City of Toledo v. State
| Citation | 130 N.E.3d 341,2019 Ohio 1681 |
| Decision Date | 03 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. L-18-1168,L-18-1168 |
| Parties | CITY OF TOLEDO, Appellee v. STATE of Ohio, et al., Appellants |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
Dale R. Emch, Law Director, Jeffrey B. Charles, Chief of Litigation, and John T. Madigan, Senior Attorney, for appellees.
Michael DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, Nicole M. Koppitch and Halli Brownfield Watson, Assistant Attorney Generals, for appellants.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
{¶ 1} Appellants, the state of Ohio and Attorney General Michael DeWine, appeal from the July 10, 2018 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, where summary judgment was granted to appellee, the city of Toledo. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, and reverse in part.
{¶ 2} This matter was originally filed on March 13, 2015. Appellee, the city of Toledo, sought declaratory judgment, temporary restraining order, and preliminary and permanent injunctions against appellants, the state and attorney general of Ohio. Appellee brought the action to challenge State Bill No. 342, Ohio's traffic-camera law and, after cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court held in favor of appellee on April 27, 2015.
{¶ 3} The trial court permanently enjoined appellants from enforcing eight statutory provisions of the traffic-camera law, finding those provisions limited appellee's power to enact and enforce its own legislation in violation of the home-rule provision stated within Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution. Pursuant to this home-rule provision, appellee had enacted its own municipal code ordinance to address and impose civil penalties for traffic violations captured by its traffic cameras, under Toledo Municipal Code 313.12, prior to the passage and enactment of S.B. 342 (Ohio's traffic-camera law).
{¶ 4} On July 8, 2016, we affirmed the trial court and upheld the injunction against the enforcement of R.C. 4511.093(B)(1) and (3), 4511.095, 4511.096, 4511.097, 4511.098, 4511.099, 4511.0911(A) and (B), 4511.0912. See City of Toledo v. State , 2016-Ohio-4906, 56 N.E.3d 997 (6th Dist.). Our majority held that these provisions fail the fourth factor in the "general law" legal test derived from City of Canton v. State , 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963. Id. at ¶ 48.
{¶ 5} However, on December 13, 2017, the Supreme Court of Ohio vacated and remanded the case to the trial court to apply Dayton v. State , 151 Ohio St.3d 168, 2017-Ohio-6909, 87 N.E.3d 176. See City of Toledo v. State , 152 Ohio St.3d 496, 2017-Ohio-8955, 98 N.E.3d 222. The Dayton majority individually analyzed and enjoined enforcement of R.C. 4511.093(B)(1), 4511.0912, and 4511.095. Dayton at ¶ 35.
{¶ 6} On remand, the trial court individually analyzed the Ohio traffic-camera provisions it had previously invalidated on April 27, 2015. Consistent with Dayton , the trial court affirmed its prior decision to invalidate R.C. 4511.093(B)(1), 4511.0912, and 4511.095, and, additionally, found the law as articulated in Canton and Dayton further applied to invalidate R.C. 4511.093(B)(3), 4511.096, 4511.097, 4511.098, 4511.099, and 4511.0911(A) and (B). The judgment was journalized on July 10, 2018, and appellants timely appeal.
{¶ 7} When reviewing a trial court's summary judgment decision, the appellate court conducts a de novo review. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. , 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Summary judgment will be granted when there remains no genuine issue of material fact and, when construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving party, reasonable minds can only conclude that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civ.R. 56(C). Accord Lopez v. Home Depot, USA, Inc. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-02-1248, 2003-Ohio-2132, 2003 WL 1962360, ¶ 7.
{¶ 8} In all four of their assigned errors, appellants assert the trial court committed reversible error by determining appellee had standing to bring this action, and by enjoining statutes of the Ohio traffic-camera law under Canton and Dayton .
{¶ 9} Appellee contends no error occurred below under Canton and Dayton , as those statutes were correctly found unconstitutional because they only serve to limit municipal authority in violation of the home-rule provision of Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 10} At the outset, and in addressing appellants' first assignment of error, we find that this action appropriately concerns the home-rule provision and, hence, for purposes of our analysis appellee, a municipality of the state of Ohio, has standing pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution, infra , to challenge the statutes which it argues conflict with its ordinance and municipal power. See , e.g. , Dayton , 151 Ohio St.3d 168, 2017-Ohio-6909, 87 N.E.3d 176, at ¶ 12. Accordingly, we find appellants' first assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 11} When considering the constitutionality of a statute, the presumption is that the legislation is valid. See id. , citing Wilson v. Kasich , 134 Ohio St.3d 221, 2012-Ohio-5367, 981 N.E.2d 814, ¶ 18. The party challenging the validity of the statute bears the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional. Id. It is said that the challenging party has "a ‘heavy burden’ when attempting to overcome the presumption of constitutionality." Id. , citing Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd. , 43 Ohio St.3d 1, 10, 539 N.E.2d 103 (1989).
{¶ 12} The home-rule provision of the Ohio Constitution provides that "[m]unicipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws." Id. at ¶ 13 ; see also Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution. The home-rule provision hence provides independent authority to Ohio's municipalities to self-govern. Id. , citing W. Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St.2d 113, 115, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965).
{¶ 13} A municipal ordinance, nevertheless, must yield to a statewide statute if the following elements are met: "(1) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute, (2) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, and (3) the statute is a general law." See Canton , 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, at ¶ 9.
{¶ 14} Subsequent to Canton , the Supreme Court of Ohio has reordered this test and has stated that the proper sequence to approach a home-rule analysis is as follows: "(1) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, (2) the statute is a general law, and (3) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute." See Mendenhall v. Akron , 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 17.
{¶ 15} We, hence, will not proceed in the order and sequence presented by appellants' remaining assignments of error. To be specific, appellants' third and fourth assigned errors attack the second element (general law), and their second attacks the third element (conflict). We will address appellants' assigned errors in the sequence and order as suggested proper in Mendenhall . Id.
{¶ 16} Further, we note for appellants to be successful in this appeal and show that there is no home-rule violation, they must support all three elements in their entirety. Id. Consequently, we will thoroughly analyze each of the three elements in turn, to reach a proper determination as to whether the ordinance must yield to the statutes.
Home Rule Element No. 1 – Exercise of Police Power
{¶ 17} The first element requires review to determine whether the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than an exercise of local self-government. Mendenhall at ¶ 18. Appellants do not specifically have an assignment of error dedicated to this element, however, we note that both parties address and argue it in their appellate briefs.
{¶ 18} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that "[i]f an allegedly conflicting city ordinance relates solely to self-government, the analysis stops, because the Constitution authorizes a municipality to exercise all powers of local self-government within its jurisdiction." (Citation omitted) Id. "If, on the other hand, the ordinance pertains to local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution, the municipality has exceeded its home rule authority only if the ordinance is in conflict with a general state law." (Quotation omitted) Id.
{¶ 19} We initially review the ordinance and generalize its content as we did in Toledo , 2016-Ohio-4906, 56 N.E.3d 997, at ¶ 2.
{¶ 20} Under Toledo Municipal Code 313.12, civil penalties are assessed against the owner or driver of a vehicle for red light and speed violations captured by traffic cameras. The program is administered by appellee's Division of Transportation, Police Department, and Department of Law. In the event the camera detects a red light or speeding violation, a "notice of liability" is processed and forwarded...
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Downey v. City of Toledo
...Court of Appeals that § 4511.093(B)(3) violated its home-rule authority and therefore was unenforceable. City of Toledo v. State of Ohio, 130 N.E.3d 341, 350 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). The City's argument therefore is wholly unpersuasive. Cf. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) (The......