Com. v. Cox

Decision Date03 July 1951
Citation327 Mass. 609,100 N.E.2d 14
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. COX.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

F. Juggins, Boston (R. R. Clark, Boston, with him), for defendant.

L. C. Sprague, Asst. Dist. Atty., Boston, for the Commonwealth.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, WILKINS, SPALDING and WILLIAMS, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

On this indictment for the murder of his wife the defendant has been found guilty in the first degree and duly sentenced. The case is here upon his appeal with a summary of the record, a transcript of the evidence, and an assignment of errors. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 278, §§ 33A-33G, as amended by St.1939, c. 341. The only error assigned is the denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of not guilty of murder in the first degree. The defendant has never controverted the evidence for the prosecution, but contends that he should have been found not guilty by reason of insanity. Compare Commonwealth v. Curtis, 318 Mass. 584, 63 N.E.2d 341. Not only has he not controverted the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth, but his acceptance of it to the last horrible detail was, and is, the cornerstone of his defence.

That evidence consists principally of a signed confession, of admissions of the defendant made to the police, and of photographs of the deceased taken at the scene of the killing. The defendant and his wife, Helen H. Cox, who were married in 1933, had lived in a house near the center of Concord since 1941. There were no children. The defendant was born in 1889, and his wife was four years older. He had spent most of his life in this Commonwealth, and here he was graduated from high school and from college, and received a master's degree. He never achieved the economic success for which his education seemingly should have allowed him to hope. He did some teaching at first, but at the time of the events now the subject of our concern he was the owner and manager of the Stow County Club in the town of that name, and in the winter time engaged in a small candy business.

On February 21, 1948, shortly after 10 A.M. the officer at the desk at the Concord police station received a telephone call from the defendant, who gave his name and address, and said, 'I have some bad news for you. I have just killed my wife. Will the police please come down?' In a few minutes a police officer arrived at the house, where he found the defendant in one room and his wife in a moribund condition lying in a pool of blood on the floor of another. The defendant's first words were, 'Officer, I have just done a most terrible thing. I just killed my wife.' As the police officer, who had observed that Mrs. Cox was still alive, went to a telephone, the defendant said, 'It's useless to get a doctor because I've done a very thorough job. A doctor could do her no good.' When the medical examiner, who was a physician known to the defendant, arrived, the defendant said that there was no sense in the doctor being there because he had really 'fixed her.'

The defendant was in no way hesitant about telling what had happened. While his wife was playing a composition of Mozart on the piano, he approached from behind and with great force struck her on the head with a common type of claw hammer. When she fell forward, he lifted her to the floor where he struck her a number of additional blows on the head with the same instrument. As these did not bring about immediate death, he procured an ice pick with which he penetrated her left eye and left ear, and punctured her left breast three times. Still not achieving her death, he brought into use a wire which he placed around her neck in an attempt at strangulation. He then washed off the hammer and ice pick with a dish towel.

Death occurred after the police and medical examiner arrived. The cause of death was multiple compound fractures of the skull. Multiple stab wounds of the chest and heart were a contributory cause.

After the various attacks, but prior to calling the police, the defendant telephoned his stockbrokers in Boston and gave instructions to sell all the securities in his account and not to call him back. He also telephoned his brother. The defendant's explanation of his action, given to the police and later to psychiatrists, was that he had become discouraged because of prospective heavy expense of repairing the country club roof, which had fallen in because of an accumulation of snow, and that he wished to spare his wife the sufferings of financial adversity. She had recently said that she dreaded growing old. He thought of killing himself but felt that would have left the burden on her. In 1930 he had unsuccessfully tried suicide by poison. He conceived the idea of killing her during the previous night when he was in bed. It occurred to him that he might put her out of this world without her ever knowing what happened. 'It seemed like a kindness.' There was no domestic disagreement, no marital unhappiness. Following the assaults, the defendant exhibited no remorse, and his outward manner was calm and composed. He then experienced a sensation of great relief, and 'quite a few times he repeated that he thought he did a good job, that when he killed his wife that would be the end of her, and that the State would take his life, and that they would both meet in the next world.' He expressed the view that she was better off.

After indictment and plea of not guilty the defendant was examined by two psychiatrists pursuant to the so called Briggs law. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 123, § 100A, as amended by St.1941, c. 194, § 11. Upon their recommendation he was committed for observation to Bridgewater State Hospital on March 23, 1948. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 123, § 100. On April 23, 1948, he was committed to that hospital until further order of the court following a warrant to remove signed by Dr. Stearns, medical director of the hospital, G.L. [Ter.Ed.] c. 125, § 48, and by Dr. Perkins, the commissioner of mental health, and a report by Dr. Stearns, which concluded, 'it is our opinion that he is insane and in need of care in a hospital for mental disease. Diagnosis: Manic Depressive Insanity; Depressed Phase.' On February 8, 1950, Dr. Stearns reported that the defendant had recovered, and he was returned for trial. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 123, § 105, as appearing in St.1936, c. 130, as amended by St.1945, c. 50. Commonwealth v. Zelenski, 287 Mass. 125, 126, 191 N.E. 355.

At the trial, which was held on April 24, 25 and 26, 1950, the Commonwealth did not call these doctors as witnesses. The defendant, however, as his only witnesses, called Dr. Berk, one of the psychiatrists appointed under § 100A, as amended, and Dr. Stearns, who at some time previous to his connection with Bridgewater State Hospital had been commissioner of correction. These medical witnesses were of unquestioned qualifications. See Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 257 Mass. 391, 396, 153 N.E. 881. They testified that in their opinion the defendant was 'insane' on February 21, 1948. We consider the case on the footing that by this they meant a lack of mental capacity which would excuse the defendant from legal responsibility for crime, and that they did not intend to express an academic medical viewpoint without relevancy in a criminal case. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 307 Mass. 155, 157, 29 N.E.2d 719. See Commonwealth v. McCann, 325 Mass. 510, 515, 91 N.E.2d 214, and cases cited.

Apart from any issue of legal responsibility there was evidence warranting a finding that the murder was committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought. Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 486-496, 76 N.E. 127, 7 L.R.A.,N.S., 1056...

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    ...strong evidence of his lack of criminal responsibility, we are convinced that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Cox, supra. We are blostered in our conclusion by two additional factors: The refusal of the judge to give the defendant's requested instruction ......
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