, tax and regulate insurance companies, and that pursuant to such authority the city of St. Joseph had enacted the ordinance in question imposing a license or occupation tax of fifty dollars upon every person or company carrying on any kind of insurance business in the city.
The minor premise of the defendant's syllogism is that the law as so stated remained the same until 1895 when it was changed so as to be as it now appears in article 8 of chapter 119, Revised Statutes 1899, the change being that the sections of the law which required returns to be made to the assessors of the county, city or town, and which authorized such localities to levy a tax as aforesaid, were repealed and the section which imposed a State tax of one per cent per annum upon all premiums received in cash or in notes, for business done in the State in excess over returned premiums and losses actually paid during the year, was also repealed, and in lieu thereof it was provided that foreign insurance companies doing...
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