Columbia Rio Grand Regional Hosp v. Stover

• Decision Date: 28 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 13-98-140-CV,13-98-140-CV
• Citation: 17 S.W.3d 387
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000) COLUMBIA RIO GRANDE REGIONAL HOSPITAL, Appellant, v. LUCY STOVER, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF GARY REED, DECEASED AND MOTORS INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellees
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 387

17 S.W.3d 387 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000)

COLUMBIA RIO GRANDE REGIONAL HOSPITAL, Appellant, v. LUCY STOVER, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF GARY REED, DECEASED AND MOTORS INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellees.

No. 13-98-140-CV

COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS, CORPUS CHRISTI

April 28, 2000.

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 of Hidalgo County, Texas. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Chief Justice Seerden and Justices Yanez and Rodriguez

O P I N I O N

Opinion by Justice Rodriguez

Appellant Columbia Rio Grande Regional Hospital (Columbia), a medical provider, filed a declaratory action against Appellee Lucy A. Stover (Stover), independent executrix of the estate of Gary D. Reed (Reed), deceased. Stover filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, inter alia, the action was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. Without specifying the grounds, the trial court granted Stover's motion. We affirm.

Columbia provided medical services to Reed for an on-the-job injury. Columbia charged Reed for services provided in the amount of $15,395.85, and later filed a hospital lien for that amount in Hidalgo County.¹ Subsequently, Reed filed suit against his employer in the 206th District Court in Hidalgo County (Reed Lawsuit). Columbia filed notice of its hospital lien in the Reed Lawsuit.² During the course of the lawsuit Reed died, and Stover filed an application to probate Reed's will. The probate court, County Court at Law No. 4, Hidalgo County, in Cause No. 25,040-D, appointed Stover independent executrix of Reed's estate. Stover stepped in as plaintiff in the Reed Lawsuit. When the lawsuit settled, the 206th District Court entered judgment whereby the defendant's insurer, Motors Insurance Corporation (Motors), agreed to tender to Stover the settlement amount of $135,000.00, out of which Columbia's hospital lien was to be satisfied, depending on the outcome of litigation between the estate and Columbia. Motors issued a $15,395.85 check payable to Stover's trustee and Columbia. Stover refused to sign the check over to Columbia and the district court placed the funds in its registry.

At Stover's request, the district court ordered Motors' check transferred to the registry of the county court where the estate was being probated. Columbia then filed an authenticated claim for Reed's medical expenses in the probate proceeding. In response, Stover filed a motion to bar Columbia's claim asserting the claim did not attach to the estate or, alternately, the claim was untimely filed. The probate court granted Stover's motion.

Contemporaneously with these proceedings, Columbia filed an original declaratory judgment action against Stover urging its rights pursuant to the hospital lien. Columbia's action was assigned the same cause number as the probate proceeding in County Court at Law No. 4. Stover answered, counterclaimed, and filed a motion for summary judgment based on the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In her motion, Stover asserted Columbia's causes of action were barred because Columbia's claims had been adjudicated by either: (1) the judgment of the 206th District Court regarding Reed's personal injury cause of action; or (2) the order of the probate court barring Columbia's claim. Columbia responded and objected to Stover's summary judgment evidence. Columbia also filed a cross motion for summary judgment and amended its petition. Stover did not amend her motion.

On January 26, 1998, by agreement of the parties, the probate court severed Columbia's action against Stover from the probate proceeding and assigned the severed action cause number 25,040-D-1. On February 3, 1998, the probate court granted Stover's summary judgment motion. The probate court did not rule on Columbia's cross motion for summary judgment. On February 10, 1998, Stover non-suited her counterclaim against Columbia.

In addition to the foregoing litigation, Columbia filed suit against Motors in County Court at Law No. 3, asserting liability for paying over the hospital lien and for not paying the proceeds directly to Columbia. Motors filed an unopposed motion to consolidate Columbia's suit against Motors with cause number 25,040-D. The motion was granted on February 4, 1998.

