Com. v. Pares-Ramirez, PARES-RAMIREZ
| Decision Date | 11 August 1987 |
| Docket Number | PARES-RAMIREZ |
| Citation | 511 N.E.2d 344,400 Mass. 604 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Sebastian |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Michael R. Schneider, Committee for Public Counsel Services, Salem, for defendant.
Natalea Skvir, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.
Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.
The defendant appeals from convictions of murder in the second degree and unlawfully carrying a firearm. At trial, it was not disputed that the defendant had shot the victim, but the defendant claimed that he had acted in self-defense. On appeal, he argues that his defense was undermined by two prejudicial errors. The first claimed error is the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress a statement that he had signed. The statement was read to the jury by a police officer and went with the jury to the deliberating room. The other alleged error is the judge's failure to instruct the jury adequately with respect to self-defense as it relates to the charge of murder in the second degree. We transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion. We affirm the convictions.
At trial, the jury were presented with three distinct versions of the events preceding the shooting. Nora Gonsalez Rio, a prosecution witness, gave one account inculpating the defendant. A second version, which we summarize below, was contained in the contested statement signed by the defendant at the police station in Lowell. The third version, more favorable to the defendant than the other two, particularly with respect to his defense of self-defense, was provided by the defendant's trial testimony.
According to the written statement, the defendant went with his wife and child to the victim's apartment in the early morning, July 17, 1984, in order to collect $7,000 owed him by the victim. The victim had called the defendant and told him that he had the money. When the defendant arrived, the victim was very drunk and started an argument. The victim said that he had all the money he owed the defendant but was going to pay only $1,500. The defendant became very angry because he had driven a long distance to collect the money and because the victim called him obscene names in front of his wife and child. The defendant rose from the table in the course of the argument and started to go outside. The victim pulled one knife from his pocket and obtained another from the kitchen. While everyone was leaving the apartment, the victim was attempting to stab the defendant with both knives at the same time. The defendant ran to his car and retrieved his gun from under the seat. He told the victim that he could have the money and to leave him alone, but the victim continued swearing and trying to stab the defendant. The defendant then shot the victim.
At trial, the defendant testified that, during the course of an argument over a drug transaction, the victim struck the defendant on the top of the head, that the defendant became dizzy and confused, that the victim "grabbed something like knives" from a kitchen drawer, and that the defendant was afraid that the victim would kill or injure him. According to his testimony, the defendant fled, and, while still dizzy and afraid, he "heard ... shots or something like that." The defendant further testified that he thought the victim was going to kill him, that he did not know at the time if he had actually shot the victim, and that he never had planned to kill the victim.
The defendant supported his pretrial motion to suppress the written statement with an affidavit and memorandum of law. The judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and made findings and rulings which he set forth in a memorandum of decision. He denied the motion to suppress the statement.
The thrust of the defendant's affidavit in support of his motion to suppress was that his signed statement was coerced. In his affidavit, he asserted that, while he was in the custody of the Lowell police, he was not allowed to make any telephone calls, he was not allowed to consult an attorney despite his requests to do so, and "[a]fter constant questioning and after constant pressures [he] made certain statements to a Spanish-speaking officer." The affidavit continued:
In his memorandum in support of the suppression motion, the defendant repeated the assertions he had made in his affidavit. He argued that he had not waived any of the rights addressed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and that the police had not respected them. He also argued that, considering the totality of the circumstances, his statements, including the signed statement in question, were coerced by the treatment he had received. The memorandum emphasized the significance to the question of voluntariness of psychological pressure, of intense and protracted interrogation, of the inability to understand English, and of being held "incommunicado" and without food or sleep.
The judge's findings focused on the issues raised by the defendant's affidavit and memorandum. He found that the defendant, while sleeping on a garage floor in Springfield, was arrested at approximately 5 A.M. on August 17, 1984, by a Springfield police officer on an outstanding warrant for murder from the Lowell District Court. Shortly after being arrested, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights in English and Spanish by Officer Joseph Morales, a Spanish-speaking police officer of the Springfield police department. Subsequently, the defendant was booked at the Springfield police department in the presence of Officer Morales, who explained all the defendant's rights to him in Spanish. At approximately 9 A.M., after the defendant's hand was treated at a hospital, Officer Charles Sadlier and Spanish-speaking Officer Julio Gonzales of the Lowell police department arrived in Springfield to transport the defendant to the Lowell police station. During the ride to Lowell, the defendant made two spontaneous statements which were not the result of any interrogation. The statements were to the effect that he did not want to involve his family and that the victim had made him do it.
At approximately noon, the defendant arrived at the Lowell police station and was fully advised of his rights in both English and Spanish by Officer Gonzales. The defendant voluntarily signed two Miranda cards printed in English and Spanish. The defendant was further advised, in Spanish, of his right to use the telephone, and signed slips confirming that fact.
Subsequently, the defendant gave an oral statement to the Lowell police officers (impliedly, in Spanish). This statement was reduced to writing in English. Officer Gonzales then fully, fairly, and...
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