Coastal Florida Police Benev. Ass'n, Inc. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 30 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. SC00-1860, No. SC00-2072.
• Citation: 838 So.2d 543
• Parties: COASTAL FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. Phillip B. (Phil) WILLIAMS, etc., Respondent. Phillip B. (Phil) Williams, etc., Petitioner, v. Coastal Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

838 So.2d 543

COASTAL FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. Phillip B. (Phil) WILLIAMS, etc., Respondent.

Phillip B. (Phil) Williams, etc., Petitioner, v. Coastal Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc., Respondent.

Nos. SC00-1860, SC00-2072.

Supreme Court of Florida.

January 30, 2003.

G. "Hal" Johnson, Tallahassee, for Petitioner/Respondent.

Phillip P. Quaschnick of Powers, Quaschnick, Tischler, Evans & Dietzen, Tallahassee; and Stephen H. Grimes of Holland & Knight LLP, Tallahassee, for Respondent/Petitioner.

James G. Brown and Dorothy F. Green of Brown & Green, P.A., Orlando, for Palm

Beach County Sheriff's Office, Amicus Curiae.

William E. Powers, Jr., of Powers, Quaschnick, Tischler, Evans & Dietzen, Tallahassee, for the Florida Sheriffs' Association, Amicus Curiae.

Ellen Leonard, Tampa, for Cal Henderson, Sheriff of Hillsborough County, Amicus Curiae.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review Williams v. Coastal Florida Police Benevolent Ass'n, 765 So.2d 908 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), wherein the district court certified the following question to be of great public importance:

ARE DEPUTY SHERIFFS CATEGORICALLY EXCLUDED FROM HAVING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS UNDER CHAPTER 447?

Id. at 909. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons stated below, we rephrase the question, and, as rephrased, we answer the certified question in the negative. We rephrase the question:

ARE DEPUTY SHERIFFS CATEGORICALLY EXCLUDED FROM HAVING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS UNDER THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?

We answer this question in the negative and hold that deputy sheriffs, like all other employees, are entitled to collective bargaining rights under the express provisions of the Florida Constitution.

PROCEEDINGS TO DATE

This case arose out of a petition filed before the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) by the Coastal Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (CFPBA), seeking to represent certain public employees in the State of Florida for purposes of collective bargaining. PERC is the agency which oversees and regulates public sector collective bargaining in Florida. CFPBA filed a representation-certification petition seeking certification as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for employees of the Brevard County Sheriff's Office. The employees included deputy sheriffs in the positions of deputy, field training officer, corporal, and sergeant. After a preliminary investigation, PERC issued its "Notice of Sufficiency" finding that the CFPBA's petition was sufficient to allow it to enforce the collective bargaining rights of the deputy sheriffs:

The Florida Supreme Court's recent opinion in Service Employees International Union Local 16, AFL-CIO v. Public Employees Relations Commission, et al., No. SC 94427 (Fla. January 13, 2000), casts doubts as to the vitality of its prior decision in Murphy v. Mack, 358 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1978), holding that deputy sheriffs are not public employees. Therefore, we find this petition to represent deputy sheriffs for the purpose of collective bargaining sufficient in order to develop a record as to the deputies' duties and responsibilities vis-a-vis the sheriff himself.¹

Subsequent to PERC's Notice of Sufficiency, Sheriff Williams filed an application for a writ of prohibition with the Fifth District Court of Appeal, asserting that deputy sheriffs have no collective bargaining rights. After initially granting relief in part, the Fifth District reconsidered and denied prohibition. The Fifth District opined that this Court's decision in Service Employees International Union, Local 16, AFL-CIO v. Public Employees Relations Commission, 752 So.2d 569 (Fla.2000), substantially undercut the rationale of Murphy v. Mack, 358 So.2d 822 (Fla.1978):

In Service Employees, the Florida Supreme Court took another look at the Murphy case. It said that the name "deputy" and the fact of "appointment" were meaningless distinctions in determining whether a person is entitled to collective bargaining rights under chapter 447. Rather, the statute sets forth two basic categories of persons who work for the public—the ordinary ones and the managerial ones. Only the managerial ones are not public employees for purposes of rights to collective bargaining.

Williams, 765 So.2d at 909. Based on this analysis, the Fifth District denied the petition for prohibition and certified the aforementioned question, which we have rephrased for purposes of this opinion.

