City of St. Louis v. Hammond

• Decision Date: 03 December 1917
• Docket Number: No. 18170.,18170.
• Citation: 199 S.W. 411
• Parties: CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. HAMMOND.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

199 S.W. 411

CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. HAMMOND.

No. 18170.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

December 3, 1917.

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction; Benjamin F. Clark, Judge.

Eugene Hammond was convicted of violating an ordinance of the city of St. Louis, and he appeals. Judgment affirmed.

Robert W. Hall, of St. Louis, for appellant. Bishop & Cobbs, of St. Louis, for respondent.

BLAIR, J.

Convicted of violating an ordinance regulating the speed of automobiles, appellant brings the cause here. The ordinance in question applies to all automobiles, and, among other things, prescribes a maximum speed of eight miles per hour in the business districts and of ten miles per hour in other portions of the city. Appellant contends the ordinance is invalid because (1) it is in conflict with the state law; (2) it violates appellant's rights under section 30, art. 2, of the state constitution, and (3) the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and (4) is "unreasonable, unjust, unfair, and oppressive."

I. There is no conflict with the state law. Roper v. Greenspon et al., 198 S. W. 1107 (not yet officially reported).

II. That the speed of automobiles upon streets may be regulated is "too plain for discussion." Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. loc. cit. 544, 88 N. E. 848, L. R.

A. 1915E, 264, 127 Am. St. Rep. 513; State v. Mayo, 106 Me. loc. cit. 66, 67, 75 Atl. 295, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 502, 20 Ann. Cas. 512.

Ordinances applying solely to automobiles do not deny the person affected the equal protection of the laws when there is a lawful distinction, with respect to the restriction imposed, between automobiles and other vehicles. The ordinance in question does not illegally discriminate. State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. loc. cit. 523 et seq., 102 S. W. 483, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 601, 120 Am. St. Rep. 671, 11 Ann. Cas. 725; Helena v. Dunlap, 102 Ark. loc. cit. 136, 143 S. W. 138; State v. Phillips, 107 Me. loc. cit. 256, 78 Atl. 283; State v. Ingalls, 18 N. M. loc. cit. 221, 135 Pac. 1177; Hartje v. Moxley, 235 Ill. loc. cit. 168, 85 N. E. 216; Johnson v. Sergeant, 168 Mich. loc. cit. 446, 134 N. W. 468.

III. The ordinance is designed to promote the public safety by regulating the use on the streets of vehicles which are capable of very rapid movement. Such regulation is clearly within the police power reserved to the city. Ruggles v. State, 120 Md. loc. cit. 561, 87 Atl. 1089; Ayres v. Chicago, 239 Ill. loc. cit. 245, 87 N. E. 1073; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. loc. cit. 622, 623, 35 Sup. Ct. 140, 59 L. Ed. 385; State v. Mayo, 106 Me. loc. cit. 66, 67, 75 Atl. 295, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 502, 20 Ann. Cas. 512.

Being within the police power, and infringing neither private right nor any power expressly granted to Congress, the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution is not involved. L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U. S. loc. cit. 596, 597, 20 Sup. Ct. 788, 44 L. Ed. 899; Unwen v. State, 73 N. J. Law, loc. cit. 534, 64 Atl. 163; Id., 75 N. J. Law, 500, 68 Atl. 110; Merz v. Railroad, 88 Mo. loc. cit. 676 et seq., 1 S. W. 382.

Due process is not denied. Delaney v. Police Court, 167 Mo. loc. cit. 677 et seq., 67 S. W. 589.

IV. The final contention is that the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive. In City of St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. loc. cit. 550, this court said:

"In assuming, however, the right to judge of the reasonableness of an exercise of corporate power, courts will not look closely into mere matters of judgment where there may be a reasonable difference of opinion. It is not to be expected that every power will always be exercised with the highest discretion."

In Gratiot v. Railway, 116 Mo. loc. cit. 467, 21 S. W. 1094, 16 L. R. A. 189, an ordinance of the city of St. Louis, prescribing a maximum speed of six miles per hour for railroad trains, was upheld as reasonable and humane. A like ruling was made in Merz v. Railway, 14 Mo. App. loc. cit. 462 et seq. In City of Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. loc. cit. 9, 25 S. W. 202, 41 Am. St. Rep. 678, it is said:

"The largest discretion is given them (cities) unless expressly restricted by the charter; and an ordinance which is within the limits of the powers conferred will not be declared void unless very clearly repugnant to some principle of common right."

In Columbus Railroad Co. v. Waller, 12 Ga. App. loc....