By points of error one and three Columbia complains that the summary judgment is not final because it does not dispose of all claims and parties. Columbia first asserts this appeal is taken from cause number 25,040-D, the cause into which its claims against Motors were consolidated. Columbia argues that because the summary judgment does not address its claims against Motors, it is interlocutory. In response, Stover asserts this appeal is from cause number 25,040-D-1, a cause severed out of 25,040-D. Stover contends because Columbia's claims against Motors were never before the trial court in the severed cause, she did not need to address them.

We agree with Stover that the appeal is from case number 25,040-D-1. On January 26, 1998, the trial court signed an agreed order severing Columbia's cause of action against Stover from the probate proceeding, cause number 25,040-D, and assigning that action a new cause number, 25,040-D-1. See McRoberts v. Ryals, 863 S.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Tex. 1993) (order severing part of a lawsuit is effective when it is signed). The court granted Stover's summary judgment in the severed action on February 3, 1998. The following day, February 4, 1998, Columbia's lawsuit against Motors was consolidated with the probate proceeding, cause number 25,040-D, not the severed cause. Columbia's claims against Motors were never before the trial court in cause number 25,040-D-1. As Motors was never a party to the severed lawsuit, it was not necessary for the summary judgment to address Columbia's claims against Motors.

Columbia further contends Stover's summary judgment motion failed to address new causes of action pleaded in its amended petition. Specifically, Columbia asserts Stover did not address: (1) an action to enforce and satisfy its hospital lien; and (2) a request for declaratory relief and judgment and foreclosure of its hospital lien. Columbia's amended petition contained one new paragraph and one revised paragraph. The new paragraph entitled "Action to Enforce and Satisfy Hospital Lien" repeats or restates alleged facts, assertions and arguments set out in the original petition. The revised paragraph entitled "Request for Declaratory Relief and Judgment" adds the phrase "foreclosure of lien" to the title and body of the paragraph. The substance of the paragraph, however, remains the same. In its original petition Columbia claimed ownership of the monies by virtue of the hospital lien that attached to the settlement proceeds, and requested the court to declare the lien rightfully belonged to Columbia and to issue the monies from the registry of the court to Columbia. The amended petition has simply been reworded, with no additional relief prayed for in the amended petition. We conclude Columbia's amended petition raises no new issues or causes of action. Stover's motion addressed all causes of action raised by Columbia.

Finally, Stover concedes that the order was interlocutory because the summary judgment order did not address Stover's counterclaims. The probate court, however, non-suited Stover's counterclaim on February 10, 1998, seven days after the entry of the summary judgment. Where an interlocutory order is entered disposing of the interests of less than all parties and claims, that order does not become final until a subsequent order is entered disposing of the remaining parties and claims. Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590, 591 n.5 (Tex.1993); H. B. Zachry Co. v. Thibodeaux, 364 S.W.2d 192, 193 (Tex.1963). Once an order has been entered disposing of all remaining parties and issues, all the orders merge, creating a final and appealable judgment. Id. Therefore, the probate court's summary judgment, interlocutory in nature when granted, became final on February 10, 1998, when the trial court disposed of Stover's counterclaim. Because we conclude the judgment from which Columbia appealed is a final judgment, this Court has jurisdiction to hear Columbia's appeal. Points of error one and three are overruled.

By its second point of error, Columbia contends the trial court erred in granting Stover's motion for summary judgment on the basis of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Summary judgment for a defendant is proper when the summary judgment evidence negates an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action as a matter of law or establishes all the elements of an affirmative defense as a matter of law. See American Tobacco Co. v. GrinnelI, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997) (citing City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979)). When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant and indulge every reasonable inference in the non-movant's favor. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985). When there are multiple grounds for summary judgment and the order does not specify the ground on which the summary judgment was rendered, appellant must negate all grounds on appeal. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S. S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 389 (Tex.1993). If the appellant fails to negate each ground on which the judgment may have been rendered, we must uphold the summary judgment. Id.

The broad doctrine of res judicata encompasses two distinct principles: (1) res judicata, or claim preclusion; and (2) collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp, 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992). Because the issue in this case is Columbia's ability to bring an entire claim against Stover, we look first at the claim preclusion or res judicata component of the doctrine.

Res judicata prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well...