Commonwealth v. Blystone

Decision Date20 July 2015
Docket NumberNo. 697 CAP,697 CAP
Citation119 A.3d 306
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Scott Wayne BLYSTONE, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

James F. Hibey, Esq., Rebecca Liu, Esq., Michael Wiseman, Esq., Philadelphia, for Scott Wayne Blystone.

Anthony John Krastek, Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, Gregory Joseph Simatic, Esq., for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.

OPINION

Justice TODD.

This matter comes to us upon Appellant's interlocutory appeal from an order of the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas. In this capital case, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that Appellant Scott Wayne Blystone was entitled to receive a new sentencing hearing after concluding that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and develop penalty- phase mitigating evidence in the form of institutional records and expert mental-health evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, and Appellant presently awaits a new penalty-phase hearing following the completion of discovery.

Throughout the course of counsel's current mitigation investigation, Appellant's mother, Norma Blystone, has consistently refused to divulge certain information regarding Appellant's childhood—which Appellant deems “critical”—unless she is assured that the information she provides will not be made public. In an attempt to provide Mrs. Blystone with such assurances and to obtain this additional information from her, Appellant filed a motion in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County for limited courtroom closure and temporary sealing of transcripts with respect to Mrs. Blystone's testimony, any expert testimony addressing the information Mrs. Blystone reveals, and any closing arguments referencing such testimony. The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant has filed an interlocutory appeal from that order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313.1 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that our Court lacks jurisdiction to review the trial court's interlocutory order denying Appellant's closure motion, and, accordingly, this appeal must be quashed.

I. Background

The facts underlying Appellant's conviction are set forth more fully in this Court's opinion resolving Appellant's direct appeal, see Commonwealth v. Blystone (“Blystone I”), 519 Pa. 450, 549 A.2d 81 (1988) ; however, a brief recitation of those facts is necessary to provide context to the instant matter. On September 9, 1983, at approximately 12:00 a.m., Appellant was driving with his girlfriend and two others, when he picked up a hitchhiker and later robbed and murdered him, shooting him in the back of the head. Appellant was charged with first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Following a jury trial in the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas, he was found guilty of each of the aforementioned crimes.

During Appellant's penalty-phase hearing, Appellant's trial counsel elected not to offer any mitigating evidence. Ultimately, the jury found one aggravating circumstance—that Appellant killed the victim in the perpetration of a felony—and it sentenced Appellant to death pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (“The verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance.”). Appellant also received a consecutive sentence of 10 to 20 years imprisonment for his robbery conviction. Appellant appealed his judgment of sentence, and, on October 17, 1988, this Court affirmed. Blystone I.

Thereafter, on October 12, 1995, Appellant, represented by new counsel, filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),2 raising various claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel, trial court error, and constitutional violations. Relevant to the instant matter, Appellant asserted, inter alia, that his counsel was ineffective for failing to offer mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of his capital trial and, more specifically, for failing to interview his family about mitigating evidence concerning his childhood. During the ensuing PCRA hearing, Appellant offered a variety of mitigation evidence that he claimed was available to counsel at the time of trial, including testimony from, inter alia, his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Blystone; Dr. Patricia Fleming, a clinical psychologist and neuropsychologist; and Dr. Alec Whyte, a psychiatrist, as well as affidavits from Mr. and Mrs. Blystone; Appellant's sisters, Cynthia Gaye Guthrie and Julie Ann Dice; and others.

Appellant's father, Norman Blystone, testified that Appellant frequently acted out and that he used corporal punishment to discipline Appellant approximately once or twice a week beginning when Appellant was seven or eight years old until his early teenage years. N.T. Hearing, 11/3/1995, at 100–03. Mr. Blystone described that he used various methods of disciplining Appellant, including whipping him with a belt, slapping him with his hands, and kicking him. Id. at 104. Additionally, Mr. Blystone stated that Appellant's prior counsel did not discuss mitigating circumstances with him prior to Appellant's trial and did not ask him to aid with obtaining his son's school, military, or medical records. Id. at 94. Mr. Blystone's affidavit contained similar information, stating that he “was the disciplinarian in the family,” and that he punished Appellant more than his other children. Affidavit of Norman Blystone, 10/5/1995, at 3.

