Claim of Gruber

• Decision Date: 26 November 1996
• Citation: 674 N.E.2d 1354,652 N.Y.S.2d 589,89 N.Y.2d 225
• Parties: , 674 N.E.2d 1354 In the Matter of the Claim of David GRUBER, Respondent. New York City Department of Personnel, Appellant; John E. Sweeney, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent. In the Matter of the Claim of Kent A. GREENE, Respondent. New York City Department of Personnel, Appellant; John E. Sweeney, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 589

652 N.Y.S.2d 589

89 N.Y.2d 225, 674 N.E.2d 1354

In the Matter of the Claim of David GRUBER, Respondent.

New York City Department of Personnel, Appellant;

John E. Sweeney, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

In the Matter of the Claim of Kent A. GREENE, Respondent.

New York City Department of Personnel, Appellant;

John E. Sweeney, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 26, 1996.

Paul A. Crotty, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Ellen Ravitch and Stephen J. McGrath, of counsel), for appellant in the first and second above-entitled proceedings.

Francis J. Smith, Jr., Albany, for David Gruber, respondent in the first above-entitled proceeding.

McNamee, Lochner, Titus & Williams, P.C., Albany (David J. Wukitsch, of counsel), for Kent A. Greene, respondent in the second above-entitled proceeding.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General, Brooklyn (Steven Segall, Barbara G. Billet, Peter H. Schiff, Daniel F. De Vita and Steven Koton, of counsel), for John E. Sweeney, respondent in the first and second above-entitled proceedings.

OPINION OF THE COURT

TITONE, Judge.

Labor Law § 593(1) provides that claimants will be disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits if they voluntarily separate without good cause from their "last employment" prior to the filing of an unemployment claim. In each of these two cases, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board determined that the words "last employment" as used in that section did not refer to the last covered "employment" as that term is defined in Labor Law § 511, but referred to the claimant's last actual employment, regardless of whether that employment was covered by the Unemployment Insurance Law. Under the circumstances presented, the question of statutory interpretation presented is one of law for this Court, requiring no deference to the agency determinations below. Having performed that function, we conclude that the term "last employment" refers to covered employment, and that these claimants were disqualified from receiving benefits because they voluntarily separated from their last covered employment without good cause (see, Labor Law § 593[1] ). Thus, we reverse the determinations below that these claimants are entitled to unemployment benefits.

I. Matter of Gruber

Claimant Gruber graduated from Mount Sinai Medical School in May 1983 and received a medical degree. He was employed as a research assistant for the New York City Department of Health from July 15, 1983 through June 13, 1984. He resigned from the City post to accept a position in a medical residency program at St. Luke's, which is a teaching hospital accredited by the AMA.

Gruber's contract with St. Luke's was executed on March 22, 1984 and covered a one-year term to commence on July 1, 1984. However, claimant received permission to begin rendering his services for the hospital at an earlier date, and began making rounds on June 18, 1984. After only several days at the hospital, claimant became emotionally ill and was hospitalized. He never returned to the residency program.

Gruber filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits. By initial determination, the local unemployment office concluded that Gruber's "last employment" within the meaning of Labor Law § 593(1) was with St. Luke's, that he lost such employment because of illness--a nondisqualifying condition--and thus that he was eligible to receive unemployment insurance. The office determined that claimant's employment with St. Luke's was not "covered" employment, and thus charged the City of New York for claimant's benefits under Labor Law § 581(1)(e) as claimant's "last employer."

Respondent City of New York objected to the ruling, contending that either (1) St. Luke's should be liable if claimant's employment with the hospital does not fall within the exclusion to the definition of "employment" under Labor Law § 511(15), or (2) if claimant's employment with St. Luke's is deemed to be "student services" excluded from the definition of covered employment, then the City Department of Health should be deemed claimant's "last employer," but claimant should be deemed ineligible to receive benefits because he left that employment with the City to pursue his education--a disqualifying condition. The Labor Commissioner determined that claimant was eligible for benefits. However, after concluding that claimant's employment at St. Luke's Hospital was not covered employment, the Commissioner charged the City Department of Health for claimant's benefits.

