Coker v. City of Lewiston

• Decision Date: 30 April 1998
• Docket Number: Docket No. A
• Citation: 710 A.2d 909
• Parties: Marvin COKER v. CITY OF LEWISTON. nd-97-375.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 909

710 A.2d 909

1998 ME 93

Marvin COKER v. CITY OF LEWISTON.

Docket No. And-97-375.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Dec. 1, 1997.

Decided April 30, 1998.

Patricia M. Ender (orally), Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Inc., Augusta, for plaintiff.

Robert S. Hark (orally), City Attorney, Lewiston, for defendant.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, LIPEZ, and SAUFLY, JJ.

SAUFLEY, Justice.

¶1 This case requires us to decide whether a recipient of general assistance who has performed "workfare" to maintain eligibility for that assistance is entitled to offset the value of that workfare against the recipient's obligation to reimburse the municipality for the general assistance received. Because we conclude that the recipient is entitled to such an offset, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Atwood, J.) affirming the hearing officer's decision to the contrary.

¶2 The facts are undisputed. The City of Lewiston provided Marvin Coker with general assistance and required him to perform work through its municipal work program intermittently between October 1993 and August 1995. ¹ In total, the City provided Coker with $1,651.85 in general assistance and Coker performed 285 hours of workfare valued at $1,211.25 if compensable at the then-existing minimum wage of $4.25 per hour. See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4316-A(2)(A) (Supp.1997).

¶3 During an intervening period of private employment, Coker injured his back, applied for workers' compensation, and was awarded $1,267.68. At the City's request, pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. § 4318 (1992 & Supp.1997), Coker authorized a lien on his workers' compensation award to reimburse the City for the general assistance it had provided him. The City then enforced the lien and, because that amount was less than the $1,651.85 of general assistance provided to Coker, kept the entire $1,267.68 award.

¶4 Coker appealed to the City's fair hearing authority, citing 22 M.R.S.A. § 4316-A(2)(A) and arguing that the value of his workfare operated as an offset against the general assistance he received. Accordingly, Coker asserted that the City owed him $827.08. ² The hearing officer concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. § 4322 (Supp.1997). On appeal to the Superior Court, the court (Alexander, J.) ruled that the hearing officer did have jurisdiction and remanded the matter for disposition on the merits. The hearing officer then concluded that 22 M.R.S.A. § 4318 permitted the City to keep all of Coker's workers' compensation award without regard for the value of his workfare. Coker once again appealed to the Superior Court (Atwood, J.), which affirmed the hearing officer's decision.

¶5 The City challenges the court's determination that the hearing officer had authority to address Coker's appeal. Coker, in turn, challenges the court's judgment affirming the hearing officer's conclusion that the City may retain all of his workers' compensation award as a recovery of the general assistance it provided to him. Coker argues that the value of work performed by a general assistance recipient pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. § 4316-A(2)(A) must be offset against the general assistance received, thus limiting the municipality's recovery pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. § 4318. The City, relying on Radvanovsky v. Maine Dept. of Manpower Affairs, 427 A.2d 961 (Me.1981) and Closson v. Town of Southwest Harbor, 512 A.2d 1028 (Me.1986), contends that the work performed has no value other than to establish the recipient's continuing eligibility to receive general assistance.

¶6 When the Superior Court reviews a municipal decision pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 11001-11007 (1989), we review the decision of the municipality directly. See H.E. Sargent, Inc. v. Town of Wells, 676 A.2d 920, 923 (Me.1996); 5 M.R.S.A. § 11008 (1989). The hearing officer here was called upon to construe the Municipal General Assistance statutes, specifically 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4316-A and 4318. The meaning and construction of statutory language presents a question of law. See Community Telecomm. Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 684 A.2d 424, 426 (Me.1996). We review such questions de novo. See H.E. Sargent Inc., 676 A.2d at 923.

¶7 Maine's general assistance statutes must be construed liberally to effect their remedial purposes and achieve their humanitarian aims. See Beaulieu v. City of Lewiston, 440 A.2d 334, 344 (Me.1982). ³ We look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language as a means of effecting the legislative intent. See Daniels v. Tew Mac Aero Servs., Inc., 675 A.2d 984, 987 (Me.1996). Where the statutory language is ambiguous, we examine other indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history. See Jordan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 651 A.2d 358, 360 (Me.1994). The statutory scheme from which the language arises must be interpreted to achieve a harmonious outcome. See id. We will not construe statutory language to effect absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results. See Fullerton v. Knox County Comm'rs, 672 A.2d 592, 594 (Me.1996).

