Hernandez v. State

Decision Date23 May 2019
Docket Number526866
Citation173 A.D.3d 105,99 N.Y.S.3d 795
Parties Crispin HERNANDEZ et al., Appellants, v. STATE of New York et al., Opinion and Order Appellants, and New York Farm Bureau, Inc., Respondent.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York City (Erin Beth Harrist of counsel), for Crispin Hernandez and others, appellants.

Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Joseph M. Spadola of counsel), for State of New York and another, appellants.

Bond Schoeneck & King PLLC, Syracuse (Brian J. Butler of counsel), for respondent.

Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, Inc., Baltimore, Maryland (Naomi B. Campbell of counsel), for Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc. and others, amici curiae. Powers and Santola, LLP, Albany (Michael J. Hutter of counsel) and Jonathan Wood, Arlington, Virginia, admitted pro hac vice, for Pacific Legal Foundation, amicus curiae.

Before: Garry, P.J., Lynch, Clark, Devine and Pritzker, JJ.

Clark, J.Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (McNally Jr., J.), entered January 17, 2018 in Albany County, which granted a motion by defendant New York Farm Bureau, Inc. to dismiss the complaint against it.

In 1937, through the enactment of the State Labor Relations Act – later renamed the New York State Employment Relations Act (hereinafter SERA) (seeLabor Law § 718, as renum and amended by L 1991, ch 166, § 251)the Legislature granted employees a statutory right to organize and collectively bargain and established a comprehensive administrative framework that protects those rights, regulates the collective bargaining process and provides a forum in which employers and employees can resolve labor disputes (seeLabor Law §§ 700 –718 ; L 1937, ch 443, § 1). However, SERA's rights and protections extend to only those persons who fit within SERA's definition of "employees" (Labor Law § 701[3][a] ). Excluded from that definition are, among others, "any individuals employed as farm laborers" (hereinafter referred to as the farm laborer exclusion) (Labor Law § 701[3][a] ).

In May 2016, plaintiffs commenced this action against defendants State of New York and Governor Andrew Cuomo (hereinafter collectively referred to as the State defendants) seeking, among other things, a declaration that the farm laborer exclusion is unconstitutional. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the farm laborer exclusion violates several provisions of the N.Y. Constitution, including the right to organize and collectively bargain guaranteed to "[e]mployees" by article I, § 17 (first cause of action), the right to equal protection (second cause of action) (seeN.Y. Const, art I, § 11 ), the right to due process under the law (third cause of action) (seeN.Y. Const, art I, § 6 ), and the right to freedom of association (fourth cause of action) (seeN.Y. Const, art I, § 9 ). In June 2016, prompted by the State defendants' public statements that they did not intend to defend the constitutionality of the farm laborer exclusion, defendant New York Farm Bureau, Inc. (hereinafter the Farm Bureau)"the state's largest agricultural advocacy organization," whose membership is primarily comprised of agricultural employers – moved to intervene as a defendant in this action. Supreme Court granted that motion in October 2016. Shortly thereafter, the State defendants interposed an answer stating, among other things, that they intended to join plaintiffs in arguing that the farm laborer exclusion is unconstitutional.1 Around that same time, the Farm Bureau moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (seeCPLR 3211[a][7] ), which plaintiffs and the State defendants opposed. Supreme Court granted the Farm Bureau's motion to dismiss the complaint, finding, among other things, that the right to organize and collectively bargain guaranteed to employees in N.Y. Constitution, article I, § 17 does not extend to farm laborers. Plaintiffs and the State defendants now appeal.

We must first address two threshold issues raised by the Farm Bureau. The Farm Bureau argues that the State defendants lack standing to appeal because they are not aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint brought against them and, further, that this appeal does not present a justiciable controversy given the State defendants' alignment in position with plaintiffs. We disagree with the Farm Bureau on both points.

1 We initially resolve the issue of justiciability, as it implicates the Court's subject matter jurisdiction (see e.g.Matter of New York State Inspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Empls., Dist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL–CIO v. Cuomo,64 N.Y.2d 233, 241 n. 3, 485 N.Y.S.2d 719, 475 N.E.2d 90 [1984] ). Pursuant to CPLR 3001, "[S]upreme [C]ourt may render a declaratory judgment having the effect of a final judgment as to the rights and other legal relations of the parties to a justiciable controversy whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." "To constitute a ‘justiciable controversy,’ there must be a real dispute between adverse parties, involving substantial legal interests for which a declaration of rights will have some practical effect" (Chanos v. MADAC, LLC.,74 A.D.3d 1007, 1008, 903 N.Y.S.2d 506 [2010] ; seeAmerican Ins. Assn. v. Chu,64 N.Y.2d 379, 383, 487 N.Y.S.2d 311, 476 N.E.2d 637 [1985] ; New York Pub. Interest Research Group v. Carey,42 N.Y.2d 527, 529–531, 399 N.Y.S.2d 621, 369 N.E.2d 1155 [1977] ).

