Com. v. Barton

• Decision Date: 27 February 1997
• Citation: 690 A.2d 293,456 Pa.Super. 290
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Joanne M. BARTON, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 293

690 A.2d 293

456 Pa.Super. 290

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Joanne M. BARTON, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Jan. 7, 1997.

Filed Feb. 27, 1997.

J. Richard Gray, Lancaster, for appellant.

Joseph C. Madenspacher, District Attorney, Lancaster, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before CIRILLO, President Judge Emeritus, KELLY, J., and MONTEMURO, J. ^*

MONTEMURO, Judge:

Appellant, Joanne Barton, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County following a stipulated trial ¹ wherein Appellant was found guilty of three counts of driving under the influence of alcohol, ² one count each of driving at a safe speed, ³ and driving on the right side of the roadway. ⁴ Specifically, Appellant challenges the court's denial of her motion to suppress the results of a blood test performed for medical purposes and obtained by the police through a warrantless search of Appellant's medical records. The suppression court concluded that the warrantless search was justified and, therefore, denied the motion. We agree, and for the reasons set forth below, affirm.

On January 1, 1995, Appellant was transported to Lancaster General Hospital for treatment of injuries sustained from a two-vehicle automobile accident. Officer Laura Overby of the West Hempfield Police Department responded to the accident scene and it is undisputed that after investigation at the scene, Officer Overby developed sufficient probable cause to believe that at the time of the accident, Appellant was operating her vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Subsequently, after clearing the accident scene, the Officer contacted the Lancaster General Hospital emergency room at approximately 7:00 a.m. to request hospital personnel withdraw and test a blood sample from Appellant for purposes of testing its blood alcohol content. Officer Overby was informed by hospital personnel that pursuant to standard hospital procedure, in cases such as this, involving the treatment of shock trauma patients, blood is typically withdrawn and tested for blood alcohol.

Therefore, assuming that such blood testing of Appellant was conducted, the next day Officer Overby completed a standard form provided by Lancaster General Hospital, requesting the results of Appellant's blood alcohol and drug screening test. The Officer did not obtain a search warrant for the results this test. Pursuant to the Officer's request, Lancaster General Hospital provided a verification of authenticity and testing procedure, drug screen, and blood alcohol test results. Appellant's blood alcohol test revealed a level of .19 percent.

Subsequently, Officer Overby charged Appellant with three counts of driving under the influence of alcohol, and one count each of driving a vehicle at a safe speed and driving on the right side of the roadway. Appellant filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the form of a motion to suppress the results of the blood test, reasoning that under Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, a search warrant was required to seize the test results contained in Appellant's medical records. The suppression court denied the motion and the action proceeded to a stipulated trial on July 17, 1996 where Appellant was found guilty on all counts. Because this was Appellant's second D.U.I. offense, she received a sentence of twenty-four months of intermediate punishment to be served as thirty days incarceration with work release, followed by sixty days on house arrest with electronic monitoring and the impaired drivers program. This appeal followed.

Appellant raises one issue for our review:

Whether a police officer, to constitutionally seize medical records for purposes of possible prosecution, is required by the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Article I, § 8, to first procure a warrant to accomplish the seizure? ⁵

(Appellant's Brief at 3).

Appellant specifically challenges the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress. In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we must first determine whether the factual findings, the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and the legal conclusions of the suppression court are supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 446 Pa.Super. 87, 91, 666 A.2d 323, 325 (1995). In doing so, we must consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth's witnesses and so much of the evidence of the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. Id. We note that it is the exclusive province of the suppression court to determine the credibility of the witnesses and, if the factual findings are supported by the record, we may only reverse if the suppression court committed an error of law or abuse of discretion. Id. In the instant case, Appellant does not challenge the constitutionality of the withdrawal of blood by the medical personnel for medical purposes. Rather, Appellant contends that the police violated her rights against unreasonable searches and seizures underArt. I, § 8 ⁶ when they obtained the results of her medical purposes blood test from her medical records without a search warrant.

The protection of Article I, § 8 extends to those areas where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 44, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (1979). The courts of this Commonwealth have continued to recognize that the citizens of Pennsylvania have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their medical records. In re June 1979 Allegheny Cty. Investigating Grand Jury, 490 Pa. 143, 150, 415 A.2d 73, 77 (1980)(holding privacy interest in medical records pursuant to Art. I, § 1). We note, however, that although Appellant has an expectation of privacy in her medical records, this privacy interest does not preclude all searches and seizures of medical records. "[T]he proper function of ... Art. I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, is 'to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.' " Commonwealth v. Hipp, 380 Pa.Super. 345, 354, 551 A.2d 1086, 1090 (1988)(quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1829, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 912 (1966)). Therefore, Appellant's privacy interest is subject to reasonable searches and seizures.

Generally, under the protections afforded by Art. I, § 8, "a search or seizure is not reasonable unless it is conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause." Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152, 166, 615 A.2d 308, 315 (1992). The "implied consent" provision of the Motor Vehicle Code, however, dispenses with the need to obtain a warrant. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a)(1). Section 1547(a)(1) states:

(a) General Rule.--Any person who drives, operates or is in actual physical control of the movement of a motor vehicle in this Commonwealth shall be deemed to have given consent to one or more chemical tests of breath, blood or urine for the purposes of determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of a controlled substance if a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving, operating or in actual physical control of the movement of a motor vehicle:

(1) while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance or both....

The "reasonable grounds" requirement of this provision has been interpreted to require probable cause. Kohl, 532 Pa. at 167, 615 A.2d at 315. Also applicable to the instant case is section 3755 of the Motor Vehicle Code. This section provides that:

If, as a result of a motor vehicle accident, the person who drove, ... any involved motor vehicle requires medical treatment in an emergency room of a hospital and if probable cause exists to believe a violation of section 3731 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance) was involved, the emergency room physician or his designee shall promptly take blood samples from those persons and transmit them within 24 hours for testing....

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755(a). This section directs the release of such test results upon the request of the person tested, his or her attorney, physician, or governmental officials or agencies. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755(a).

Our courts have found that, together, sections 1547 and 3755 comprise a statutory scheme which, under particular circumstances, not only imply the consent of a driver to undergo chemical or blood tests, but also require hospital personnel to withdraw blood from a person, and release the test results, at the request of a police officer who has probable cause to believe the person was operating a vehicle while under the influence. Commonwealth v. Riedel, 539 Pa. 172, 180, 651 A.2d 135, 139-40 (1994); Hipp, 380 Pa.Super. at 355, 551 A.2d at 1090.

In the instant case, Appellant concedes that the officer had probable cause to believe that she was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. (Appellant's Brief at 4). However, Appellant, relying on the concurring statement in Commonwealth v. Riedel, supra, argues that her constitutional rights were violated when Officer Overby obtained the results of her medical purposes blood test without a warrant.

In Riedel, the Appellant was taken to the hospital after an auto accident, where his blood was withdrawn and tested for medical purposes. Riedel, 539 Pa. at 176, 651 A.2d at 137. The officer arrived at the hospital, intending to request a blood test based upon probable cause, however, upon learning that blood had already been taken for medical purposes, the officer never requested that a blood sample be drawn for testing pursuant to section 3755(a), and subsequently wrote to the hospital requesting the results of the medical purposes blood test. Id. The Appellant asserted a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search conducted by the officer who obtained the...