City of Waseca v. Braun
| Citation | 288 N.W. 229,206 Minn. 154 |
| Decision Date | 27 October 1939 |
| Docket Number | 32091. |
| Parties | CITY OF WASECA v. BRAUN. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Reargument Denied Nov. 17, 1939.
Appeal fro District Court, Waseca County; Fred W. Senn, Judge.
Prosecution by the City of Waseca against A. J. Braun for violating an ordinance regulating hawkers, peddlers, and canvassers and selling of goods from door to door in the City of Waseca. From an order denying A. J. Braun's blended motion for amended findings and conclusions of law, or for a new trial A. J. Braun appeals.
Order reversed, with directions.
Syllabus by the Court .
1. The negotiation of sales of goods which are in another state, for the purpose of introducing them into the state in which the negotiation is made, is interstate commerce.
2. Neither the state nor any of its subdivisions may regulate or restrain that which from its nature should be under control of national authority and as such should be free from restriction save as it is governed in the manner that the Congress constitutionally ordains. Nor may the state tax interstate commerce either by laying the tax upon the business which constitutes such commerce, or the privilege of engaging in it, or upon the receipts, as such, derived from it.
3. There can be no justification for the exercise of a power that is not possessed.
4. It is settled law that nothing which is a direct burden upon interstate commerce can be imposed by the state without the assent of Congress, and that the silence of Congress in respect to any matter of interstate commerce is equivalent to a declaration on its part that it should be forever free.
5. The interstate character of a sale, made on a contract for the purchase of goods which are to be shipped from another state is not affected by the fact that the goods are consigned to the shipper or his agent to whom the order is given and are to be delivered by such agent. Such a transaction is not deprived of its interstate character by the employment of another agent or agency for the delivery of the goods purchased or by the fact that goods ordered by several purchasers are shipped in bulk to the agent and are delivered by the agent to the respective purchasers after breaking the bulk.
6. Decisions of the United States Supreme Court are final as to what constitutes interstate commerce.
Webber, George, Owen & Brehmer, of Winona, for appellant.
Moonan & Moonan and F. Martin Senn, all of Waseca, for respondent.
Defendant was convicted of violating ‘ An ordinance to license and regulate hawkers, peddlers and canvassers, and the selling of goods from door to door in the City of Waseca Minnesota.’ He appeals from an order denying his blended motion for amended findings and conclusions of law, or, if that be denied, for a new trial.
Section 1 of the ordinance provides: ‘ That no person, as hawker, peddler or canvasser for the sale of any property, except where such property is sold at wholesale to dealers in such articles, shall sell or offer to sell, canvass for, or sell for future delivery, any goods, wares, or merchandise, within the limits of the City of Waseca, without first having obtained a license to do so as in this ordinance provided.’
Section 2 provides the procedure to be followed to secure the license pursuant to the requirements of section 1; section 3 provides for punishment for failure to procure such license; section 4 repeals inconsistent ordinances; and section 5 fixes the time when the ordinance was to take effect. (It was in effect many years prior to the time of defendant's prosecution, having been duly approved by the mayor and published in 1914.)
The complaint charges that defendant on April 20, 1937, did ‘ solicit, canvass and peddle from house to house, certain goods, wares and merchandise without a license so to do.’
The evidence was furnished largely, though not entirely, by or in defendant's behalf; hence we find no substantial conflict in the record. The facts as established thereby are as follows: Defendant is employed by the Jewel Tea Company, an Illinois corporation there domiciled but having and maintaining a branch factory at LaCrosse, Wisconsin. Its business is that of selling coffee, tea, extracts, spices, soap products, and many other articles on a direct-to-consumer basis. Defendant's salary was $24 per week, and he was also paid an additional sum based upon sales volume. He obtained all of his supplies, such as order books, reports, and the like, from his employer. His employer also provided him with an automobile or truck by means of which he delivered to his employer's customers goods previously ordered by them. The manager at the LaCrosse branch was his direct superior. From him as such he received instructions with respect to the routes to be maintained and the customers upon whom he should call. There were some 14 towns and cities designated, and Waseca was one of them. There he spent the last three secular days every alternate week. His business was to solicit and take orders for future delivery of his employer's goods. These orders were consolidated at the end of the week, and such consolidated order or requisition was then forwarded to the LaCrosse branch. The goods so ordered were then shipped by rail from LaCrosse to Owatonna in large packages or cartons and from there transferred to defendant's home in Owatonna, where the shipments were broken up and the original packages in which previously ordered goods were contained were then placed on shelves. As these items of property were to be delivered they were then taken from defendant's shelves and placed in the auto truck for delivery to the respective customers. When the goods were delivered to the customer he was authorized to demand and accept the purchase price, for which he made due accounting to his employer.
