Com. v. Carter
| Decision Date | 19 December 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-SC-211-DG,85-SC-211-DG |
| Citation | 701 S.W.2d 409 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Movant, v. Lonnie Joe CARTER, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
David L. Armstrong, Atty. Gen., David K. Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for movant.
Sanford L. Berman, Louisville, for respondent.
Lonnie Joe Carter was indicted by the Christian County Grand Jury for third degree burglary, first degree burglary, and for being a first degree persistent felony offender. Pursuant to agreement with the Commonwealth, he entered a plea of guilty to the third degree burglary charge, a plea of guilty to the reduced charge of second degree burglary, and a plea of guilty to the first degree persistent felony charge. The recommendation of the Commonwealth was accepted, and Carter received the minimum sentence on each charge, the total of ten years to be served on the persistent felony offender in lieu of the other charges, again a minimum sentence.
The case before us is the result of a motion filed pursuant to RCr 11.42, seeking to set aside his sentence on several grounds, only one of which was considered by the Court of Appeals. We granted discretionary review to the Commonwealth as a consequence of the opinion of the Court of Appeals, which vacated the plea of guilty and granted a new trial.
The sole issue before us is the application of KRS 26A.015(2)(b), as it relates to this RCr 11.42 motion. The pleas of guilty above referred to were taken before Honorable J. Thomas Soyars, Judge of the Christian Circuit Court. It is undisputed that Judge Soyars was County Attorney of Christian County in 1973 and 1977, when Carter was sentenced on two previous convictions which were utilized to affix the status of persistent felony offender to him as defendant in the current proceeding. The statute in question, in relevant portion, reads:
KRS 26A.015. Disqualification of judge or justice of Court of Justice; or Master Commissioner.
(2) Any judge or justice of the Court of Justice or Master Commissioner shall disqualify himself in any proceeding:
(b) Where in private practice or government service he served as a lawyer or rendered a legal opinion in the matter in controversy....
It is our opinion that in relation to the motion before us under RCr 11.42 the fact that Judge Soyars was County Attorney at the time of the prior convictions in 1973 and 1977 does not affect his qualification to preside at the pleas of guilty herein for the simple reason that those convictions were not "the matter in controversy" as set out in KRS 26A.015(2)(b). There were two motions filed herein, one being a motion under CR 60.02 attacking the validity of the prior convictions, and the motion now before us. In respect to the former, where those convictions were the matter in controversy, the Court of Appeals held, in Carter v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 641 S.W.2d 758 (1982), that Judge Soyars should have disqualified himself, and on remand the CR 60.02 motion was disposed of by a second judge; that disposition is not now before us. The matter which is before us is a simple plea of guilty to current charges, and the record discloses that those matters relating to the validity of the previous convictions were specifically preserved.
Carter calls to our attention the case of Small v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 617 S.W.2d 61 (1981). However, the facts in that case are readily distinguishable. Therein, the presiding judge revoked shock probation in a case in which he had been Commonwealth Attorney at the time of sentencing and placing on shock probation, constituting a direct involvement with the matter in controversy.
In examining Small, supra, we note the following at p. 62:
The Commonwealth contends that failure to file a motion in the lower court that the judge disqualify himself constitutes waiver of the mandate of KRS 26A.015(2)(a). It is our opinion that any waiver of such right may be made under proper circumstances,...
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