Com. v. Clinton

Decision Date30 March 1978
Citation374 Mass. 719,374 N.E.2d 574
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Richard S. Barton, Malden, for defendant.

Peter W. Agnes, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and BRAUCHER, WILKINS, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

This case came before the court on a bill of exceptions, following a jury waived trial in the Third District Court of Eastern Middlesex at which the defendant was convicted of negligently operating a motor vehicle so as to endanger the lives and safety of the public, G.L. c. 90, § 24, and refusing to stop for a police officer, G.L. c. 90, § 25. The judge heard and denied motions to dismiss each of the complaints, and he imposed fines of $75 and $50 respectively. We hold that the motions to dismiss should have been allowed.

We summarize the facts. On July 20, 1976, an officer of the Metropolitan District Commission (M.D.C.) stopped the defendant while he was driving an automobile in Cambridge. The officer properly completed two citations, delivering the originals in hand to the defendant. The defendant was cited for violations of G.L. c. 90, §§ 24 and 25, and each citation was clearly designated "complaint," as required by G.L. c. 90C, § 2, par. 2.

The same evening, after issuing the above citations, the complaining officer returned to his assigned station (M.D.C. Old Colony Division) and deposited the portion of each citation known as the "request for a complaint," G.L. c. 90C, § 2, par. 4, with the M.D.C. motor vehicle complaint clerk.

According to the standard M.D.C. procedure, the above requests were forwarded to the police station in the area where the incident occurred (M.D.C. Lower Basin Division). There was evidence that this M.D.C. practice was designed to facilitate the compilation of data on offenses occurring within the various M.D.C. districts.

The requests for complaints were returned to the Old Colony Division on July 27, 1976. The complaining officer received notice of this fact that evening.

The next day eight days after the citations had been written the complaining officer deposited the requests for complaints in the appropriate District Court, together with duly executed applications for complaints. General Laws c. 90C, § 2, however, requires that this be done within three days after the citation is written. 1 It seems clear to us beyond dispute that this requirement is included in the statute to implement the "no fix" purpose of the statute.

The defendant argues persuasively that the failure of the police to observe the statutory deadline constitutes a defense to the crimes charged. Since this statute is penal in nature, it must be strictly construed. Commonwealth v. Federico, 354 Mass. 206, 207, 236 N.E.2d 646 (1968). See Commonwealth v. Hayden, 211 Mass. 296, 297, 97 N.E. 783 (1912). It is true that the Legislature did not specify what consequences should...

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27 cases
  • Com. v. Jones
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • 4 Febrero 1980
    ...Contrast Commonwealth v. Shea, 356 Mass. 358, 360, 252 N.E.2d 336 (1969), and Commonwealth v. Clinton, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- i, 374 N.E.2d 574 (1978). The defendant also was not harmed by the nolle prosequi. The nolle prosequi at the stage when it occurred in this case did not constitute......
  • Simon v. Solomon
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 18 Enero 1982
    ...and background. We disagree. Although we have often stated that penal statutes should be strictly construed, Commonwealth v. Clinton, 374 Mass. 719, 721, 374 N.E.2d 574 (1978), this maxim is a guide for resolving ambiguity, rather than a rigid requirement that we interpret each statute in t......
  • Com. v. Chavis
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 8 Julio 1993
    ...v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569, 441 N.E.2d 753 modified on other grounds, 387 Mass. 768, 443 N.E.2d 407 (1982); Commonwealth v. Clinton, 374 Mass. 719, 721, 374 N.E.2d 574 (1978). We have explained, however, that "this maxim is a guide for resolving ambiguity, rather than a rigid requirement......
  • Commonwealth v. Perella
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 1 Febrero 2013
    ...“uncertainty that results from a literal reading of the statute is to be resolved in favor of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Clinton, 374 Mass. 719, 721, 374 N.E.2d 574 (1978). See United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222, 227, 88 S.Ct. 926, 19 L.Ed.2d 1055 (1968), quoting United States v. Sch......
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