Commissioner of Revenue v. Lawrence

• Decision Date: 08 November 1979
• Citation: 379 Mass. 205,396 N.E.2d 992
• Parties: COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE 1 et al. v. Emma Y. LAWRENCE et al. 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 992

396 N.E.2d 992

379 Mass. 205

COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE ¹ et al. v. Emma Y. LAWRENCE et al. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Sept. 14, 1979.

Decided Nov. 8, 1979.

John F. Hurley, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiffs.

Warren H. Pyle, Boston, for Emma Y. Lawrence.

Timothy J. Lane, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Municipal Court of the City of Boston.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

LIACOS, Justice.

The Commissioner of Revenue and the Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission brought a complaint in the nature of certiorari under G.L. c. 249, § 4, as appearing in St.1973, c. 1114, § 289, seeking to quash a decision of a judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston regarding the discharge of defendant Emma Y. Lawrence from her position as a clerk in the Department of Corporations and Taxation (appointing authority). The complaint alleges a judge of the Municipal Court erroneously reversed the determination of the Civil Service Commission (commission) that Lawrence had been discharged for just cause by the appointing authority. A single justice of this court reserved and reported the case, without decision, for the determination of the full court.

We summarize the facts as disclosed by the record. Lawrence began her career as a State employee in 1960. The charges against her related exclusively to her employment as principal clerk in the bureau of excises of the Department of Corporations and Taxation, which commenced in the summer of 1973 and ended in January, 1975. On February 14, 1975, a hearing was held before the appointing authority, in accordance with the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 43(A ). ³ The following reasons were given for the appointing authority's decision to discharge Lawrence: use of profane language to supervisors and other employees; insubordination; disrupting office decorum, thereby impairing the orderly operation of the office; and substandard work performance.

Lawrence appealed the discharge to the commission pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 43(B ), and on February 9, 1976, a hearing was conducted before a hearing officer designated by the commission as authorized by § 43(B ). Prior to the hearing, the appointing authority responded to Lawrence's request for specifications by setting forth a list of forty-seven alleged acts of misconduct. The list included thirteen instances of use of profane language, six instances of insubordination, seventeen instances of disrupting office decorum, and eleven categories of substandard work performance. On April 22, 1976, the hearing officer rendered her decision in which she determined that two instances of insubordination and two instances of disrupting office decorum had been proved. While finding that some evidence had been presented with respect to certain of the remaining charges, she determined that none of the remaining matters specified had been proved. The hearing officer's finding no. 41, in effect, contains a recommendation that the commission modify the action taken by the appointing authority and impose a suspension not to exceed three months. On May 12, 1976, the commission voted to adopt thirty-five of the hearing officer's findings and to reject six other findings on the basis that they represent conclusions rather than findings of fact. ⁴ The commission rejected the hearing officer's recommendation and affirmed the appointing authority's decision to terminate Lawrence's employment.

Lawrence then filed a petition for judicial review of the commission's decision in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston, pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 45. ⁵ A judge of that court heard oral arguments from the parties on January 8, 1977. After reviewing the transcript of the evidence before the hearing officer, the judge ruled that the commission's action in affirming the appointing authority's discharge of Lawrence was not supported by substantial evidence. On March 11, 1977, the judge entered a judgment reversing the decision of the commission and ordered the reinstatement of Lawrence to her former position without loss of compensation.

The issue before us is whether the judge committed an error of law in dealing with the issues before him. In an action in the nature of certiorari brought under G.L. c. 249, § 4, we will correct only "substantial errors of law apparent on the record adversely affecting material rights." Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 369 Mass. 84, 90, 337 N.E.2d 682, 686 (1975), quoting from Sullivan v. Committee on Rules of the House of Representatives, 331 Mass. 135, 139, 117 N.E.2d 817 (1954). Specifically, the issue presented is whether the judge of the Municipal Court, in reversing the decision of the commission for lack of substantial evidence, exceeded his authority under G.L. c. 31, § 45, by failing to apply the proper standards of judicial review. ⁶ See Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, supra at 86, 337 N.E.2d 682.