It sometimes happened that an order could not or was not delivered to the particular customer who had ordered the goods. In such event defendant took the ordered items back to the truck and transported them to his basement in Owatonna, using such article or articles to fill subsequent orders of the same type. The amount of goods so handled was nominal only, not exceeding one out of every hundred sales.
Defendant contends that the mentioned ordinance was, as applied to the facts in this case, in direct violation of U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, U.S.C.A. While he attacks the ordinance on other grounds, we conclude that the issue just mentioned presents the nub of the controversy.
1, 2. It has long been established law that " The negotiation of sales of goods which are in another state, for the purpose of introducing them into the state in which the negotiation is made, is interstate commerce." As such commerce, neither the state nor local authority may burden it with license or other taxes. Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland, 268 U.S. 325, 335, 45 S.Ct. 525, 526, 69 L.Ed. 982, 985; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489, 7 S.Ct. 592, 30 L.Ed. 694; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289, 14 S.Ct. 829, 38 L.Ed. 719; Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U.S. 27, 22 S.Ct. 576, 46 L.Ed. 785; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622, 23 S.Ct. 229, 47 L.Ed. 336; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Sims, 191 U.S. 441, 24 S.Ct. 151, 48 L.Ed. 254; Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U.S. 507, 27 S.Ct. 159, 51 L.Ed. 295; Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389, 33 S.Ct. 294, 57 L.Ed. 565; Rogers v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 401, 33 S.Ct. 298, 57 L.Ed. 569; Stewart v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 665, 34 S.Ct. 476, 58 L.Ed. 786.
In this case it is clearly established that the goods ordered by the various customers of the tea company were in the state of Wisconsin when the orders were taken. Later, pursuant to the orders so taken, they were shipped into the state and received by defendant at his home in Owatonna. Up to that point at least there can be no doubt that the transaction was strictly one in interstate commerce. This being so, it follows that neither the state nor any of its subdivisions could impose-‘ direct burdens upon interstate commerce; that is, they may not regulate or restrain that which from its nature should be under the control of the one authority and be free from restriction save as it is governed in the manner that the national legislature constitutionally ordains. This limitation applies to the exertion of the state's taxing power as well as to any other interference by the state with the essential freedom of interstate commerce. Thus, the states cannot tax interstate commerce, either by laying the tax upon the business which constitutes such commerce or the privilege of engaging in it, or upon the receipts, as such, derived from it. Similarly, the states may not tax property in transit in interstate commerce.’ State of Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 8, 9, 54 S.Ct. 34, 36, 78 L.Ed. 131, 135.
In Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S 203, 45 S.Ct. 477, 69 L.Ed. 916, 44 A.L.R. 1219, the court stated the legal problem to be (268 U.S. 203, 216, 45 S.Ct. 480, 69 L.Ed. 923, 44 A.L.R. 1219):‘ May a state impose upon a foreign corporation which transacts only interstate business within her borders an excise tax measured by a combination of two factors-the proportion of the total value of capital shares attributed to transactions therein, and the proportion of net income attributed to such transactions?’ Referring to Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147, 153, 154, 38 S.Ct. 295, 62 L.Ed. 632, 636, where the state had demanded an excise of a foreign corporation which transacted therein only interstate business, the excise being laid upon the corporation, and where the Supreme Court had held the excise to be ‘ essentially a tax on doing an interstate business and therefore...
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