I. Authority of the Hearing Officer

¶8 We first address the authority of the hearing officer to entertain Coker's appeal. The right to a fair hearing arises from 22 M.R.S.A. § 4322 (Supp.1997), which provides that "[a]ny person aggrieved by a decision, act, failure to act or delay in action concerning his application for general assistance under this chapter shall have the right to an appeal [to the fair hearing authority]." The City urges a narrow construction of this language, contending that an appeal is authorized only for decisions directly relating to the original application for general assistance.

¶9 Section 4322, however, as one of Maine's general assistance statutes, is entitled to liberal construction. See Beaulieu, 440 A.2d at 344. Its language anticipates a variety of different decisions from which an applicant will be entitled to an appeal. In recognition of this variety, section 4322 provides an appeal period of five working days when the applicant has received "written notice of denial, reduction, or termination of assistance," but provides a longer appeal period, ten working days, from "any other act or failure to act by the municipality with regard to an application for assistance." Moreover, guidelines established by the Department of Human Services provide that "all decisions regarding General Assistance are subject to the fair hearing process." Me. Dep't. of Hum. Serv. Gen. Assistance Guidelines § 8 (June 1995) [hereinafter Guidelines]; cf. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust v. Superintendent of Bureau of Consumer Protection, 471 A.2d 292, 296 (Me.1984) ("The construction of a statute by an agency charged with enforcing it is entitled to great deference."). We conclude that the City's retention of Coker's workers' compensation award constituted an act by the City regarding Coker's application for general assistance. Accordingly, the court did not err in ruling that the hearing officer had authority to entertain Coker's appeal.

II. Workfare

¶10 We turn now to the hearing officer's conclusion that the value of Coker's workfare cannot be set off against the general assistance he received from the City. ⁴ Section 4316-A(2) permits a municipality to require unemployed persons to work for the municipality or a participating nonprofit organization as a condition of receiving general assistance, ⁵ and provides in pertinent part that:

[a] person may not, as a condition of general assistance eligibility, be required to do any amount of work that exceeds the value of the net general assistance that the person would otherwise receive under municipal general assistance standards. Any person performing work under this subsection must be provided with net general assistance, the value of which is computed at a rate of at least the State's minimum wage.

22 M.R.S.A. § 4316-A(2)(A) (Supp.1997) (emphasis added).

¶11 Although this section anticipates that a recipient of general assistance will not be required to perform workfare beyond the amount of "net general assistance" received, it does not explicitly provide that the value of the recipient's workfare operates as a credit against the obligation to reimburse the municipality for the general assistance received. ⁶ Because the plain language of section 4316-A(2)(A) does not unambiguously disclose the Legislature's intent, we look to the legislative history of the statute for guidance. See Jordan, 651 A.2d at 360. During the House debate of the 1977 legislative revisions to the general assistance statutes, which, inter alia, authorized municipalities to adopt workfare programs in connection with general assistance, Representative Wilfong characterized the purpose of the workfare as follows:

It will require that people who come to the city or town asking for general assistance may have to work for all or a portion of the assistance that they receive, that they will be paid the minimum wage and that if you come for $100, for an example, because you need $100 to pay an oil bill or whatever and you are in good health, ... that you may be asked to do some work in that town to pay for a portion of the $100 or maybe the whole of the $100. I think this is a positive step toward our solving our welfare problem. I think that this is the step that really gives some dignity to the people who are coming and asking for general assistance.

2 Legis.Rec. 1551 (1977). Representative Berube further elaborated on the workfare requirement:

Section 12 of L.D. 1868, the Majority Report, has a work requirement. Some people sincerely want to work for the money that they are requesting. It is temporary assistance, generally that they request. They certainly don't want a handout. Most people don't. This would give them an opportunity to work for the assistance they were receiving, work for a city or a town project.

Id. These statements evidence the Legislature's intention that the...