Coleman v. Georgia Power Co.

• Decision Date: 09 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. 21:98-CV-1529-ODE.,21:98-CV-1529-ODE.
• Citation: 81 F.Supp.2d 1365
• Parties: Donald R. COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

Page 1365

81 F.Supp.2d 1365

Donald R. COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 21:98-CV-1529-ODE.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

February 9, 2000.

Matthew C. Billips, Zimring Smith & Billips, Atlanta, GA, for plaintiff.

Stephen William Riddell, Ashley Zeiler Hager, Troutman Sanders, Atlanta, GA, for defendant.

ORDER

ORINDA D. EVANS, Chief Judge.

This civil action, in which Donald Coleman ("Plaintiff") alleges that he was terminated because of his disability, namely obesity complicated by knee and back injuries, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., is currently before the court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff's motion to hold in abeyance Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and Defendant's motion for leave to file a supplemental reply brief in support of its motion. Plaintiff seeks reinstatement, full back-pay with prejudgment interest and employment benefits, compensatory damages for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees and expenses.

In light of this court's July 13, 1999, order, in which the court denied Plaintiff's motion to compel further discovery, Plaintiff's motion to hold in abeyance Defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby denied without discussion. Further, the court grants, without discussion, Defendant's motion for leave to supplement its reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment to include Supreme Court case law promulgated after Defendant had filed its original reply brief.

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Georgia Power Company ("GPC" or "Defendant") employed Plaintiff from March 23, 1973, through October 22, 1996, when Plaintiff was terminated for failing to meet GPC's weight guideline. His work performance was always satisfactory. Plaintiff was employed as a fleet mechanic — a position which sometimes required the use of aerial lift devices found on the back of GPC bucket trucks. Many of these aerial lift devices have 300-pound safety ratings. In June 1995, Defendant implemented a Region Operations and Power Delivery Weight Guideline ("Weight Guideline"), for the stated reason of ensuring the safety of its employees whose jobs require them to use these aerial devices.

The Weight Guideline mandates that every Region Operations or Power Delivery employee who may be required to use aerial devices is subject to a 300-pound safety rating weigh 280 pounds or less. If such an employee is over the 280 pound maximum, that employee will be given a one-time opportunity to participate in an individualized weight-loss program developed by a medical doctor at GPC's expense. If the employee is then able to lose sufficient weight to bring himself within the Weight Guideline in the proscribed period of time, he will be returned to his prior position. According to the 1995 Weight Guideline, if an employee remains outside of the weight limit after completing his weight loss program, he will be demoted to a position not requiring the use of aerial lift devices. Under the 1997 version of the Weight Guideline, an employee failing to meet the weight requirement might be demoted or terminated.

On July 24, 1995, Ronnie Ivey ("Ivey"), Plaintiff's supervisor, weighed Plaintiff on a GPC scale. According to that scale, he weighed 343 pounds. Ivey then took Plaintiff to a medical clinic where he was evaluated by Dr. Walter Dunbar. According to the clinic's scale, Plaintiff weighed 339 pounds. Dr. Dunbar's report states that Plaintiff's heart, peripheral vessels, abdomen, genitalia, prostate, thyroid, musculoskeletal and neurological systems were normal. However, Dr. Dunbar did find Plaintiff morbidly obese and determined that he had diabetes mellitus and hyperlipidemia (high cholesterol) and was at high risk for heart attack. The doctor also noted that Plaintiff was "capable of continuing work as a fleet mechanic." (Dunbar report at 4). Dr. Dunbar did not place any restrictions on Plaintiff due to his obesity.

Recommending that Plaintiff lose two pounds per week by means of diet and exercise, Dr. Dunbar sent Plaintiff to a nutritionist who would outline a diet and exercise program. Defendant then placed Plaintiff on this weight program, pursuant to the Weight Guideline and told him that he needed to reach the 280 pound target weight by May 20, 1996. Under this regime, Plaintiff was able to lose the necessary weight. On May 20, 1996, he weighed in at 278 pounds and was thus permitted to continue working as a fleet mechanic. However, on October 21, 1996, Plaintiff was weighed again at GPC. Finding him over the weight limit, his new supervisor, James Faulkner, took Plaintiff back to the medical clinic. According to the clinic's scale, he weighed 296 pounds.

On October 22, 1996, Defendant informed Plaintiff he was being terminated for violation of the Weight Guideline. Plaintiff claims he is morbidly obese and suffers from limitations caused by knee and back injuries as well as diabetes. He asserts that Defendant's termination of him based on the Weight Guideline is pretextual. He claims that he has not been required to operate an aerial device from the bucket in the last five years, and in any case operating an aerial device constitutes less than one percent of the duties of a fleet mechanic. Moreover, the Weight Guideline in force at the time of his termination only provided for demotion, and not termination, for failure to comply with the Weight Guideline.

Plaintiff filed his discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and received his right to sue letter on March 5, 1998. On May 27, 1998, he brought this suit. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff does not suffer from a disability as defined by the ADA and is therefore not entitled to its protection.

Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In ruling on Defendant's motion, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). To prevail on its motion for summary judgment, Defendant must show that the evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of Plaintiff's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If Defendant makes a sufficient showing, then the Plaintiff "must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(3)). If the evidence supporting the Plaintiff's claims is insufficient for a jury to return a verdict for Plaintiff, or is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative," then Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If, however, reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence, and a reasonable interpretation of the evidence could lead to a verdict for the Plaintiff, then summary judgment is inappropriate. Id. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

To establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is disabled; (2) he is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) he suffered adverse employment action because of his disability. Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assoc., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff bears the burden of proving his prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. See Doe v. Dekalb County School Dist., 145 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir.1998).

The sole issue before the court is whether Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.¹ The ADA defines "disability" as a(1) physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Accordingly, for an individual to be disabled within the meaning of the ADA he must satisfy at least one of these prongs. Plaintiff alleges that he meets the definition of disability under each of these prongs. Whether a person has a disability within the meaning of the ADA is an individualized inquiry. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2147, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). Courts must examine "the effect of [the] impairment on the life of the individual." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).

Turning now to the question of whether Plaintiff meets the definition of disability under the first prong, Plaintiff must show that he has a mental or physical impairment and that such impairment substantially limits a major life activity. In the first instance, the parties dispute whether Plaintiff's morbid obesity constitutes an impairment as contemplated by the ADA.

The EEOC issued regulations implementing the ADA in which it defined a "physical impairment" as

Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lyphatic, skin, and endocrine.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). According to these EEOC guidelines the "definition of impairment does not include physical characteristics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight or muscle tone that are within `normal' range and are not the result of a...