The essential nature of a proceeding initiated under § 45 is to provide for judicial review and not judicial retrial. Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 369 Mass. 84, 87, 337 N.E.2d 682 (1975). See also Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 359 Mass. 211, 214, 268 N.E.2d 346 (1971); Sullivan v. Municipal Court of the Roxbury Dist., 322 Mass. 566, 78 N.E.2d 618 (1948).

The case of Sullivan v. Municipal Court of the Roxbury Dist., supra, sets forth the relevant considerations for the reviewing court under G.L. c. 31, § 45, where the commission rejects the conclusions of the hearing officer. In that case we said, "The 'disinterested person' . . . came to the conclusions that the petitioner's attitude and failure to cooperate with the other officers at the time of his arrest and while in custody were not conduct becoming an officer and should 'not go unnoticed for appropriate disciplinary action,' but that the petitioner was not guilty as specifically charged in the two specifications. The commissioners, however, were not bound by the ultimate conclusions of the 'disinterested person.' They could rest their own decision upon his subsidiary findings. The commissioners' action is their own and is not that of the 'disinterested person,' G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 31, § 43(b), as appearing in St.1945, c. 677, § 1." Id. at 575-576, 78 N.E.2d at 621. See also Haywood v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 359 Mass. 760, 271 N.E.2d 591 (1971), where the Commissioners' rejection of the hearing officer's conclusions was likewise upheld.

The commission may reject the conclusions of the hearing officer with respect to guilt or innocence on certain charges as well as the hearing officer's recommendation as to disposition, and may rest its own decision on the subsidiary findings, as long as its decision can be justified on the basis of the accepted findings. The judge below stated: "(I)f the hearing officer was able only to find sufficient credible evidence to sustain four of the forty-seven allegations ⁷ of misconduct that caused the appointing authority to discharge the petitioner, we can hardly say that the action of the Civil Service Commission was justified and that it was done upon adequate reasons, sufficiently supported by credible evidence, Sullivan v. Municipal Court of the Roxbury Dist. supra, at p. 573, 78 N.E.2d 618. Further, if we add to this the Commission's rejection of findings 8, 22, 33 and 40, it would appear that the members of the Commission found that none of the 47 allegations were sustained."

We do not view this conclusion by the judge as a valid analysis of the record. While the commission rejected finding no. 33 ⁸ on the basis that it viewed that finding as a "conclusion" rather than as a finding of fact, it accepted subsidiary findings numbered 27, 28, 29, and 30, ⁹ on which the hearing officer based finding no. 33. Likewise, while rejecting finding no. 22 ¹⁰ on the basis that it viewed the finding as a conclusion rather than as a finding of fact, the commission accepted subsidiary findings numbered 13, 14, and 21, ¹¹ on which finding no. 22 was based. On the basis of the commission's acceptance of these subsidiary findings, it could have concluded, as did the hearing officer, that Lawrence was guilty of two counts of insubordination and two counts of disrupting office decorum. ¹²

We conclude that the judge of the Municipal Court committed error of law by failing to recognize that the commission may base its decision on the subsidiary findings of the hearing officer, while at the same time rejecting her conclusions and recommendation as to disposition. Applying the correct standard of review to the commission's decision, we conclude that it was not "unsupported by substantial evidence." G.L. c. 31, § 45. There was ample evidence in the subsidiary findings of the hearing officer which were accepted by the commission to justify the discharge of Lawrence. We therefore remand the case to the county court, where a judgment is to be entered setting aside the decision of the judge of the Municipal Court and directing that the decision of the Civil Service Commission be affirmed.

So ordered.

1 Statute 1978, c. 514, established the Department of Revenue, which is the statutory successor to the Department of Corporations and Taxation. The public official responsible...