Com. v. Prater

• Decision Date: 15 June 1995
• Citation: 651 N.E.2d 833,420 Mass. 569
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Charles E. PRATER. Bristol
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 833

651 N.E.2d 833

420 Mass. 569

COMMONWEALTH v. Charles E. PRATER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Bristol.

Argued Feb. 9, 1995.

Decided June 15, 1995.

Leah R. Kunkel, Northampton (Kim Charles Rosen, with her), for defendant.

Mary O'Neil, Sp. Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and GREANEY, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

Notwithstanding his defense of lack of criminal responsibility, the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree by reason of extreme atrocity or cruelty. ¹ The defendant appeals on the grounds that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the trial judge's determination that he was competent to stand trial; (2) a videotaped confession should have been suppressed as the tainted product of an earlier, suppressed confession; and (3) pursuant to our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E (1992 ed.), we should order a new trial or enter a lesser degree of guilt. We affirm the conviction. We decline to exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, in favor of the defendant to order a new trial or enter a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt.

I. Facts. We review the facts in a light favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Kappler, 416 Mass. 574, 575, 625 N.E.2d 513 (1993). Around 6 P.M. on September 15, 1984, the defendant went to 520 Cherry Street, Fall River, to visit the victim, Maurice Larue. The defendant had known the victim for some time and previously had lived with his girl friend and the victim in the 520 Cherry Street apartment. During the defendant's visit, the two men drank beer and vodka. At some point the defendant left to purchase more beer. The trial judge found that the defendant consumed four sixteen-ounce cans of beer and eight or nine "shots" of vodka during his visit. The victim also was drinking quite heavily (his blood alcohol content at the time of death was .33).

The two men had an extended conversation while drinking. At some point the defendant became agitated; an argument ensued, and the two men came to blows. The defendant confessed to punching the victim in the face several times until he fell to the floor. The defendant then searched out and found an axe which he knew the victim kept in a nearby cabinet. According to the defendant, "something just made me kill him. Something went into my head and said, 'kill that guy.' " Once he had the axe, the defendant "just went right towards him and started ... [c]utting him in half.... [The victim] picked his head up and he looked up at [the defendant] [and said,] 'Oh, God,' ... [and the defendant] just sliced his brain in half." ²

The defendant did not leave until he was certain the victim had died. The defendant explained that the victim "was making noises, blood gurgling, coughing blood up ... barfing blood up ... then he reached the point where he had no blood in him. That was the last mouthful that he barfed up." The defendant told police that he "waited till [the victim] was dead and didn't breathe no more and then all the blood was on the ground and [he] kicked him to see if he was alive. He didn't move."

From 520 Cherry Street the defendant went to a local bar, the Tremont Cafe. There, Paulie Barboza, a friend of the defendant, helped the defendant wash blood from his jacket and hands. Once his jacket had dried, the defendant proceeded to a second bar, Shaker's. Around 11 P.M. the defendant confided in another friend, Joseph Rutkowski, that he had just killed someone. Doubtful that the defendant had committed a murder, but intending to steal any valuables from the victim's apartment if the defendant had killed him, Rutkowski dared the defendant to show him the body. The two men left Shaker's and drove to the victim's apartment in Rutkowski's car. The defendant confessed that he again "[k]icked [the victim] to see if he was alive." When the defendant showed Rutkowski the body, Rutkowski said "they should hire you for some Union." But when he saw the defendant pick up the axe, "Ru[t]kowski got scared. He ran out into the hallway, thought [the defendant] was going to do him up for robbing [the victim]." The defendant ran after Rutkowski, dropping the axe on the stairway in his rush to catch up with him. Catching Rutkowski before he drove away, the defendant said, "Joe, let's go and have a few drinks, you know, hang around.... No problem. Let's go ... I'll pay for it."

Rutkowski drove the defendant back to Shaker's, where he called the police from a public telephone. In the interim, the defendant argued with another bar patron, whom he threatened to kill just as he had killed the victim. When the police arrived at Shaker's, the defendant and Rutkowski accompanied them to Cherry Street. The defendant then was arrested, initially for assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and brought to the police station. After being read the Miranda warnings he signed a waiver form. In his statement, the defendant confessed to the crime. After the first confession, the defendant consented to a second round of interrogation while being videotaped. The trial judge suppressed the first confession but allowed the second. The facts surrounding the two confessions given by the defendant at the station are provided in more detail in the analysis of their admissibility. See infra. The defendant did not challenge the facts of the murder. His trial strategy was based on his claim that he was not criminally responsible.

II. Competency to stand trial. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty and requested a hearing on competency. Pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 15(b ) (1992 ed.), the defendant was examined at Bridgewater State Hospital by the assistant medical director, who reported to the motion judge that the defendant was competent to stand trial. The motion judge held a three-day hearing and received testimony from five mental health experts as to the defendant's competence. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (criminal defendant's due process right to fair trial requires hearing on issue of competence to stand trial); Commonwealth v. Hill, 375 Mass. 50, 375 N.E.2d 1168 (1978). After the hearing, the motion judge concluded that the defendant was competent to stand trial. The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the motion judge's conclusion that the defendant was competent to stand trial. He further challenges the motion judge's finding on the ground that the hearing on competence did not satisfy the due process clause. We do not agree.

"It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial." Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). See Commonwealth v. Crowley, 393 Mass. 393, 398, 471 N.E.2d 353 (1984) (criminal defendant may not stand trial if unable to understand charges against him, communicate with counsel, and aid in his own defense). In Commonwealth v. Vailes, 360 Mass. 522, 275 N.E.2d 893 (1971), we followed the standard of competency to stand trial set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam). See also Drope v. Missouri, supra; Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2685, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). For a criminal defendant to be competent to stand trial, the judge hearing the competency issue must find that the Commonwealth has shown by a preponderance of evidence, ³ Commonwealth v. Crowley, supra, 393 Mass. at 401-402, 471 N.E.2d 353, that "[ (1) ] [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and ... [ (2) ] [the defendant] has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Commonwealth v. Vailes, supra 360 Mass. at 524, 275 N.E.2d 893, quoting Dusky v. United States, supra 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824.

In reviewing the motion judge's determination that the defendant was competent to stand trial, we give substantial deference to his findings of fact because the judge had the opportunity to view the witnesses in open court and to evaluate the defendant personally. Commonwealth v. DeMinico, 408 Mass. 230, 235-236, 557 N.E.2d 744 (1990). The motion judge had a duty to weigh the credibility of the expert testimony in determining whether the Commonwealth had met its burden of proof to show the defendant had a "present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and also to determine whether the Commonwealth had shown that the defendant had "a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Commonwealth v. Vailes, supra.

The experts generally agreed that the defendant had a low intelligence quotient (IQ) indicative of borderline retardation and that he was on medication usually prescribed for mental illnesses, ⁴ but offered conflicting conclusions as to the defendant's competency to stand trial. Weighing the conflicting conclusions of the experts, the judge credited testimony of Dr. Luber that, although the defendant had a low IQ and had suffered from psychiatric problems in the past, he could communicate with his lawyer and participate in his defense and also had a rational and factual grasp of the proceedings against him. The motion judge was not obliged to accept the testimony of other experts who opined that, due to his low IQ and various diagnoses of psychiatric disorders, the defendant was not competent. See Commonwealth v. DeMinico, supra 408 Mass. at 235-236, 557 N.E.2d 744 ("Judicial experience with psychiatric testimony makes it abundantly clear that it would be unrealistic to treat an opinion ... by an expert on either side of ... [a...