Clark v. State
| Decision Date | 31 January 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 3D99-3025.,3D99-3025. |
| Parties | Courtney CLARK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Lee Weissenborn, Special Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Frank J. Ingrassia, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before JORGENSON, COPE, and GODERICH, JJ.
Defendant Courtney Clark appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence for second degree murder. We affirm.
Defendant's principal argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a statement made to the investigating detective while defendant was in custody, immediately after he had been given his Miranda warnings and had allegedly invoked his right to counsel.
The sequence of events is not in dispute. Following a drive-by shooting in which an innocent bystander was killed, defendant was taken into custody pursuant to an arrest warrant after being identified by witnesses as one of the shooters. At the Dade County Jail he was advised of his Miranda rights by Detective De La Torriente. Defendant refused to sign the Miranda form or initial any of the boxes that appear at the side of each specifically identified right. Defendant then, without any prompting, stated to the detective Detective De La Torriente went no further with the interview; he gave defendant his card and told defendant that defendant or his attorney should call if defendant decided to give a statement about the homicide.
It is the entire above-quoted statement that defendant's counsel moved to suppress. However, the only portion of the statement that the State sought to admit against the defendant was the first sentence: "I'm not going to talk to you now because what I say could put me in jail for a long time."
The transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress indicates that the trial court gave the defense the option of admitting only that second part of the first sentence, or admitting the entire statement, consisting of the two full sentences. After again objecting to the admission of any part of the statement, the defense indicated that if the phrase "because what I say could put me in jail for a long time" was admitted, then the entire statement consisting of both full sentences should come into evidence to give full context to that admission. At trial, the entire statement was admitted pursuant to defense counsel's choice.
We find no error in the trial court's admission of defendant's statement "because what I say could put me in jail for a long time." Our research has disclosed no case on all fours, where the defendant in the same breath first invoked his right to remain silent and then volunteered an incriminating statement. However, the law is clear that even after a suspect has invoked his right to remain silent, an inculpatory statement is admissible if it was voluntary and initiated by the defendant. See State v. Evans, 462 So.2d 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
. See also Christopher v. State, 269 Ga. 382, 497 S.E.2d 803 (1998) (); People v. Eveans, 277 Ill.App.3d 36, 214 Ill.Dec. 49, 660 N.E.2d 240 (1996) ().
We find no merit in the remaining arguments on appeal, and affirm the conviction. We likewise affirm the aggravated departure sentence; the reason given was the statutory departure reason set forth in section 921.0016(3)(i), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996).
AFFIRMED.
Although there was an error in the denial of the motion to suppress the defendant's statement, the error was harmless.
The detective gave defendant-appellant Clark full Miranda1 warnings, after which defendant stated in substance, 2
After ruling that the first sentence was admissible, the court gave the defense the option of having only that sentence admitted, or having both sentences admitted into evidence:
The court allowed defense counsel until the next day to make a decision.
The following day, just before trial began, defense counsel renewed his objection to any part of the statement coming into evidence. Defense counsel then indicated that if the first sentence were to come into evidence, then the second sentence should come in as well so as to show the full context of the statement that was made. Consequently, both sentences were presented to the jury.3
The question before us is whether the trial court erred in ruling admissible the statement, "I'm not going to talk to you now because what I say could put me in jail for a long time."
The first part of this sentence—"I'm not going to talk to you now"—is an invocation of the right to silence. Under Miranda itself, that part of defendant's statement should not have been placed before the jury. The Miranda decision provides:
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.
384 U.S. at 468, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see United States v. Szymaniak, 934 F.2d 434, 439 (2d Cir.1991)
; Royal v. State, 347 So.2d 742, 743-44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Carter v. State, 335 So.2d 875, 875-76 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); see also Jones v. State, 200 So.2d 574-576 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). But see Shields v. State, 269 Ga. 177, 496 S.E.2d 719, 720-21 (1998).
The second part of the defendant's statement—"because what I say could put me in jail for a long time"—is a volunteered statement, which the defendant made after he had been warned that anything he said could be used against him. It would have been permissible for the State to introduce in its case in chief that the defendant said, "what I say could put me in jail for a long time." See Royal v. State, 347 So.2d at 743-44
.
Thus, the first part of defendant's statement, where he invoked his right to remain silent, should have been suppressed and should not have been placed before the jury. The second part of the same sentence was not subject to suppression, and was admissible in evidence.
An error of this type is subject to harmless error analysis. See Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 973 (Fla.1992)
; State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1134-37 (Fla.1986). After redacting the first part of defendant's statement, it was permissible for the jury to hear that defendant said "what I say could put me in jail for a long time." I do not think that there is a material difference between that statement, and the full sentence, "I'm not going to talk to you now because what I say could put me in jail for a long time," or for that matter, the entire two sentences which were placed before the jury at the option of defendant. The heart of the matter was the volunteered statement that "what I say could put me in jail for a long time."
This was a shootout on a city street in a dispute over territory for street drug sales. The defendant was in the back seat of a Cadillac driven by Sabrina Simmons. Simmons' husband, Mark Cole, was in the front passenger seat. A gunfight occurred between the occupants of the Cadillac and individuals on the street. During this gunfight, a bystander was shot and killed as she attempted to enter her apartment while carrying an infant.
It was undisputed that the defendant was in the Cadillac and that the gunshots from the Cadillac...
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