Mrs. Blystone stipulated that she would testify to the same information as Mr. Blystone. N.T. Hearing, 11/3/1995, at 126. Additionally, with respect to Mr. Blystone's use of corporal punishment, Mrs. Blystone testified that there were times that she tried to stop Mr. Blystone from using such punishment on Appellant and that there were times that she felt that Mr. Blystone's actions in disciplining Appellant were excessive.Id. at 127. Mrs. Blystone explained that, when she felt that her husband was being excessive, she would try to talk to him about it, which sometimes developed into an argument; however, she claimed that, “most of the time,” she was successful in getting her husband to stop. Id. at 128. Additionally, Mrs. Blystone stated in her affidavit that her husband was the family's disciplinarian, that he was “very stern” with Appellant, and that he punished Appellant more than the other children, and did so with his belt or his hand. Affidavit of Norma Blystone, 10/5/1995, at 2.

The affidavits of Appellant's sisters similarly revealed that Mr. Blystone set the rules in the house, disciplined the children, and was “very strict.” Affidavit of Julie Ann Dice, 10/5/1995, at 1. The affidavits further described that Appellant “got the most whippings,” “couldn't learn from being punished,” and “couldn't stay out of Dad's way.” Affidavit of Cynthia Gaye Guthrie, 10/5/1995, at 2.

Dr. Fleming testified that she diagnosed Appellant with organic brain damage, bipolar mood disorder, polysubstance abuse, and borderline personality disorder, N.T. Hearing, 11/14/1995, at 46, 48, 53, 54, based upon her clinical interviews and psychological testing of Appellant, Appellant's life history, and her review of Appellant's Department of Corrections, hospital, and navy records. Id. at 19–21, 27. Specifically, Dr. Fleming explained that Appellant developed bipolar personality disorder, in part, because he was “truly abused physically over a long period of time,” the abuse was “inconsistent, it was irrational, and not based on fact,” and, thus, [Appellant] did not know how to deal with the world” and “withdrew.” Id. at 49.

Dr. Whyte testified that, based upon his interview with Appellant, his review of affidavits from Appellant's mother, father, and other family members, and his review of Appellant's correctional institution records, navy records, and hospital records, id. at 69–70, he diagnosed Appellant with borderline personality disorder, bipolar mood disorder, and organic personality disorder. Id. at 74–75.

Additionally, Appellant introduced various institutional records, including a Mayview State Hospital competency evaluation report diagnosing Appellant with antisocial personality disorder, Department of Correction Records from Appellant's previous incarceration in Maryland documenting Appellant's good behavior in prison and various health issues, and records from the Navy recommending Appellant be discharged due to the severity of his personality disorder.

On January 4, 1996, the PCRA court denied Appellant's petition, specifically finding, with respect to Appellant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to prepare mitigation evidence, that trial counsel interviewed Appellant and his family regarding potential mitigating evidence and discrediting testimony from Appellant's family to the contrary. Appellant appealed, and this Court affirmed, concluding, inter alia, that Appellant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence because Appellant refused to allow mitigating evidence to be presented on his behalf. Commonwealth v. Blystone (“Blystone II”), 555 Pa. 565, 725 A.2d 1197, 1205–06 (1999).

Appellant subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and supplement thereto, with the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, again alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and introduce available mitigating evidence. Relying upon the PCRA court's credibility determinations, the district court rejected Appellant's contention that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and develop lay-witness mitigation testimony; however, the district court found that Appellant's trial counsel was indeed ineffective for failing “to investigate and present expert mental health mitigation evidence and mitigation evidence...

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