Coleman v. State
| Decision Date | 02 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | Nos. SC04–1520,SC09–92.,s. SC04–1520 |
| Citation | 64 So.3d 1210 |
| Parties | Michael COLEMAN, Appellant,v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.Michael Coleman, Petitioner,v.Edwin G. Buss, etc., Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Martin J. McClain of McClain and McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, FL, for Appellant/Petitioner.Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Stephen R. White, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellee/Respondent.PER CURIAM.
Michael Coleman appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to vacate his convictions of first-degree murder and sentences of death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we reverse the circuit court's denial of postconviction relief as it pertains to Coleman's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because we conclude that counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase when counsel failed to investigate, develop, and present available mitigating evidence that would have legally precluded an override of the jury's life recommendation. Therefore, we vacate Coleman's death sentences and remand for imposition of life sentences instead. We deny Coleman's petition for habeas corpus.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Michael D. Coleman was convicted of the first-degree murders of Derek Hill, Morris Douglas, Michael McCormick, and Mildred Baker and of the attempted first-degree murder of Amanda Merrell. Coleman v. State, 610 So.2d 1283, 1284 (Fla.1992). The jury recommended life by a vote of six to six. Following that recommendation, the trial court overrode the jury recommendation and imposed four death sentences. Id. at 1287. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Coleman's convictions and sentences of death. Id. at 1288. There, Coleman raised five issues.1 There, this Court detailed the facts surrounding the murders:
Michael Coleman, Timothy Robinson, and brothers Bruce and Darrell Frazier were members of the “Miami Boys” drug organization, which operated throughout Florida. Pensacola members of the group moved a safe containing drugs and money to the home of Michael McCormick from which his neighbors Derek Hill and Morris Douglas stole it. Hill and Douglas gave the safe's contents to Darlene Crenshaw for safekeeping.
Late in the evening of September 19, 1988[,] Robinson, Coleman, and Bruce Frazier, accompanied by McCormick, pushed their way into Hill and Douglas' apartment. They forced Hill and Douglas, along with their visitors Crenshaw and Amanda Merrell, as well as McCormick, to remove their jewelry and clothes and tied them up with electrical cords. Darrell Frazier then brought Mildred Baker, McCormick's girlfriend, to the apartment. Robinson demanded the drugs and money from the safe and, when no one answered, started stabbing Hill. Crenshaw said she could take them to the drugs and money and left with the Fraziers. Coleman and Robinson each then sexually assaulted both Merrell and Baker.
After giving them the drugs and money, Crenshaw escaped from the Fraziers, who returned to the apartment. Coleman and Robinson then slashed and shot their five prisoners, after which they and the Fraziers left. Despite having had her throat slashed three times and having been shot in the head, Merrell freed herself and summoned the authorities. The four other victims were dead at the scene.
Merrell and Crenshaw identified their abductors and assailants through photographs, and Coleman, Robinson, and Darrell Frazier were arrested eventually. A grand jury returned multiple-count indictments against them, charging first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, armed kidnapping, armed sexual battery, armed robbery, armed burglary, and conspiracy to traffic. Among other evidence presented at the joint trial, the medical examiner testified that three of the victims died from a combination of stab wounds and gunshots to the head and that the fourth died from a gunshot to the head. Both Crenshaw and Merrell identified Coleman, Robinson, and Frazier at trial, and Merrell identified a ring Coleman gave to a girlfriend as having been taken from her at the apartment. Several witnesses testified to drug dealing in Pensacola and to the people involved in that enterprise. Coleman and Robinson told their alibis to the jury with Coleman claiming to have been in Miami at the time of these crimes and Robinson claiming he had been in New Jersey then.
Id. at 1284–85 (footnotes omitted).
In sentencing Coleman to death, the trial court found the existence of five aggravating circumstances. Id. at 1287.2 The trial court did not find any statutory mitigating circumstances and found the existence of one nonstatutory mitigator. Id.3 After considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial judge concluded that the “jury's recommendation could have been based only on minor, non-statutory mitigating circumstances or sympathy,” and held that the life recommendation was not reasonable under the standard of Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908 (Fla.1975). Coleman, 610 So.2d at 1287. The trial judge overrode the jury recommendation and imposed four death sentences, stating that justification for the imposition of death was “so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.” Id. On direct appeal, this Court struck the avoid or prevent lawful arrest aggravator after finding the evidence insufficient to support it, but found that the other four aggravators were supported by the record. Id. at 1287. This Court also found that the trial court's override was proper under Tedder because of the lack of mitigation presented in the case. Coleman, 610 So.2d at 1287.
MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
On March 24, 1997, Coleman filed a Motion to Vacate Judgments of Conviction and Sentence with Special Request for Leave to Amend.4 On February 3, 2000, Coleman again filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment of Conviction and Sentence with Special Request for Leave to Amend.5 A Huff6 hearing was conducted on July 25, 2000. The postconviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing on January 24 and 25, 2001. Subsequently, Coleman filed a Second Amended Motion to Vacate on May 10, 2004.7 The postconviction court denied Coleman's motion for postconviction relief and both amendments. In response, on August 2, 2004, Coleman filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court. On August 9, 2004, he filed an Amended Notice of Appeal.
On April 18, 2005, Coleman filed a Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction for a Determination of Mental Retardation. On April 21, 2005, Coleman filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence with Request to Amend.8 This Court granted Coleman's motion to relinquish on September 23, 2005, and on July 17, 2007, the postconviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Atkins claim. On August 1, 2007, the postconviction court issued an order finding Coleman is not mentally retarded and denying Coleman postconviction relief. This appeal 9 and accompanying petition for habeas corpus 10 followed.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Coleman contends that his trial counsel, Ted Stokes, rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because Stokes failed to investigate, develop, and present available mitigating evidence that would have legally precluded an override of the jury's life recommendation.
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. A court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific ruling on the performance component of the test if it is clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied.
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986) (citations omitted). Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court's factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the circuit court's legal conclusions de novo. See Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 771–72 (Fla.2004).
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance was not ineffective. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The defendant carries the burden to “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). “Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.” Id. In Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla.2000), this Court held that “strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.” It is under this legal framework that Coleman's claim is addressed.
Deficiency
Coleman argues that the postconviction court erred in finding that Stokes' performance was not deficient under Stric...
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