City of St. Paul v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company
| Decision Date | 07 January 1896 |
| Docket Number | 9139--(39 [2] -95 [3] -51 [4] ) |
| Parties | CITY OF ST. PAUL v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Editorial Note:
This Pagination of this case accurately reflects the pagination of the original published, though it may appears out of sequence.
Original Opinion of May 10, 1895, Reported at: 63 Minn. 330.
Flandrau Squires & Cutcheon, for appellant.
Ordinance No. 286, together with the acts performed under it, gave rise to an irrevocable contract between plaintiff and defendant under protection of which defendant is entitled to maintain and occupy its freight-house and river-siding where they now are. The city, acting through its common council, had the capacity to enter into the contract. Sp. Laws 1874, c. 1 subc. 4, § 7. Statutory provisions of this kind have uniformly been held to confer upon city councils authority to grant to railway companies the right to occupy public streets, at least as against the city and the public. 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 719; St. Louis v. Western U Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 13 S.Ct. 990; Gregsten v. City of Chicago, 145 Ill. 451, 34 N.E. 426; Julia Bldg. Assn. v. Bell Telephone Co., 88 Mo. 258; City of St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo. 623, 10 S.W. 197; Hodges v. Baltimore U. P. R. Co., 58 Md. 603; Elliott v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co., 32 Conn. 579. Authority to grant such rights was expressly conferred on cities by G. S. 1878, c. 34, § 47. (See G. S. 1894, § 2642.) The contract is lawful because the use to which the premises are put by the railway company is a public use. Kaiser v. St. Paul, S. & T. F. R. Co., 22 Minn. 149. The agreement does not attempt to convey, create or destroy any interest in the land, but if it did attempt to do so, i. e. to surrender the public easement pro tanto, the agreement, whether valid as a deed or not, would constitute a defense in a court of equity to a proceeding to oust the grantee, after it had performed its side of the contract. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 759; 1 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. § 383; Pfiffner v. Stillwater & St. P. R. Co., 23 Minn. 343; Gill v. Newell, 13 Minn. 430 (462); Place v. Johnson, 20 Minn. 198 (219); Johnson v. Skillman, 29 Minn. 95, 12 N.W. 149; Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373, 29 N.W. 135; Evans v. Miller, 38 Minn. 245, 36 N.W. 640. On the question whether the agreement constitutes an irrevocable contract, the intention of the parties must control. Johnson v. Skillman, supra; Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 51 Minn. 304, 311-314, 53 N.W. 639. The language of the grant is not that of a license or permit but rather that of a grant. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 136. Defendant is entitled to insist that the privilege granted shall continue, so long as the structures remain open and subject to the use of the public for wharfage and transfer purposes without charge, and so long as it continues to discharge its obligations to the city. City of St. Louis v. Western U. Tel. Co., 63 F. 68; City of New Orleans v. Great Southern T. & Tel. Co., 40 La. Ann. 41, 3 So. 533. The intention of the council that the privilege granted should be irrevocable, at least under present conditions, is manifest, and to permit the city to revoke the privilege at this time would operate as a fraud on defendant. Such being the case, plaintiff is estopped to claim that, under the contract, it possesses any right of revocation. St. Louis v. Western U. Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 13 S.Ct. 485, 63 F. 68; Rerick v. Kern, 14 S. & R. 267; Cumberland V. R. Co. v. McLanahan, 59 Pa. 23; Pierce v. Cleland, 133 Pa. 189, 19 A. 352; Clark v. Glidden, 60 Vt. 702, 15 A. 358; Western U. Tel. Co. v. Bullard, 67 Vt. 272, 31 A. 286; Rhodes v. Otis, 33 Ala. 578; Veghte v. Raritan Water Power Co., 19 N.J.Eq. 142.
