Clay County v. Bank of Knobel

• Decision Date: 09 December 1912
• Citation: 151 S.W. 1013,105 Ark. 450
• Parties: CLAY COUNTY v. BANK OF KNOBEL
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

151 S.W. 1013

105 Ark. 450

CLAY COUNTY v. BANK OF KNOBEL

Supreme Court of Arkansas

December 9, 1912

Appeal from Clay Circuit Court, Western District; W. J. Driver Judge; reversed.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

At the March term, 1912, of the Clay County Court appellee presented its petition, alleging that its property in 1911, including its entire assets, personal and real, was assessed at the sum of $ 9,342.43, whereas it should have been assessed at one-half that sum. It prayed that the assessment be reduced.

The petition was overruled. Appellee took an appeal to the circuit court. In the circuit court appellant filed an answer, admitting that appellee's property had been assessed at the sum alleged, but denied that the property was doubly assessed, and set up that the court was without jurisdiction or power to grant the relief prayed for, and alleged that if the petitioner was entitled to any relief it had lost that right by failure to apply to the proper court within the time required by law.

A trial was had and evidence was adduced tending to show that appellee's property was assessed at its true value, the amount alleged in the complaint; and there was evidence to the effect that the board of equalization of Clay County had a rule to assess property at fifty cents on the dollar of its true value; that the board, in that respect, approved the rule of the State Tax Commission to assess property at its real value, and then cut it half in two and put the valuation at one-half the real value. But this was not done as to the property of appellee.

The circuit court rendered judgment reducing the assessment to $ 4,696.25, as prayed in the petition. Appellant duly prosecutes this appeal.

Judgment reversed, and cause dismissed.

G. B Oliver, for appellant.

Appellee had a remedy provided by law whereby it could obtain relief. Not having pursued that remedy, the judgment was erroneous and should be reversed. Kirby's Dig., § 7180; Acts 1911, p. 230, § 1; 94 Ark. 217; 90 Ark. 417.

J. S Jordan, for appellee.

By the amendment of 1911 (Acts, p. 161) to the act of February 22, 1881, establishing separate courts in Clay County, there was established a county court for the Western District of Clay County, and the terms of said court were fixed by section 2 of the amendment to be held on the third Monday in December and the fourth Mondays in March, June and September. There was therefore no October term of the court, and no board of equalization convened on the first Monday in September. Appellee could not have complied with the act of 1911, p. 230, unless its property were in the Eastern District of the county. See Kirby's Dig,. § 6993; Id. § 7180; 56 Ark. 173; 62 Ark. 461.

OPINION

WOOD, J., (after stating the facts).

Act 249, of the Acts of 1911, p. 230, which amends section 7003 of Kirby's Digest, provides that the board of equalization, when in session, "shall have power to examine witnesses with respect to any matter under investigation, to hear complaints with respect to the undervaluation or overvaluation of property, and to equalize the assessments of the county by adding to or taking from the valuation of any real or personal property, moneys and credits within the county, and to assess the property of any person omitted from the rolls by the assessor, and to correct the obvious errors that may have been made in the assessment of property by the assessor."

The second section specifies when the board of equalization shall meet, and then provides: "The board shall have power to exercise its functions in the equalization of property until the fourth Wednesday of October."

The fourth section provides that "all appeals taken from the order of the board of equalization shall be taken to the October term of the county court, and such appeals, even if taken after the regular October term of the county court has convened, shall be heard and passed upon by said court before the fourth Wednesday in October."

And the fifth section, among other things, provides that "all appeals from the county court to the circuit court herein provided must be taken within thirty days of the day upon which the order from which the appeal is taken was made."

It will thus be seen that the statute furnishes a complete remedy, in case of overvaluation of property by the assessor, to have the same reduced by first applying to the board of equalization, and, if relief is not granted there, then by appeal to the county court, and then to the circuit court. The appellee did not pursue the remedy provided by statute.

We held, in Clay...