Com. v. CSX Transp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 March 1998 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Mark A. Serge, Greensburg, for appellant.
James M. Becker, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before McGINLEY and PELLEGRINI, JJ., and JIULIANTE, Senior Judge.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (District Attorney) 1 appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Criminal Division (common pleas court), dated January 13, 1997, which granted CSX Transportation, Inc.'s (CSXT) motion to quash. The common pleas court found that the penalty CSXT paid in the civil action was criminal in nature and quashed the criminal information because it believed that permitting the prosecution to proceed would result in a double jeopardy violation of Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
CSXT is a railway transportation company that transports freight along rail lines it owns and operates in the Commonwealth. On August 23, 1989, two CSXT freight trains were traveling on adjacent tracks in Westmoreland County. The trains derailed as they passed each other. Rain and flooding had washed out the tracks. The trains overturned down a steep embankment adjacent to the Youghiogheny River (the Yough). The railway cars were punctured and their contents (cleaning detergent and corn syrup) spilled into the Yough. As a result of the derailment, approximately ten thousand-three hundred and fifty one (10,351) fish were killed, the Yough was polluted, and the McKeesport Water Treatment Plant had to be shut down.
CSXT voluntarily began to remediate the problems caused by the accident, and incurred costs in excess of $460,000.00. CSXT hired five different contractors for the clean up. 2 Additionally, CSXT contributed $4500.00 to the West Newton Sportsmen's Association to restock the Yough. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 95a-212a.
Two years after the accident, the District Attorney filed criminal charges against CSXT. Following the preliminary hearing, the District Attorney filed a Criminal Information charging CSXT with violating Section 2504(a)(2) of the Fish and Boat Code, 30 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a)(2), by allowing a substance deleterious, destructive or poisonous to fish to flow into the Yough. On June 18, 1992, CSXT moved to quash the Criminal Information contending that Section 2504(a)(2), a strict liability criminal provision, violated the due process clauses of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. The common pleas court granted the motion and quashed the Criminal Information on October 21, 1992. On appeal, this Court reversed the common pleas court, holding that Section 2504(a)(2) was not unconstitutional. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied CSXT's petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 653 A.2d 1327 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995), appeal denied, 542 Pa. 675, 668 A.2d 1137 (1995).
While the District Attorney proceeded with criminal charges, on August 22, 1994, the Department of Environmental Resources (Department) 3 filed a civil complaint for violations under the Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA), Act of July 7, 1980, P.L. 380, 35 P.S. §§ 6018.101--6018.1003, and the Clean Streams Law (CSL), Act of June 22, 1937, P.L.1987, 35 P.S. §§ 691.1--691.1001. Counts I through IV of this complaint arose from the August 23, 1989, train derailment, count V arose from an unrelated and separate incident on September 14, 1990, in Somerset County. On April 21, 1995, the Department amended its civil complaint, and sought to add three additional counts based on alleged facts that arose out of the Somerset County incident. The Department sought to recover statutory civil penalties of up to $10,000.00 per day for each alleged violation of the CSL based upon the August 23, 1989, spillage and up to $25,000.00 per day for each alleged violation of the SWMA.
On June 26, 1995, while the District Attorney's appeal from the common pleas court order of October 21, 1992, quashing the Criminal Information was still pending, the Department and CSXT reached a settlement of the Department's civil penalty claims before the Environmental Hearing Board (EHB). The parties agreed that the Department would withdraw the civil complaint in exchange for CSXT conveying a parcel of property known as BoWest Yard to the Department, or in the alternative, pay the Department $100,000.00 plus interest. R.R. at 8a-12a. On September 6, 1996, CSXT transferred the BoWest Yard to the Department. The agreement provided that the resolution of the civil penalties constituted a "Consent Order and Adjudication." R.R. at 11a.
On April 29, 1996, CSXT sought to quash the District Attorney's Criminal Information based on double jeopardy. The common pleas court heard oral argument on September 23, 1996. Oral Argument, September 23, 1996; R.R. at 321a. After argument, the parties submitted additional briefs to the common pleas court, and the common pleas court conducted an evidentiary hearing on December 19, 1996. On January 13, 1997, the common pleas court quashed the Criminal Information, stating, "[T]he penalty CSXT has paid in the civil action is criminal in nature and as such, allowing the within prosecution to proceed would result in a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy." Opinion and Order dated January 13, 1997, at 12; R.R. at 297a. The District Attorney appealed to this Court.
The issue for our review is whether the common pleas court erred in determining the civil settlement was a penalty and criminal in nature which foreclosed the criminal prosecution. 4
The District Attorney contends that the agreement does not bar criminal prosecution, that the protection against double jeopardy does not apply in civil proceedings such as those before administrative agencies that result in civil penalties. We must agree.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall be "subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...." A comparable clause in the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Pa. Const. Article 1, Section 10. The Double Jeopardy Clause is designed to protect against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989); United States v. James, 78 F.3d 851 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 128, 136 L.Ed.2d 77 (U.S.1996); see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 435 Pa.Super. 132, 645 A.2d 234 (1994), affirmed, 542 Pa. 568, 669 A.2d 315 (1995).
Recently in the case of Hudson v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997), our United States Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution where the administrative proceedings were civil, not criminal. In Hudson, the Government imposed monetary penalties and occupational debarment for violation of federal banking statutes on John Hudson, Larry Baresel, and Jack Butler Rackley (Hudson, Baresel and Rackley). Hudson, Baresel, and Rackley were officials at two banks where they made certain unlawful loans which benefited Hudson. The Government took many factors into consideration before assessing penalties of $100,000 against Hudson and $50,000 each against Baresel and Rackley. In October 1989, Hudson, Baresel and Rackley entered into a "Stipulation and Consent Order" that provided for payments of $16,500, $15,000, and $12,500 respectively. They also "agreed not to 'participate in any manner' in the affairs of any banking institution without the written authorization of the OCC and all other relevant regulatory agencies." Hudson, --- U.S. at ----, 118 S.Ct. at 492.
When the Government subsequently indicted Hudson, Baresel, and Rackley for conspiracy, misapplication of bank funds, and making false bank entries (essentially the same conduct involved in the administrative proceedings), Hudson, Baresel, and Rackley moved to dismiss under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The United States Supreme Court stated:
Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory construction. Helvering, supra, at 399, 58 S.Ct. at 633. [Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938).] A court must first ask whether the legislature, "in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other." Ward, 448 U.S. at 248, 100 S.Ct. at 2641. [United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980).] Even in those cases where the legislature "has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect," id., at 248-249, 100 S.Ct. at 2641, as to "transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty," Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154, 76 S.Ct. 219, 222, 100 L.Ed. 149 (1956).
...
The Eighth Amendment protects [individuals] against excessive civil fines, including forfeitures. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 113 S.Ct. 2766, 125 L.Ed.2d 441 (1993); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993). The additional protection afforded by extending double jeopardy protections to proceedings heretofore thought to be civil is more than offset by the confusion created by attempting to distinguish between "punitive" and "nonpunitive" penalties. [See also, Pa. Const., Art. I, § 13.]
Hudson, --- U.S. at ----, ----, 118 S.Ct. at 493, 495.
By comparison, Section 605 of the SWMA, 35 P.S. §...
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