Ruggles v. State
| Decision Date | 11 April 1913 |
| Citation | 87 A. 1080,120 Md. 553 |
| Parties | RUGGLES v. STATE. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Criminal Court of Baltimore City; James P. Gorter Judge.
Thomas D. Ruggles was convicted of operating a motor vehicle without a license, and he appeals. Affirmed.
George J. Kessler, of Baltimore, for appellant.
Horton S. Smith and Edgar Allan Poe, both of Baltimore, for the State.
The motor vehicle law of Maryland includes among its provisions the following: "No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon any highway of this state until he shall have first obtained an operator's license for the purpose, but nothing herein contained shall be taken to prevent the operation of a motor vehicle by an unlicensed person other than a person whose application has been refused or whose license had been suspended or revoked, if accompanied by a licensed operator. ***" Section 137, c. 207, Acts of 1910; section 139, art. 56, Annotated Code of 1912. Section 138, c. 207, Acts of 1910; section 140, art. 56, Annotated Code; chapter 133, Acts 1912.
The appellant was tried under an indictment which charged, in separate counts, first, that he unlawfully operated a motor vehicle upon the highways of the state, without having first obtained a license from the commissioner of motor vehicles, and, secondly, that he unlawfully operated a motor vehicle upon the highways of the state for another, to wit, for the Brown Taxi Company, a corporation, for salary, wages, hire, and profit, without having first obtained a license from the commissioner for that purpose. Each of the counts averred also that the defendant was not "then and there accompanied by a person duly licensed to operate motor vehicles upon the highways of the state." By motion to quash the first count and by demurrer to the second count the defendant questioned the jurisdiction of the court, the sufficiency of the indictment, and the constitutionality of the statute upon which the prosecution was based.
The ground of the motion was that the criminal court of Baltimore city could take cognizance of such a case only on appeal from the action of a police justice of the city, and, since the defendant had not been tried for the alleged offense before such an officer, the court was without jurisdiction. There was a provision in chapter 207 of the Acts of 1910 to the effect that any person arrested for the violation of the motor vehicle law in Baltimore should be tried before the nearest police justice, to whom jurisdiction was given by the act to hear and determine the case and to impose the prescribed penalty, subject to the right of the defendant on conviction to appeal to the criminal court. This provision was construed and upheld in Crichton v. State, 115 Md. 423, 81 A. 36. By chapter 133 of the Acts of 1912, approved April 4th of that year, it was enacted that any justice of the peace having criminal jurisdiction should have full authority to try and determine violations of the act. It was enacted, however, by chapter 777 of the Acts of 1912, approved seven days later than chapter 133, that the police justices of Baltimore city "shall not have power to try and determine any violations of the public general laws of this state relating to licenses (except violations of laws relating to hawkers and peddlers ***) *** but shall cause all such offenders *** to be committed or held to bail for trial in the criminal court of Baltimore." This statute, by amendments to the Baltimore city charter, revised in part the criminal jurisdiction and procedure of the police justices of the city. The act became effective before the commission of the offense charged in the indictment, and, as that is alleged to consist of a violation of the law requiring a license for the purpose described, it would seem to be expressly excluded from the classes of cases which the police justices of Baltimore city are authorized to try and determine.
The theory of the defendant is that the statutes regulating the use of motor vehicles embody a special system of law on that subject, and that chapter 777 of the Acts of 1912 is an enactment of a more general nature. It is then sought to apply the rule that a later general law does not repeal a prior and particular act unless direct reference is made to it for that purpose, or unless the terms of the two statutes are irreconcilable. Garrett v. Janes, 65 Md. 260, 3 A. 597; State v. Railway Co., 44 Md. 167; Anne Arundel County v. United Railways Co., 109 Md. 390, 72 A. 542. If it be assumed that the legislation defining the jurisdiction of the police justices of Baltimore city is more general in its character than that relating to the use of moter vehicles throughout the state, there is nevertheless such an inconsistency between the provisions under consideration as to affect a repeal by implication. The test of repugnancy in such cases is the practical inquiry whether the two laws can "stand together and be executed at one and the same time." State v. Gambrill, 115 Md. 511, 81 A. 12; State v. Yewell, 63 Md. 121; School Commissioners v. Henkel, 117 Md. 105, 83 A. 89. It is evident here that the earlier statute, authorizing the police justices of Baltimore city to try and determine cases in which persons are accused of violating the law requiring licenses to be obtained for the operation of motor vehicles, cannot be applied consistently with the later act, which expressly forbids the exercise of such jurisdiction. We accordingly hold that the motion to quash was properly overruled.
The indictment was said to be defective in not alleging that the automobile operated by the defendant was not included in certain classes of motor vehicles which are specifically exempted by the terms of the statute. The requirement for the license is in section 138, while the exception referred to is in section 140t, which provides an exemption as to all motor vehicles used by any municipal police or fire department or salvage corps, and all ambulances, road rollers, street sprinklers, street sweepers or cleaners, and all traction engines used for the hauling of agricultural machinery. The rule is that, "where, after general words of prohibition, an exception is created in a subsequent clause or section, it must be interposed by the accused as a matter of defense, and it is not necessary in such case that the indictment should negative the exception by express averment." Weber v. State, 116 Md. 410, 81 A. 609; Parker v. State, 99 Md. 201, 57 A. 677; Kiefer v. State, 87 Md. 567, 40 A. 377; Stearns v. State, 81 Md. 341, 32 A. 282. This well-settled principle disposes of the objection to which we have referred.
There are various constitutional questions raised on the demurrer, and they will be considered in the order in which they are presented.
The first of these objections is based upon a theory which involves a consideration of section 138 of the motor vehicle law as it existed prior to its amendment by chapter 133 of the Acts of 1912. This section in its present form has already been quoted. As incorporated in chapter 207 of the Acts of 1910, it provided that the license fee of $2, provided for operators of motor vehicles, should be good until suspended or revoked for causes specified in a later section, and should not be subject to annual renewal. The provision that professional chauffeurs should annually obtain an operator's license at a cost of $5 was added to the section by the act of 1912. It is contended that the licenses issued under the act of 1910 were perpetual and irrevocable, except for certain designated causes of forfeiture, and constituted contracts between the holders and the state which the act of 1912 impairs as to professional operators in violation of section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States.
It was held in Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U.S 535, 24 L.Ed. 148, that "a mere license by a state is always revocable," and in Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 25 L.Ed. 1079, that "the contracts which the Constitution protects are those that relate to property rights, not governmental," and that "the Legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a state." This court has twice declared that the Legislature has ...
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