City of St. Louis v. St. Louis & New Orleans Transp. Co.
Decision Date | 31 October 1884 |
Citation | 84 Mo. 156 |
Parties | THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. THE ST. LOUIS & NEW ORLEANS TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Appellant. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis Court of Appeals.
AFFIRMED.
Given Campbell and O'Neill Ryan for appellant.
(1) The barge was not owned, or under charge or management of defendant, in fact was not in existence on August 1st, 1880, it having been built or brought to St. Louis about May, 1881, and hence defendant could not have made the sworn return and have had it assessed as required by the city ordinance. (2) The facts of this case do not bring defendant within the provisions of the ordinance requiring payment of five cents per ton, and the doubling of that amount as a penalty for its non-payment. This is a reasonable construction of the ordinance, and the court must judge in such case whether the exercise of the powers of ordinance is reasonable. City v. Weber, 44 Mo. 550; Com. v. Worcesler, 3 Pick. 462; Dillon on Mun. Corp., p. 373. (3) The courts will construe an ordinance with reference to the subject matter, its object, mischief to be remedied, etc. Spitler v. Young, 63 Mo. 42; Neenan v. Smith, 50 Mo. 528.
Leverett Bell for respondent.
The ordinance is not open to any legal objection. It conforms to the grant of power contained in section 6906 of the General Statutes. 2 R. S., p. 1360. The provisions of the city charter, authorizing the collection of wharfage (2 R. S., p. 1585), and the ordinance provisions on the subject, were before the Supreme Court of the United States in Packet Company v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423, and were held to be valid. It is claimed by the appellant that the barge was built subsequent to August 1, 1880, and for this reason it was not returned for taxation for the year commencing on that day. If so, no taxes were assessed or paid on the property for said year, and no injustice is worked to the owner by exacting wharfage at the rate of five cents per ton. The ordinance is clear on the point that the rate of three cents per ton is to be applied to such boats only as have been returned for taxation in St. Louis, for the year commencing on the first day of August, immediately preceding the day of the landing of the boat.
This is a proceeding in the nature of a civil action, begun in a St. Louis police court for the recovery of $50.90, for the violation of an ordinance of the city concerning wharfage. The portions of the ordinance necessary to an understanding of the issue are these:
The cause was tried in the police court where plaintiff had judgment for $50.90; defendant appealed to the St. Louis court of criminal correction, where the judgment was for $15.27; from which plaintiff appealed to the St. Louis court of appeals, and there...
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