Com. v. King
Decision Date | 30 December 2003 |
Citation | 576 Pa. 318,839 A.2d 237 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Carolyn Ann KING, Appellee. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Ronald Thomas Williamson, Norristown, Robert William McAteer, Philadelphia, Robert A. Graci, Pittsburgh, for the Com. of Pa., appellant.
Kelly Ann Cloak, Thomas B. Schmidt, Harrisburg, for Carolyn Ann King, appellee.
Before: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and LAMB, JJ.
OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
In this Post-Conviction Relief Act1 ("PCRA") case, we granted the Commonwealth's petition for permission to appeal in order to determine whether the PCRA court properly granted Appellee Carolyn Ann King's motion for recusal. For the following reasons, we affirm the order of the PCRA court.
In 1994, following a jury trial before the Honorable Robert J. Eby of the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, Appellee Carolyn Ann King and her co-defendant Bradley Martin were convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses and sentenced to death for fatally suffocating Guy Goodman in the course of robbing him in his home. On appeal, this Court affirmed, Commonwealth v. King, 554 Pa. 331, 721 A.2d 763 (1998), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. King v. Pennsylvania, 528 U.S. 1119, 120 S.Ct. 942, 145 L.Ed.2d 819 (2000) (mem.). Following the denial of certiorari, then-Governor Ridge signed a death warrant for Appellee, scheduling her execution for March 29, 2000.
On February 11, 2000, Appellee simultaneously filed an emergency motion to stay her execution and a timely pro se PCRA petition. One week later, on February 18, 2000, now-President Judge Eby denied Appellee's emergency motion for a stay and issued a notice of intent to dismiss her pro se PCRA petition. Appellee subsequently filed an emergency motion to stay her execution with this Court, which we granted in a per curiam order, staying her execution pending the filing and disposition of an amended, counseled PCRA petition.2Commonwealth v. King, 561 Pa. 144, 748 A.2d 1232 (2000) (per curiam). Pursuant to that order, Appellee filed an amended, counseled PCRA petition, in which she lodged numerous claims of constructive denial of counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel, including claims that the appointment of "a civil practitioner with no relevant experience, or training" as trial counsel and the failure of Lebanon County ("the County") to provide adequate standards and resources for appointed counsel in capital cases had constructively denied Appellee the assistance of counsel.3 R. at Ex. 76 ( ).
On May 30, 2001, Appellee filed a motion requesting President Judge Eby to recuse himself from the remainder of Appellee's PCRA proceedings, arguing that recusal was warranted because: (1) President Judge Eby's impartiality might reasonably be questioned in deciding whether his appointment of inexperienced trial counsel was constitutional; (2) President Judge Eby's impartiality might reasonably be questioned in deciding whether the County's fee and expenditure restrictions for defense counsel in capital cases were constitutional because, according to Appellee, the President Judge had devised those restrictions; and (3) President Judge Eby had personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, specifically, whether the County maintains adequate standards for the appointment of counsel in capital cases and whether it provided adequate resources for Appellee's defense. Although President Judge Eby, upon considering Appellee's motion, concluded that "none of the arguments presented by [Appellee] support[ed] her request for [his] recusal," R. at Ex. 101 (PCRA Ct. Op. at 14), he nevertheless recused himself in order to expedite the disposition of Appellee's PCRA petition. Additionally, he requested the assignment of a judge from outside of the County to preside over the remainder of Appellee's post-conviction proceedings.4 At the Commonwealth's request, President Judge Eby certified this interlocutory order regarding his recusal for appeal. The Commonwealth then filed a petition for permission to appeal to this Court, which we granted.
In general, a motion for recusal is properly directed to and decided by the jurist whose participation the moving party is challenging. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 661 A.2d 352, 370. In filing a motion for recusal, the moving party must allege facts tending to show bias, interest or other disqualifying factors. Reilly v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291, 1300 (1985). In turn, once the judge decides whether to preside over the case, that decision is "final and the cause must proceed." Id. at 1300.
Although it is well-established that this Court may review the denial of a motion for recusal to determine whether the lower court abused its discretion in refusing to recuse itself, see Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 553 Pa. 485, 720 A.2d 79, 89 (1998),
this Court has not yet considered the standard for reviewing the grant of a motion for recusal, such as the one at issue here.5 In reviewing the denial of a recusal motion to determine whether the judge abused his discretion, we "recognize that our judges are honorable, fair and competent." Reilly, 489 A.2d at 1300. Based on this premise, where a judge has refused to recuse himself, on appeal, we place the burden on the party requesting recusal to establish that the judge abused his discretion. See Commonwealth v. White, 557 Pa. 408, 734 A.2d 374, 384 (). Of course, it is self-evident that the characteristics of our judges do not change according to whether they recuse themselves from a particular case or not, and as such, where a judge has, in fact, recused himself, we must proceed on a similar premise, recognizing that our "honorable, fair and competent" judges do not grant recusal motions lightly. Therefore, where a judge has decided to recuse himself, we must place the burden on the party opposing recusal to establish that the judge did in fact abuse his discretion in doing so.6
Here, the Commonwealth cites to Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (2000), in support of its argument that President Judge Eby abused his discretion by granting Appellee's motion for recusal.7 In Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (2000), we explained the abuse-of-discretion standard in depth:
Id. at 753 (emphasis added) (quoting Coker v. S.M. Flickinger Co., 533 Pa. 441, 625 A.2d 1181, 1185 (1993)). Relying on Widmer, the Commonwealth specifically argues that because President Judge Eby recused himself on grounds other than those alleged by Appellee in her recusal motion, grounds which the President Judge explicitly found did not require his recusal, he necessarily failed to apply the law, and, therefore, abused his discretion.
The Commonwealth's logic is flawed, however, as both the Code of Judicial Conduct and our caselaw allow a judge, of his own volition, to decide that recusal is appropriate for reasons other than those advanced by one of the parties. See Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C)(1) ( ); see also Reilly, 489 A.2d at 1298
. 8 Admittedly, as the Commonwealth points out, we have expressed a strong preference for the trial judge to preside over a petitioner's post-conviction proceedings in order to promote judicial efficiency. See, e.g., Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d at 90 (). However, such a preference does not in any way serve as a blanket prohibition against a trial judge recusing himself from subsequent proceedings. Rather, we have placed the decision on whether to recuse squarely in the hands of the trial judge through Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 903(C), which provides: "The trial judge if available, shall proceed with and dispose of the [PCRA] petition in accordance with these rules, unless the trial judge determines, in the interests of justice, that he or she should be disqualified." Pa.R.Crim.P. 903(C) (emphasis added).
Here, in his fourteen-page opinion supporting his decision to recuse himself, President Judge Eby thoughtfully considered all of the grounds for recusal alleged by Appellee and concluded that he was not required to recuse himself on those grounds. However, the President Judge nonetheless decided to recuse himself, in an effort to expedite the disposition of Appellee's PCRA petition. He explained:
[T]he jury has spoken as to the responsibility of [Appellee] for...
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...over by the Honorable Harold Thomson, who was appointed after Judge Eby granted Appellant's motion for recusal. See Commonwealth v. King, 576 Pa. 318, 839 A.2d 237 (2003) (affirming Judge Eby's decision to recuse himself). 3. After the Commonwealth filed its cross-appeal, docketed at 615 CA......
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