Coleman v. State

• Decision Date: 21 November 1988
• Docket Number: No. 77880,77880
• Citation: 189 Ga.App. 366,375 S.E.2d 663
• Parties: COLEMAN v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 663

375 S.E.2d 663

189 Ga.App. 366

COLEMAN v. The STATE.

No. 77880.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Nov. 21, 1988.

Richard E. Thomas, Cordele, for appellant.

John C. Pridgen, Dist. Atty., for appellee.

DEEN, Presiding Judge.

In July 1986 appellant Coleman was the sole passenger in an automobile which a State trooper stopped for speeding on Interstate 75 in Crisp County in south Georgia. It was discovered that the vehicle had been rented by appellant in Sarasota, Florida, and that the person driving had no license. Upon arrival at the Crisp County jail, the arresting officer requested and received appellant's permission to search the automobile, and an "Igloo" cooler containing 165 grams of powdered cocaine and 68 grams of "crack" cocaine were discovered under the hood. A strainer, copper spoons, and a can labeled "Mannitol" (a substance widely used for diluting cocaine but also used as a laxative) were found elsewhere in the car. Both Coleman and the driver were indicted and tried on two counts of trafficking in cocaine.

At trial appellant denied knowledge of the presence of either the cocaine or the cooler and alleged that other persons, including the driver/co-defendant, had had access to the automobile before it was driven into Georgia. The arresting officer testified, however, that at the time of the arrest the appellant had admitted that he knew the cooler was in the car and also that he "knew what the risks were of getting into a business like this." A jury found Coleman guilty on both counts, and the trial court merged the convictions for sentencing and ordered that appellant be imprisoned for twenty years and pay a $150,000 fine. On appeal Coleman enumerates eight errors. Held:

1. Coleman first alleges that the court erred in admitting into evidence a custodial statement, urging that failure to record the statement electronically violated the constitutional guarantees of due process, right to counsel, right to a fair trial, and right not to incriminate oneself. Although appellant's exposition of this point, based largely on an Alaska case interpreting a provision of that state's constitution (Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 [Alaska, 1985] ), is extremely interesting, we find that neither the Georgia Constitution nor the Constitution of the United States mandates such a procedure in the instant case. The trial transcript reveals that a Jackson v. Denno hearing was held and that the court found appellant's custodial statements to have been made freely, voluntarily, and without undue influence, compulsion, or duress. This enumeration has no merit.

2. Appellant next alleges that the trial court erred when once during the trial he referred to appellant, in the jurors' hearing, as "the prisoner at the bar." Such designation of an accused has been held not to be error. Collier v. State, 232 Ga. 282, 283, 206 S.E.2d 445 (1974); Dortch v. State, 158 Ga.App. 233, 234, 279 S.E.2d 526 (1981). This enumeration, also, is without merit.

3. Appellant enumerates as a third error the trial court's refusal to permit defense counsel to question potential jurors during voir dire regarding their feelings towards appellant. When counsel asked one juror, "[W]hat are your feelings about Mr. Coleman right now?," the State objected that the question called for prejudgment of the case, and the court sustained the objection. The trial court has broad discretion as to what questions should be allowed on voir dire, and that discretion will not be disturbed absent abuse. Wilcox v. State, 250 Ga. 745, 749, 301 S.E.2d 251 (1983); Ridgeway v. State, 174 Ga.App. 663, 330 S.E.2d 916 (1985). This enumeration, too, is without merit.

4. Appellant further enumerates as error the prosecuting attorney's statement in closing argument: "[Y]ou heard Agent Whitaker's testimony, the only purpose he knows of ... for Mannitol is to cut cocaine." Defense counsel objected that the witness had testified that Mannitol could also be used as a laxative, and the trial court instructed the jury to recall the testimony accurately. It is well settled that counsel has wide latitude on closing argument, including drawing deductions from the evidence. Walker v. State, 232 Ga. 33, 36, 205 S.E.2d 260 (1974); Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615, 631 (1852). Moreover, immediately prior to mentioning Mannitol the prosecutor had mentioned the discovery of such items as the strainer and the spoons. In the context of the proximity of these items--as well as of the cocaine--to the Mannitol can, it was surely not unreasonable or unfair for the State to suggest that the Mannitol was there for the purpose of diluting the cocaine. This enumeration, too, is devoid of merit.

5. Appellant is correct in stating, in his fifth enumeration of error, that Georgia's Supreme Court has disapproved the challenged jury instruction on the presumption of truthfulness. Noggle v. State, 256 Ga. 383, 349 S.E.2d 175 (1986). What he does not state, however, is that the Supreme Court did not find its use to constitute reversible error. Noggle, supra. See also Davis v. State, 241...