Collins Inv. Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County
| Decision Date | 19 February 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 32644,32644 |
| Parties | COLLINS INVESTMENT CO., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Board of County Commissioners, elected governing body of Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, Irving G. McNayr, as County Manager of Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, and Ray E. Green, Comptroller of the State of Florida, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Leonard D. Baskin, Miami, for appellant.
Darrey A. Davis, County Atty., and Thomas C. Britton, Asst. County Atty., for appellees.
By direct appeal we have for review a final decree of a chancellor expressly upholding the validity of Section 196.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.
We must decide whether an ad valorem taxpayer who complains against an alleged excessive assessment must deposit with his complaint the amount of taxes admitted to be legally due.
On November 29, 1962, appellant Collins Investment Co., filed its complaint. It attacked the validity of the 1962 county assessment of its property for ad valorem taxing purposes. The complaint alleged that the assessment was illegally excessive and discriminatory. It alleged that the property had been assessed at a value of $181,000. It conceded that the maximum legal assessment would not exceed $85,559.00. The complaint sought an injunction against the collection of any taxes until an adjudication of a legal assessment could be obtained. It alleged that the plaintiff was 'unable to determine what taxes were lawfully and justly due.' The plaintiff offered to do equity but made no deposit of any amount when the complaint was filed. There was an offer to pay such amount as the Court should direct to be legally due. It was agreed that the tax roll became final on October 1, 1962. A motion to dismiss the complaint was filed December 20, 1962. On March 22, 1963, plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary injunction. These motions came on for hearing on March 29, 1963. At the hearing plaintiff sought leave to amend its complaint. It then tendered a check for the amount of taxes which plaintiff alleged would be legally due and payable. On April 4, 1963, the chancellor dismissed the complaint with prejudice. As the basis for his order of dismissal the chancellor announced that the tender of the amount legally due did not accompany the filing of the complaint. He held that it could not be made beyond the 60 day period prescribed by Section 192.21, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. It is this decree which we now review.
The chancellor held that Section 196.01, supra, required a deposit of the amount of the admittedly legal portion of the tax simultaneously with the filing of the complaint. He overruled plaintiff's contention that the statute is unconstitutional. He further held that under Section 192.21, supra, the time for filing the complaint expired on December 1, 1962. He concluded that no tender could be made after that date.
The appellant here contends that the tender of taxes admittedly due could properly be made a any time before relief was granted provided the complaint itself was filed within the statutory 60 day period. It is also contended that if given any different construction, Section 196.01, supra, would be unconstitutional.
Section 192.21, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., is a legislative effort to establish finality of tax assessments. It provides in part, as follows:
'* * * no assessment shall be held invalid unless suit be instituted within sixty days from the time the assessment shall become final, * * *.'
In the instant case it is admitted that the 60 day statutory period expired December 1, 1962. The complaint was filed November 29, 1962.
Section 196.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., recognizes the jurisdiction of courts of chancery to inquire into the validity of tax assessments. It provides in part, as follows:
'* * * provided that the complainant shall in every case tender into court and file with the complaint the full amount of any such tax, assessment or toll which he shall admit to be legal and due by him, or file with the complaint a receipt showing payment of the same prior to the institution of the suit. * * *'
Our problem is to determine whether the tender required by Section 196.01, supra, must be made within the 60 day limitation period provided by Section 192.21, supra.
In our examination of the statutes and controlling precedents we also deem it advisable to take note of Article IX, Section 8, Florida Constitution, F.S.A., which reads, as follows:
It is of considerable importance to observe that the Constitution merely precludes the granting of any relief until the legally assessed taxes are paid. The Constitution does not interject a condition to the filing of the suit. It simply circumscribes the granting of relief with the condition requiring the payment of any amount legally due.
Over the years Section 196.01, supra, has been consistently construed as a legislative condition to granting relief as distinguished from a condition to filing suit. In numerous cases where tax assessments have been assaulted this Court has held that the statutory requirement of a tender is effectively met if the tender is made or required as a condition to relief. This may be accomplished beyond the 60 day period for the filing of suit stipulated by Section 192.21, supra.
We note in passing that the 60 day limitation for the filing of the complaint has been held to be constitutional. Nash v. Merritt Island Lumber Co., Fla.App., 110 So.2d 677; Thompson v. City of Key West, Fla.1955, 82 So.2d 749; Dade County v. DuPont Plaza, Fla.App., 117 So.2d 849, quashed on other grounds, Fla., 125 So.2d 564, opinion conformed, Fla.App., 128 So.2d 151; Rudisill et ux. v. City of Tampa, 151 Fla. 284, 9 So.2d 380.
Section 196.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., originated as Chapter 8586, Laws of Florida 1921. Prior to that time this Court had applied Article IX, Section 8, supra, as requiring a complaining taxpayer to make a deposit of the amount legally due as a condition to obtaining relief against a tax roll even though no tender was made with the complaint. City of Tampa v. Mugge, 40 Fla. 326, 24 So. 489; Pickett v. Russell, 42 Fla. 116, 28 So. 764.
After the passage of Chapter 8586, Laws of 1921, now Section 196.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the Court applied the same rule. Since then the rule has been that the requirements of the statute are met if there is an offer to do equity and the trial judge requires a deposit of the valid portion of the tax before he grants any relief. Louisville and N. R. Co., et al. v. Amos, 98 Fla. 350, 123 So. 745. Where a taxpayer assaulted an assessment but failed to tender with the complaint the amount of taxes admittedly due, the Court held that an amended complaint with a proper tender should be allowed as a condition to relief. Arundel Corp. v. Sproul, 136 Fla. 167, 186 So. 679. Section 196.01, supra, was similarly construed in City of Tampa et al. v. Wiley, 137 Fla. 126, 188 So. 134. There, the trial judge denied a motion to dismiss a complaint. The motion was grounded on the plaintiff's failure to pay the tax legally due at the time of filing the complaint. The denial of the motion was sustained. This Court held that under the Constitution and statute the chancellor had the power to determine such amounts as appeared legally due and require a deposit thereof as a condition to relief. An identical construction of the statute was applied in City of Fort Myers v. Heitman, 148 Fla. 432, 4 So.2d 871; Id., 149 Fla. 203, 5 So.2d 410. When so construed Section 196.01, supra, does no violence to the Constitution.
By analogy Section 196.05, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., precludes the granting of relief against any...
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