2 There is no doubt that plaintiffs' complaint presented a bona fide justiciable controversy as to whether the farm laborer exclusion violates the N.Y. Constitution (see e.g.Blye v. Globe–Wernicke Realty Co.,33 N.Y.2d 15, 19, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170, 300 N.E.2d 710 [1973] ). That justiciable controversy was not, as the Farm Bureau contends, eliminated by the State defendants' subsequent decision to forgo defending the constitutionality of the exclusion in court (seeUnited States v. Windsor,570 U.S. 744, 756, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 186 L.Ed.2d 808 [2013] ; Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha,462 U.S. 919, 939–940, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 [1983] ). Notwithstanding the State defendants' position that the farm laborer exclusion is unconstitutional, the Governor and the executive agencies charged with the enforcement of SERA continue to apply and give effect to the exclusion (seeUnited States v. Windsor,570 U.S. at 756, 133 S.Ct. 2675 ; Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha,462 U.S. at 939–940, 103 S.Ct. 2764 ). Despite their alignment with the State defendants, plaintiffs still do not have the ultimate relief they seek. Moreover, the Farm Bureau became a party in this action "for all purposes" when it was granted permission to intervene as a defendant (Matter of Greater N.Y. Health Care Facilities Assn. v. DeBuono,91 N.Y.2d 716, 720, 674 N.Y.S.2d 634, 697 N.E.2d 589 [1998] ; seeMatter of Rent Stabilization Assn. of N.Y. City v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal,252 A.D.2d 111, 116, 681 N.Y.S.2d 679 [1998] ). The Farm Bureau's "sharp adversarial presentation of the issues" in its motion to dismiss establishes the existence of a real dispute between adverse parties regarding substantial legal interests (United States v. Windsor,570 U.S. at 761, 133 S.Ct. 2675 ). Thus, contrary to the Farm Bureau's assertions, this case squarely presents a ripe, justiciable controversy (seeCPLR 3001 ; compareSchultz v. City of Port Jervis,242 A.D.2d 699, 700–701, 662 N.Y.S.2d 591 [1997] ).

34 As for the issue of aggrievement, CPLR 5511 provides that only "[a]n aggrieved party" may appeal from an appealable order or judgment (seeMatter of Dolomite Prods. Co., Inc. v. Town of Ballston,151 A.D.3d 1328, 1331, 58 N.Y.S.3d 174 [2017] ). "[A] party is aggrieved when the court denies, in whole or in part, such party's requested relief [or, conversely,] when a court grants relief, in whole or in part, against such party and such party had opposed the requested relief" (Matter of Dolomite Prods. Co., Inc. v. Town of Ballston,151 A.D.3d at 1331, 58 N.Y.S.3d 174 ; seeMixon v. TBV, Inc.,76 A.D.3d 144, 156–157, 904 N.Y.S.2d 132 [2010] ). Here, consistent with their intention – announced in their answer – to argue that the farm laborer exclusion violates the Equal Protection Clause of the N.Y. Constitution, the State defendants opposed and advocated for the denial of the Farm Bureau's motion to dismiss the complaint. As Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss, the State defendants are an aggrieved party and, thus, proper appellants (see generallyMatter of Dolomite Prods. Co., Inc. v. Town of Ballston,151 A.D.3d at 1331, 58 N.Y.S.3d 174 ; Mixon v. TBV, Inc.,76 A.D.3d at 156–157, 904 N.Y.S.2d 132 ).

Turning to the merits, plaintiffs – joined by the State defendants – assert that the farm laborer exclusion denies them equal protection of the law by infringing upon their fundamental right to organize and collectively bargain, as guaranteed by N.Y. Constitution, article I, § 17. NY Constitution, article I, § 17 states, in pertinent part, that "[e]mployees shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing." The Farm Bureau argues that, because article I, § 17 was adopted just one year after the enactment of SERA, the N.Y. Constitution's use of the word "employees" should be construed to include only those individuals who qualify as "employees" under Labor Law § 701(3)(a). Through this reasoning, the Farm Bureau contends that "individuals employed as farm laborers" do not have a constitutional right to organize and collectively bargain (Labor Law § 701[3][a] ). In dismissing the complaint, Supreme Court appears to have accepted this proposition. We, however, categorically reject it.

567 It is a well-settled and basic tenet of constitutional and statutory interpretation that the clearest and "most compelling" indicator of the drafters' intent is the language itself (People v. Carroll,3 N.Y.2d...

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