ANALYSIS

In Murphy v. Mack, 358 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1978), the Court considered whether the county sheriff was a "public employer" and deputy sheriffs "public employees" under the Florida statutory scheme of collective bargaining. The Court held that the county sheriff was a public employer; however, it held that deputy sheriffs were not public employees. Id. at 824 ("[W]e find that the language employed by the Legislature in Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975), does not reveal a legislative intent to include appointed deputy sheriffs within the definition [of] `public employee.'").

In Service Employees this Court was presented with a similar question certified by the Fifth District involving public employees who have historically been categorized as "deputies":

Are deputy court clerks, unlike deputy sheriffs, public employees within the contemplation of section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes?

752 So.2d at 570. The Court answered affirmatively and held that deputy clerks were in fact public employees entitled to collective bargaining rights under section 447.203, Florida Statutes (1997). The Court acknowledged that in the past a "deputy" may have occupied a special place inasmuch as a "deputy functioned as the alter ego, so to speak, or second in command to the principal." Id. at 572. In this respect, the Court noted, deputies were in fact managerial-level employees who could take charge in the principal's absence. However, the Court found:

Times have changed and the public officials who once required one or two deputies to assist them in their tasks now might require a host of assistants. Further, the range of tasks performed by these workers has expanded and the tasks themselves have become specialized. For instance, a clerk of court today might employ a score or more skilled workers as bookkeepers, archivists, filing clerks, typists, and receptionists. In deference to tradition, such employees are often still called "deputies," but their positions bear little resemblance to the deputies of old. As noted by the district court below, the deputies of today often "look surprisingly like other public employees." Various public officials are currently authorized under Florida Statutes to appoint deputies—e.g., sheriffs, clerks of court, property appraisers, and tax collectors.

Id. (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted). In Service Employees, the Court further observed that "Murphy appears to have exalted form over substance in contravention of the plain language and broad purpose of the Act." The Court also noted that the "appointed/employed" distinction was of little significance under chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1997), because the definition of "public employee" in section 447.203 itself drew no such distinction. The Court explained that there was simply no basis for excluding a "deputy" from the protection of chapter 447:

There are two basic categories of persons who work for the public: (1) employees in the ordinary sense of the word, and (2) managerial level employees (as well as various other specialized workers). Employees in the ordinary sense of the word are considered "public employees" under the Act and their right to collectively bargain is protected. Managerial level employees, on the other hand, are not considered "public employees" and their right to collectively bargain is not protected by the Act.

752 So.2d at 572. We ultimately concluded that it would not be appropriate to extend our prior ruling in Murphy to deputy clerks.

On the other hand, consistent with our holding in Murphy, we note that other statutory provisions reflect an apparent legislative intent to deny or control the right to extend collective bargaining to deputy sheriffs.² First, section 30.071(1) states that chapter 30, Florida Statutes (2002), applies to all deputy sheriffs, except those who, by special act of the Legislature or local law, are granted rights greater than those provided in the chapter, including collective bargaining rights. By necessary implication, this evinces an intent that the Legislature has not otherwise granted the right to collective bargaining to all deputy sheriffs, but local entities may do so if they please. To the extent that is not sufficiently clear, section 30.071(2) unambiguously states, "This act does not grant to deputy sheriffs the right of collective bargaining." In addition, section 112.535, Florida Statutes (2002), provides:

The provisions of chapter 93-19, Laws of Florida, shall not be construed to restrict or otherwise limit the discretion of the sheriff to take any disciplinary action, without limitation, against a deputy sheriff, including the demotion, reprimand, suspension, or dismissal thereof, nor to limit the right of the sheriff to appoint deputy sheriffs or to withdraw their appointment as provided in chapter 30. Neither shall the provisions of chapter 93-19, Laws of Florida, be construed to grant collective bargaining rights to deputy sheriffs or to provide them with a property interest or continued expectancy in their appointment as a deputy sheriff.

Id. (emphasis added.) It is important to note that the Murphy opinion considered whether "a sheriff is a `public employer' and whether a deputy sheriff is a `public employee' as such terms are utilized in Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975)." 358 So.2d at 823. The Murphy opinion did not consider any constitutional considerations associated with the determination of the status...