City of Webster v. The Moto Kobayashi Tr.
| Decision Date | 09 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 01-22-00628-CV |
| Parties | CITY OF WEBSTER, Appellant v. THE MOTO KOBAYASHI TRUST AND MITSUTARO KOBAYASHI WESTSIDE PROPERTIES, LP, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 152nd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2019-36189
Panel consists of Justices Landau, Countiss, and Guerra.
The City of Webster appeals the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction.[1] The Moto Kobayashi Trust and Mitsutaro Kobayashi Westside Properties, LP alleged in a Harris County district court that the City's ordinance requiring the removal or demolition of their properties as a public nuisance abatement measure, is illegal and effectively an unconstitutional taking. The City contends the district court erred by refusing to dismiss the constitutional inverse condemnation claim because the district courts lack jurisdiction over such claims in Harris County. We agree, and have held, that Government Code section 25.1032(c) confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Harris County civil courts at law over constitutional inverse condemnation claims. See San Jacinto River Auth. v. Burney, 570 S.W.3d 820 828-29 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2018), aff'd sub nom, San Jacinto River Auth. v. Medina, 627 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2021).
The parties dispute, however, whether the public-nuisance-abatement statute, Local Government Code section 214.001, as interpreted by the Texas Supreme Court creates an independent, statutory takings claim within the district court's jurisdiction, which the property owners have asserted or could assert through repleading. We agree with the City that it does not.
We reverse the district court's order denying the City's plea to the jurisdiction, and we render judgment dismissing the inverse condemnation claim without prejudice to its refiling in the county civil courts at law.
The Moto Kobayashi Trust and Mitsutaro Kobayashi Westside Properties, LP ("Owners") own three unoccupied, commercial buildings in the City of Webster. After an inspection, the City's chief building official notified Owners that the buildings have "structural issues," are "unsafe" and "a threat to human life, safety[,] and health," and pose a "safety and security risk" because unauthorized people could access them.
The building official referred the matter to the Building Board of Adjustment, which conducted a hearing and recommended to the City that the buildings be repaired or demolished because they were unsafe and structurally deficient.
The City conducted a public hearing on the board's recommendation. Relevant here, Local Government Code section 214.001 authorizes the City to enact ordinances requiring, among other things, the repair, removal, or demolition of buildings that are "dilapidated, substandard, or unfit for human habitation and a hazard to the public health, safety, and welfare" or "boarded up, fenced, or otherwise secured" in a manner that inadequately prevents unauthorized entry or use of the building by "vagrants or other uninvited persons as a place of harborage" or by children. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 214.001(a)(1)-(3).
After the hearing, the City approved an ordinance declaring that the buildings were "dangerous, structurally deficient[,] and pose[d] a threat to human life, safety, and health." In addition, the City found that the buildings did not comply with applicable building and property maintenance codes. The ordinance ordered the demolition or removal of the buildings, with no option for repair, within 45 days. Or else, the City would do so.
Owners appealed to the Harris County district court under Local Government Code section 214.0012.[2] See id. § 214.0012(a) (). Their petition alleged that the ordinance was illegal for several reasons, including vagueness, procedural errors, and insufficient evidence, and they sought a judgment declaring the ordinance unenforceable.
Owners also pleaded an inverse condemnation claim, alleging that the forced demolition of their property under section 214.001 violated the Texas Constitution's Takings Clause, and requested damages. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 17 ("No person's property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person[.]").
Whether their pleading alleged only constitutional inverse condemnation or also a statutory taking is disputed. According to Owners, because the claim arose from section 214.001's operation, their petition should be construed to include, or could be amended to include, an independent takings claim under that statute.
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the inverse condemnation claim because, under Government Code section 25.1032(c), county civil courts at law have exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.[3] See Tex. Gov't Code § 25.1032(c) ().
The district court denied the City's plea.
Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to a court's authority to decide a case. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). A plea questioning the trial court's jurisdiction raises a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We focus first on the plaintiff's petition to determine whether the facts pleaded show that jurisdiction exists. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446; Tex. S. Univ. v. Gilford, 277 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). We construe the pleadings liberally, look to the plaintiff's intent, and accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27; Gilford, 277 S.W.3d at 68. If the pleadings cannot establish jurisdiction but do not show an incurable defect, the plaintiff should be allowed to replead. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex. 2007); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. But if the pleadings affirmatively negate the trial court's jurisdiction, a claim may be dismissed without the opportunity for repleading. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227.
The jurisdictional question here turns on the construction of two statutes, which is also a question of law subject to de novo review. See TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin, 498 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. 2016). Our primary objective in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislature's intent. See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011); see also Tex. Gov't Code § 312.005. We identify that intent by looking first to the statute's plain language. See Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam). A statute's clear and unambiguous language determines legislative intent. See TIC Energy & Chem., 498 S.W.3d at 74-75. We presume that the legislature purposefully chose which words to include in the statute and which to omit. See Lippincott, 462 S.W.3d at 509. We give a statute's undefined terms their plain and ordinary meaning, and we construe the statute in a way that avoids rendering any word or provision meaningless. See Hous. Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Hous., 487 S.W.3d 154, 164 (Tex. 2016). We do not consider statutory provisions in isolation but read the statute as a whole. See In re Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d 686, 701 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding).
Sometimes, statutes appear to conflict. If a general provision conflicts with a specific or local provision, we will construe them to give effect to both, if possible. Tex. Gov't Code § 311.026(a). But if the general provision and the specific or local provision cannot be reconciled, "the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail." Id. § 311.026(b).
The City argues that the district court lacks jurisdiction over Owners' inverse condemnation claim because Government Code section 25.1032(c) gives the Harris County civil courts at law exclusive jurisdiction of such claims.
An inverse condemnation action is a constitutional claim in which a property owner asserts that a governmental entity intentionally performed acts that resulted in a "taking" of property for public use, without formally condemning the property, and require compensation. San Jacinto River Auth. v. Ogletree, 594 S.W.3d 833 839 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). Sometimes called a "takings claim," it is a type of eminent domain proceeding. Id. Generally, Texas district courts and county civil courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction in eminent domain cases, including inverse condemnation actions. See Tex. Prop. Code § 21.001. Harris County is an exception. In Harris County, Government Code section 25.1032(c) governs jurisdiction over eminent domain proceedings:
A county civil court at law has exclusive jurisdiction in Harris County of eminent domain proceedings, both statutory and inverse, if the amount in controversy in a statutory proceeding does not exceed the amount provided by Section 25.0003(c) in civil cases. Notwithstanding Section 21.013, Property Code,...
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