Coleman v. Ky. Ret. Sys., 2012-CA-001518-MR
| Decision Date | 10 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2012-CA-001518-MR,2012-CA-001518-MR |
| Parties | BRENDA COLEMAN APPELLANT v. KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS APPELLEE |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
On August 7, 2008, Brenda Coleman filed an application to purchase service credit for the period of time between January 1, 1990, and January 27, 2006, during which she worked for Constance Revlett, a private attorney. At the time she filed the application to purchase service credit, she was working as a child support caseworker for the McLean County Attorney.
Coleman originally became a member of the County Employees Retirement Systems (hereinafter "CERS") on August 3, 1987, when she was employed by Revlett, the elected McLean County Attorney. Coleman, however, resigned from that position on June 29, 1989, and ceased being a contributing member of CERS.
In 1989, Revlett also lost her election to continue as McLean County Attorney. Her last day as County Attorney was December 31, 1989. Revlett then entered private practice as a self-employed attorney. Shortly thereafter, she was offered a contract by the Commonwealth of Kentucky to provide child support enforcement services in Muhlenberg and Ohio Counties through her private law practice. Revlett agreed to the contract, and as a result, served as a Special Prosecutor for child support in Muhlenberg and Ohio Counties.
Revlett then hired Coleman as an employee in her private law office. Coleman worked for Revlett from January 1, 1990, through January 27, 2006. Coleman is seeking to purchase service credit for this time period. But the Kentucky Retirement Systems (hereinafter "Retirement Systems") deniedColeman's application to purchase omitted service credit for this time period. The Retirement Systems determined that because Revlett was not a participating employer with them, Coleman was not eligible to purchase service credit since she was employed in a non-State job.
Following the denial of her request, Coleman appealed the decision and requested an administrative hearing. After the hearing, the hearing officer issued a recommended order on April 15, 2011, wherein the hearing officer affirmed the decision of the Retirement Systems. Coleman filed exceptions to the recommended order, but the Board of Trustees of the Kentucky Retirement Systems (hereinafter "the Board") adopted the hearing officer's recommended order in its June 13, 2011 final order. Coleman appealed this decision to the Franklin Circuit Court, which on August 3, 2012, affirmed the Board. She now appeals the order of the circuit court.
On appeal from a ruling by an administrative agency, courts generally apply the substantial evidence standard of review. But, in the case at hand, the facts are not disputed. As Coleman states in her brief on page 3, "[t]he facts in this matter are undisputed." When findings are undisputed, the review is as follows:
If the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence of probative value, than they must be accepted as binding and it must then be determined whether or not the administrative agency has applied the correct rule of law to the facts so found.
Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com'n v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Kentucky, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Ky. 2002)(citations omitted).
The genesis of the conflict is not the sufficiency of the evidence but rather interpretation of the pertinent statutes and the facts of this case. In essence, Coleman argues that statutorily she should be able to purchase service credit for this time because she was employed in the same position as the one she had when she originally worked for the McLean County Attorney. And the Retirement Systems counters that for a person to purchase omitted service credit, they must have worked for an employer participating in the Commonwealth's retirement system.
Thus, the issues raised are questions of law and mixed questions of fact and law. An issue of statutory construction is legal, and the review is de novo. E.g., Liquor Outlet, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 141 S.W.3d 378, 381 (Ky. App. 2004). When an issue presents a mixed question of law and fact, our review is also de novo. Epsilon Trading Co., Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 775 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. App. 1989). With this standard in mind, we turn to this particular case.
Before resolving this issue, some general observations about the tenets of statutory construction are necessary. The interpretation of a statute is a matter of law. Halls Hardwood Floor Co. v. Stapleton, 16 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Ky. App. 2000). The primary purpose of judicial construction is to carry out the intent of thelegislature. Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 294 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Ky. App. 2008). Further, "[a] court may not interpret a statute at variance with its stated language." SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Revenue Cabinet, 40 S.W.3d 883, 885 (Ky. App. 2001).
Some principles of statutory constructions are, first, to use the plain meaning of the words used in the statute. See Revenue Cabinet v. O'Daniel, 153 S.W.3d 815 (Ky. 2005); Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 446.080(4). "[S]tatutes must be given a literal interpretation unless they are ambiguous and if the words are not ambiguous, no statutory construction is required." Monumental Life Ins. Co., 294 S.W.3d at 19. The words of the statute are based on their normal, ordinary, everyday meaning. Commonwealth v. Plowman, 86 S.W.3d 47, 49 (Ky. 2002). "We are not at liberty to add or subtract from the legislative enactment or discover meanings not reasonably ascertainable from the language used." Commonwealth v. Harrelson, 14 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Ky. 2000). The courts should reject a construction that is "unreasonable and absurd, in preference for one that is 'reasonable, rational, sensible and intelligent[.]'" Commonwealth v. Kerr, 136 S.W.3d 783, 785 (Ky. App. 2004).
With these guidelines for statutory interpretation, we now examine whether Coleman is eligible to purchase omitted service credit for the period that she was employed in Revlett's private law practice. The purchase of service credit is governed by KRS 61.552(2):
Any employee participating in one (1) of the retirement systems administered by Kentucky Retirement Systems, who has at least forty-eight (48) months of service if age sixty-five (65) or at least sixty (60) months of service if under age sixty-five (65) in the systems administered by the Kentucky Retirement Systems, and who did not elect membership in the County Employees Retirement System, as provided in KRS 78.540(2), may obtain credit in the County Employees Retirement System for prior service and for current service by paying to the County Employees Retirement System a delayed contribution payment for the service he would have received had he elected membership. The delayed contribution payment shall not be picked up, as described in KRS 61.560(4), by the employer. Payment may be by lump sum or the employee may pay by increments.
Based on this provision, Coleman now seeks to purchase service credit for the years that she was employed as a child support caseworker in Revlett's private law practice.
Examining the statutes related to the CERS, we note that "employee" is defined as a "regular full-time appointed or elective officer or employee of a participating county . . . The term shall not include persons engaged as independent contractors, seasonal, emergency, temporary, and part-time workers." KRS 78.510(6). Thus, based on the plain meaning of the statutory words, a person may only participate in CERS if they are an employee of a "participating County."
The next inquiry is the definition of "employer," which is contained in the subsequent section of the statute:
"Employer" means a county, as defined in subsection (3) of this section, the elected officials of a county, or any authority of the county having the power to appoint or elect an employee to office or employment in the county.
KRS 78.510(7). Hence, "county" qualifies as an "employer" and includes "the elected officials and their employees. The evidence is uncontradicted that Revlett did not participate in the CERS while under contract with the Commonwealth and self-employed in a private law practice. Moreover, she provided her employees with a private retirement fund.
Continuing with our assessment of the statutory language, we observe the definition of "county" in KRS 78.510(3):
"County" means any county, or nonprofit organization created and governed by a county, counties, or elected county officers, sheriff and his employees, county clerk and his employees, circuit clerk and his deputies, former circuit clerks or former circuit clerk deputies, or political subdivision or instrumentality, including school boards, charter county government, or urban-county government participating in the system by order appropriate to its governmental structure . . .
KRS 78.510(3). Therefore, the plain language of the statute and its unambiguous meaning dictate that Revlett was not an employer or a county and, logically then, Coleman was not an employee of a participating county. In addition, the fact that the funds for Revlett's private practice emanated from federal and state grants does not change this calculus. Coleman worked for Revlett who paid her from the funds of the private practice. The source of Revlett's funds is not relevant for...
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