Respondent City objected to the Commissioner's determination. A hearing was then held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the New York State Department of Labor. The ALJ concluded that claimant was eligible for benefits and that claimant's employment with St. Luke's did not fall under the exception created by Labor Law § 511(15) because claimant's service as a medical resident did not constitute "services rendered for an educational institution by a person who is enrolled and is in regular attendance as a student in such an institution." Thus, the ALJ sustained the City's objection, and overruled the Labor Commissioner's determination that claimant's employment with St. Luke's was not covered employment. St. Luke's was thus charged for Gruber's benefits.

On appeal taken by the Commissioner of Labor and St. Luke's, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board determined that claimant's services at St. Luke's did fall within the section 511(15) exception to the definition of employment, and St. Luke's was not liable for claimant's benefits. However, the Appeal Board determined that for purposes of Labor Law § 593(1), "claimant's last employment was with St. Luke's and he left this employment with good cause and under nondisqualifying conditions." The Board reasoned that the term "employment" as used in section 593(1) meant any employment, not only covered employment as defined in Labor Law § 511. Thus, the Board concluded that the City Department of Health was primarily chargeable for claimant's benefits because that employment was "covered." The Appellate Division affirmed. We granted the City's motion for leave to appeal, and now reverse.

Matter of Greene

Claimant Greene was simultaneously employed by the City of New York Department of Health and by the College of Staten Island as a teacher while enrolled in a Master's Degree program at the latter institution. He voluntarily terminated his employment with the City Department of Health on May 24, 1991 to pursue his education. Greene's last day of teaching was May 30, 1991, although he remained on the payroll through August 1, 1991.

Greene filed an application for benefits, and the local office ruled that he was eligible. The City of New York objected and a hearing was held before a State Department of Labor ALJ. The ALJ found that claimant was eligible for benefits, concluding that "although claimant's last employment was not in covered employment pursuant to Section 511(15), it is nevertheless employment which should be considered to adjust the issue of who the last employ[er] [sic] was and under which circumstances the last employment came to an end". The ALJ concluded that claimant's employment with the college was his last employment "and although that was not covered employment it is not self-employment and it may be counted to break the disqualification that is apparent for voluntar[ily] [sic] leaving the municipal employment."

The City appealed. The Appeal Board adopted the findings of fact and opinion of the ALJ and confirmed the ALJ's determination. The Appeal Board concluded that Greene's work as a teacher was not covered employment and should not be considered in computing his benefit rate or experience charges. Nonetheless, the Appeal Board concluded that claimant was eligible for benefits because his "last employment was at school and * * * it ended under nondisqualifying conditions."

The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court reasoned that "[a]lthough claimant's employment with the College was not 'covered' employment * * * it was nevertheless sufficient to break claimant's prior disqualification which resulted when he left his job with the City." (221 A.D.2d 789, 790, 633 N.Y.S.2d 670.) The Court noted that "Labor Law § 593(1)(a) does not specify that a claimant's 'last' employment must be 'covered' employment for purposes of disqualification" (id., at 790, 633 N.Y.S.2d 670.) The Court concluded that since claimant left his actual last employment with the college under nondisqualifying conditions, the Appeal Board's decision that claimant was eligible for benefits was supported by "substantial evidence." This Court granted the City's motion for leave to appeal, and we now reverse.

II.

1. Standard of Review

Judicial review of the determinations of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is limited by statute to questions of law (Labor Law § 623; Matter of Fisher [Levine], 36 N.Y.2d 146, 149-150, 365 N.Y.S.2d 828, 325 N.E.2d 151). Although the proper interpretation of a statute ordinarily presents an issue of law reserved for the courts, this Court has recognized that "[a]n administrative agency's interpretation of the statute it is charged with implementing is entitled to varying degrees of judicial deference depending upon the extent to which the interpretation relies upon the special competence the agency is presumed to have developed in its administration of the statute" (Matter of Rosen v. Public Empl. Relations Bd., 72 N.Y.2d 42, 47, 530 N.Y.S.2d 534, 526 N.E.2d 25). "Where the interpretation of a statute or its application involves knowledge and understanding of underlying operational practices or entails an evaluation of factual data and inferences to be drawn therefrom, the courts regularly defer to the governmental agency charged with the responsibility for administration of the statute" (Kurcsics v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 451, 459, 426...