Where a contract, containing no express provision as to the duration of the rights granted, does provide for a large investment or the payment of a considerable consideration by one of the parties, and the investment is made or the consideration rendered, there arises a conclusive presumption of law, in the absence of provisions plainly indicating the contrary, that the contract is intended to be irrevocable except by mutual consent. City of New Orleans v. Great Southern T. & Tel. Co., supra; New Orleans, S. F. & L. R. Co. v. Delamore, 114 U.S. 501, 5 S.Ct. 1009; St. Louis v. Western U. Tel. Co., supra; Coast Line R. Co. v. Mayor of Savannah, 30 F. 646; Hudson Tel. Co. v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. Law, 303, 8 A. 123; Hovelman v. Kansas City H. R. Co., 79 Mo. 632; Rutland E. L. Co. v. Marble City E. L. Co., 65 Vt. 377, 26 A. 635; Gregsten v. City of Chicago, supra; Brooklyn Central R. Co. v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 32 Barb. 358; Mayor of New York v. Second Ave. R. Co., 32 N.Y. 261; Mayor of New York v. Third Ave. R. Co., 33 N.Y. 42; Com. v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339; Binghamton Bridge Case, 3 Wall. 51; Horner v. Pleasants, 66 Md. 475, 7 A. 691; Classen v. Chesapeake Guano Co., 81 Md. 258, 31 A. 808; City of New Orleans v. Great Southern T. & Tel. Co., supra; Le Fevre v. Le Fevre, 4 S. & R. 241; Rerick v. Kern, supra; Swartz v. Swartz, 4 Pa. 353; Cumberland V. R. Co. v. McLanahan, 59 Pa. 23; Pierce v. Cleland, supra; Ricker v. Kelly, 1 Me. 117; Clark v. Glidden, supra; Western U. Tel. Co. v. Bullard, supra; Woodbury v. Parshley, 7 N.H. 237; Ameriscoggin Bridge v. Bragg, 11 N.H. 102; Rhodes v. Otis, supra; Sheffield v. Collier, 3 Ga. 82; Russell v. Hubbard, 59 Ill. 335; Wickersham v. Orr, 9 Iowa, 253; Wright v. Nagle, 101 U.S. 791; Citizens' Street R. Co. v. City R. Co., 56 F. 746; Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 462. Contract rights such as are here under consideration are within the protection of U. S. Const. art. 1, § 10; Binghamton Bridge Case, supra; Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50; New Orleans W. W. Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674, 6 S.Ct. 273; New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 6 S.Ct. 252; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 13 S.Ct. 622. An attempt on the part of the city council to revoke a privilege thus secured by contract is the act of the state. Wright v. Nagle, supra; Citizens' Street R. Co. v. City R. Co., supra; Weston v. City Council of Charleston, supra.
Edward J. Darragh and Henry J. Horn, for respondent.
The railway company having petitioned for a rehearing in reference to its rights under the city ordinance cited, on May 28, 1895, the court granted a reargument of the cause "in so far as it involves the force and effect of City Ordinance No. 286 and the rights of the defendant thereunder." Pursuant thereto there was a reargument on December 11, 1895.
January 7, 1896, the following opinion was filed:
This appeal has once before been considered by this court. The record and briefs were very voluminous, and the main issue was whether the defendant had acquired absolute title to the premises in controversy by adverse possession. The oral arguments were wholly, and the briefs mainly, devoted to a discussion of that question. The natural result was that other and less important issues received but little attention from either court or counsel.
The defendant's claim of certain rights under City Ordinance No. 286 was disposed of in our opinion by merely saying that the ordinance amounted to nothing more than a revocable license; that its language was that of a license or permit, and not of a grant. Upon an application for a reargument of this question, we became satisfied that sufficient consideration had not been given to it, and that there was at least grave doubt whether the ordinance, if valid, did not constitute an irrevocable contract between the city and defendant. We therefore ordered a reargument of the question as to the force and effect of this ordinance, and the rights of the defendant under it. This involves two questions: First, the authority of the city council of St. Paul to pass the ordinance; and, second, if the council had the power to pass it, its force and effect. These questions should be considered in the order named; for, if the ordinance is held invalid, it will be unnecessary to consider the second question at all.
The land in question fronts on the Mississippi river, and was dedicated by the original proprietor to public use as a "levee." Defendant's grantor, being in possession of the premises and claiming adversely to the city, had erected thereon a wooden freight house, fronting on the river, and some 400 or 450 feet long. In 1881, after defendant took possession, it presented a petition to the common council of the city of St. Paul, stating that it contemplated taking down this freight house, and replacing it with a large and permanent one, and asking permission in the meantime to erect a temporary wooden structure. This permit was granted, the limit of the permit being two years. In March, 1882, the defendant presented a further petition to the common council, stating that it was then ready to construct its new freight house, which was described as to be a large, elegant, and permanent structure, plans of which were submitted. The petition further stated that, in order to carry out the plan of the structure as demanded by the growing commerce of the city, it would be necessary to extend the river front of the building out into the river from seven to ten feet further than the front of the old one; and requested the council to approve the plan of the proposed building, and to grant permission to extend it out into the river to the limit above mentioned. The plan proposed was of a building about 600 feet long and 50 feet wide, of brick, with stone foundation and a slate roof. In response to this petition the council, in April, 1882, by...
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