Com. v. Pagan
| Decision Date | 18 November 2005 |
| Citation | 837 N.E.2d 252,445 Mass. 315 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Pedro PAGAN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Dean A. Mazzone, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Dana Alan Curhan, Boston, (Brad Bennion with him) for the defendant.
Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.
This case, here on a reservation and report by a single justice on the Commonwealth's petition under G.L. c. 211, § 3, seeks direction on the application of the bail revocation provisions in G.L. c. 276, § 58, third par., which authorize the revocation of bail on a pending charge or charges when a defendant is charged with committing a new offense while on release. Similar questions concerning the statute's application are raised in two related cases, Commonwealth v. Cargill, 445 Mass. 329, 837 N.E.2d 263 (2005), and Commonwealth v. Hall, 445 Mass. 1016, 837 N.E.2d 267 (2005). We shall clarify the statute's application on the particular facts of each case, concluding generally that, when none of the charges against the defendant has been dismissed or has resulted in acquittal, and where no manifest injustice exists, a District Court judge may not, under G.L. c. 276, § 58, third par., vacate a bail revocation order. We also conclude that once a bail revocation order enters, it is valid for a period of sixty days, and that, by mittimus returnable on the sixtieth day, the defendant shall be brought back to the court with jurisdiction over the charges to which the bail revocation order relates (the original pending charges) for a new bail hearing on those charges.
The background of the case is as follows. On June 4, 2002, a grand jury in Suffolk County returned indictments charging the defendant with breaking and entering in the nighttime, possession of a burglarious instrument, possession of a firearm without a firearms identification card, possession of a firearm without a license, and resisting arrest. On June 25, 2002, the defendant was arraigned in the Superior Court. A Superior Court judge set bail at $1,000, which the defendant posted, and the defendant was advised of the potential for bail revocation under G.L. c. 276, § 58, third par., if he were charged with committing a subsequent offense during the period of his release. After further proceedings, on September 26, 2003, the parties agreed to continue the case to the week of December 8, 2003, for trial.
On November 26, 2003, the defendant was arrested and arraigned in the Dorchester Division of the District Court Department on charges of receiving stolen property and breaking and entering a motor vehicle. In connection with these charges, bail was set at $500 cash, of which the defendant posted $450. The judge then allowed the Commonwealth's motion to revoke the defendant's bail that had been set in connection with the Superior Court indictments. The notation on the docket reflects that the motion was "allowed to 12-8-03," i.e., to the date of the defendant's scheduled trial on the Superior Court indictments.
The defendant's trial in Superior Court did not proceed on the scheduled date due to the absence of defense counsel. On December 8, 2003, after a hearing, a different judge (of the District Court) vacated the order revoking the defendant's bail on the Superior Court indictments and reinstated the bail originally set ($1,000 cash). With respect to the District Court charges, the judge reduced the bail to $450 cash, which had already been posted.
The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal, followed by a petition in the county court pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, seeking relief from the portion of the December 8, 2003, order that vacated the revocation of the defendant's bail on the Superior Court indictments. A single justice reserved and reported the case, without decision, to the full court. Prior to her reservation and report, both the Superior Court indictments and District Court charges against the defendant were resolved.1
1. Because the charges against the defendant were resolved, the case is moot. See Commesso v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 368, 374, 339 N.E.2d 917 (1975). We nonetheless address the issues raised because they "are fully briefed and raise matters of importance that are likely to arise again, but are unlikely to be capable of appellate review in the normal course before they become moot." Delaney v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 490, 492, 614 N.E.2d 672 (1993), quoting Upton, Petitioner, 387 Mass. 359, 365, 439 N.E.2d 1216 (1982).
2. We examine whether, under G.L. c. 276, § 58, third par., a District Court judge may vacate a bail revocation order entered by another judge. The statute "sets forth the conditions ... for the possible revocation of bail if [a defendant] is charged with committing a subsequent offense during the period of his release," Paquette v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 125, 795 N.E.2d 521 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150, 124 S.Ct. 1153, 157 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2004), reading, in relevant part, as follows:
(Emphases added.)
G.L. c. 276, § 58, third par.
We apply settled principles of statutory construction. When the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, we afford it "its ordinary meaning." Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 Mass. 772, 775, 730 N.E.2d 297 (2000). "Where the draftsmanship of a statute is faulty or lacks precision, it is our duty to give the statute a reasonable construction." Capone v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Fitchburg, 389 Mass. 617, 622, 451 N.E.2d 1141 (1983), quoting School Comm. of Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, 385 Mass. 70, 79-80, 431 N.E.2d 180 (1982). We "must construe the statute `in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.'" Capone v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Fitchburg, supra at 622-623, 451 N.E.2d 1141, quoting Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360, 364, 326 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
"The essential purpose of bail is to secure the presence of a defendant at trial to ensure that, if the defendant is guilty, justice will be served." Querubin v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 108, 113, 795 N.E.2d 534 (2003), and cases cited. We have previously recounted the history of bail and bail reform in some detail. See Commonwealth v. Ray, 435 Mass. 249, 252-257, 755 N.E.2d 1259 (2001); Commonwealth v. Baker, 343 Mass. 162, 165-168, 177 N.E.2d 783 (1961). Over the years, as Massachusetts became a leader in the bail reform movement, various bail statutes, including § 58, underwent numerous revisions. See Commonwealth v. Ray, supra. The principal legislative purpose of § 58 is "to protect the rights of the defendant by establishing a presumption that he or she will be admitted to bail on personal recognizance without surety and by delineating carefully the circumstances under which bail may be denied." Delaney v. Commonwealth, supra at 495, 614 N.E.2d 672.
In 1981, the Legislature enacted St.1981, c. 802, entitled "An Act relative to bail, pretrial release and confinement." Section 2 amended G.L. c. 276, § 58, by adding a bail revocation provision. See St.1981, c. 802, § 2. In a February 27, 1981, letter to the members of the Massachusetts Senate and House of Representatives, Governor Edward J. King indicated that he was proposing the act, in part, to "allow [a] judge to revoke bail when the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant has violated [the] condition [that he refrain from criminal activity during the period of his release], if the court determines that the defendant's release would pose a serious danger and that his detention is necessary to reasonably assure the safety of any person or the community." 1981 House Doc. No. 6320. In rejecting a substantive due process challenge to the current version of the bail revocation provision, G.L. c. 276,...
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