Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 February 1913
• Citation: 153 S.W. 459,152 Ky. 320
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

153 S.W. 459

152 Ky. 320

COMMONWEALTH v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

February 19, 1913

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hickman County.

James Garnett, Atty. Gen., and R. L. Smith, of Clinton, for the Commonwealth.

Trabue Doolan & Cox, of Louisville, C. L. Sivley, of Chicago, Ill and Bennett, Robbins & Thomas, of Clinton, for appellee.

SETTLE J.

The appellee, Illinois Central Railroad Company, was indicted in the court below for the crime of involuntary manslaughter committed, as, in substance, alleged, by its servants in charge of an engine and cars, which they unlawfully and with gross and willful negligence ran at unreasonable speed into another of appellee's cars, in which John Benedict was a passenger, whereby the latter was killed.

The circuit court sustained a demurrer to and dismissed the indictment, and from the judgment manifesting those rulings the commonwealth has appealed.

The question presented for decision by the appeal, is: Will an indictment lie against a corporation, such as a railroad company, for involuntary manslaughter? The rule, as announced in the text-books and by the decisions, is that a corporation cannot, in general, be indicted for ordinary crimes and misdemeanors that involve a criminal or immoral intent, such as are often grouped in books of the common law under the three-fold designation of treason, felony, or breach of the peace. There has been no departure from the above rule in this jurisdiction. We have, it is true, held that a corporation is liable to indictment whenever the offense consists either in a misfeasance or a nonfeasance of duties to the public, and the corporation can be reached for punishment as by a fine and the seizure of its property; and that if the penalty prescribed for the offense be both fine and imprisonment the statute is inoperative as to the imprisonment, as that part of the punishment cannot, from the nature of the offender, be carried out. Commonwealth v. Pulaski County A. & M. Ass'n, 92 Ky. 197, 17 S.W. 442, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 468.

In the case, supra, the defendant corporation, a fair association, was indicted for permitting gaming on its grounds. A demurrer was sustained to the indictment, on the ground that, being a corporation, the defendant could not commit the offense. In rejecting that doctrine the court, in the opinion, following a statement of the common law on this subject, said: "Experience showed the necessity of modifying the old rules, and the decided tendency of modern decision has been to extend the application of all legal remedies, both civil and criminal, to corporation, and subject them thereto as in the case of individuals, so far as is possible. It is therefore well settled in the courts of this country, as well as in England, that they are indictable for misfeasance as well as a nonfeasance of duty unlawful in itself and injurious to the public. It has therefore been held that they may be indicted for a nuisance, whether arising from misfeasance or nonfeasance, or for an injury otherwise to the public, unlawful in itself and arising either from commission or the omission to perform a legal duty. They may be indicted for erecting and continuing a building, for leaving railroad cars in the street, for neglecting to repair a highway, for permitting stagnant water to remain on their premises, for libel for 'Sabbath breaking' by doing work on Sunday in violation of a statute, and in many other instances. It is true there are crimes of which, from their very nature, as perjury, for example, they cannot be guilty. There are crimes to the punishment for which, for a like reason, they cannot be subjected, as in the case of a felony; but wherever the offense consists in either a misfeasance or a nonfeasance of duty to the public, and the corporation can be reached for punishment, as by a fine and the seizure of its property, precedent authorizes and public policy requires that it should be liable to indictment."

While not mentioned in the opinion, supra, homicide, in any of its degrees, is not an offense for which a corporation may be indicted; at any rate, no court, so far as we are advised, has ever so decided.

An interesting discussion of the doctrine in question is contained in volume 5, §§ 5620 and 5621, Thompson on Corporations. In section 5621 it is, among other things, said: "Corporations cannot be indicted for offenses which derive their criminality from evil intention, or which consist in a violation of those social duties which appertain to men and subjects. They cannot be guilty of treason and felony; of perjury or offenses against the person. But beyond this there is no good reason for their exemption from the consequences of unlawful and wrongful acts committed by their agents in pursuance of authority derived from them. Such a rule would, in many cases, preclude all adequate remedy, and render reparation for an injury, committed by a corporation, impossible, because it would leave the only means of redress to be sought against irresponsible servants, instead of against those who truly committed the wrongful act by commanding it to be done. There is no principle of law which would thus furnish immunity to the corporation. *** It is now settled beyond dispute in most jurisdictions that a corporation is responsible for the criminal acts or omissions of its officers or agents to the same extent that it is civilly liable for its torts; and the fact that it cannot be punished in all the ways that an individual offender may be punished does not affect the principle. Though a corporation is not subject to imprisonment, still it may be punished by a fine, and the fine may be enforced against its property, or it may have its charter forfeited for abuse."

In section 5621 it is also said: "The corporation cannot be prosecuted for a crime, where the punishment prescribed cannot be imposed upon a corporation. Thus a corporation cannot be indicted for a felony, because the punishment for felony is death or imprisonment. But if the penalty provides for fine or imprisonment, then the corporation may be indicted, because punishment by fine may be imposed for the offense. A corporation cannot, in the nature of things, be guilty of treason, felony, or perjury. So a corporation cannot be prosecuted for larceny, assault and battery, or homicide. But it has been held that a corporation, owner of a steam vessel, may be guilty of manslaughter under the federal statute, which provides that every owner of a vessel through whose misconduct, fraud, or violation of law lives are lost on such vessel, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, and upon conviction thereof shall be sentenced to confinement at hard labor, though it cannot be subjected to the punishment imposed; and this fact has been held not to affect the right of the government to prosecute individuals under said statute, who aid and abet the corporation in the commission of a crime." 1 Bishop's New Criminal Law, §§ 417-419, 421, 422; 10 Cyc. 1231.

The crimes murder and manslaughter are not defined by statute in this state, though the punishment for the former and voluntary manslaughter is prescribed by statute, but both are defined by the common law and accepted by the courts of the state as thereby defined. Involuntary manslaughter, a lesser degree of manslaughter, is an offense at the common law for which no penalty is prescribed by statute in this state consequently the punishment inflicted upon persons convicted in the state of involuntary manslaughter is that prescribed by the common law for the offense, viz., a fine in any amount, or imprisonment...