Commonwealth v. Medina

• Decision Date: 24 July 2020
• Docket Number: SJC-12830
• Citation: 149 N.E.3d 747,485 Mass. 296
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Amador MEDINA.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

485 Mass. 296

149 N.E.3d 747

COMMONWEALTH

v.Amador MEDINA.

SJC-12830

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester..

Argued January 6, 2020

Decided July 24, 2020

Ellyn H. Lazar, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

David M. Osborne, Somerville, for the defendant.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

LENK, J.

The Hartford, Connecticut, police department received a tip that the defendant had three human skulls sitting on his porch. Over the next several hours, Hartford police officers met with the defendant, first at his apartment, and later at a police station, to uncover whether, how, and why he had these bones. After learning that they might have been stolen during a grave robbery in Worcester, and at the request of the Worcester police, Hartford police officers placed the defendant under arrest.

This case is before us on appeal from an order by a Superior Court judge allowing the defendant's motion to suppress statements he made to Hartford police officers. The motion judge determined that all of these statements were made under custodial interrogation, without Miranda warnings, and that they were involuntary.

We conclude that the defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation while speaking with officers of the Hartford police department at his apartment and, thus, Miranda warnings were not required at that time. In addition, the record reflects that the defendant's statements to police there were otherwise voluntary. Accordingly, the motion judge's conclusion that all of his statements must be suppressed was erroneous, and the order allowing the defendant's motion to suppress must be reversed.

1. Background. a. Facts. We recite the facts from the motion judge's findings, reserving certain details for later discussion.

On December 4, 2015, a caller who identified himself as "Juan" telephoned 911 and reported that he had seen several sets of human remains at the defendant's home. At approximately 3:22 P.M. , Officer Bryan Gustis of the Hartford police responded to the defendant's address in Hartford. After knocking and unsuccessfully trying to enter through a locked front door, Gustis went to the back door of the defendant's second-floor apartment. There he was met by the defendant. Gustis explained that the Hartford police had received a complaint about possible human remains; the defendant invited him into the apartment to discuss it.

Gustis initially was alone with the defendant in the apartment, except for two pit bull dogs that were chained up inside. He asked the defendant whether it was true that he had human bones. The defendant responded that he did, and pointed out a black plastic bag on his porch. Gustis could see dirt and bones protruding from the top of the bag. The defendant told Gustis that he kept these bones for religious purposes. He "cordial[ly]" explained that he was a priest in the religion of Palo Mayombe, which, he said, "is the darker side of Santeria and is a very old religion." He described the role that bones played in rituals of his faith, and how bones of different ages had different healing powers. He told Gustis that, in total, he had five sets of human remains in black trash bags. Gustis could see bones inside one partially-opened bag and could see other evidence of religious rituals, including numerous figurines, candles, and bowls containing additional human bones.

The defendant elaborated on how he came to possess these bones. He said that he had purchased the five sets of human remains in May of 2015 from an unidentified man in Worcester, at a cost of approximately $3,000 apiece. Without being asked, he showed Gustis photographs on his cellular telephone of the same bones when they were still entombed. Upon learning all of this information about the bones, Gustis did not arrest or handcuff the defendant.

Additional Hartford police officers arrived at the apartment; first Sergeant Labbe, and, later, Detectives Anthony Rykowski and Brando Flores. Each officer spoke with the defendant and observed the skeletal remains. The defendant also showed Rykowski the photographs of the bones in their caskets that he had shown Gustis. Signs appearing in the background of these photographs indicated that they had been taken in Hope Cemetery, which the defendant confirmed was located in Worcester.

Rykowski contacted the Worcester police and learned that, in October 2015, a mausoleum in Worcester had been broken into, and six sets of human remains had gone missing. Upon learning this, Rykowski informed the defendant that police would be removing the bones from his apartment so that they could be returned to their families.

Following approximately two and one-half hours of continuous discussion at the apartment, Rykowski asked the defendant to come to the police station and make a further statement. The defendant agreed, and officers drove him to the station. There, detectives interviewed the defendant for at least two more hours; the interview culminated in a written statement that the defendant then declined to sign.

Near the end of the interview, Worcester officers told the Hartford police that they had probable cause to arrest the defendant, and asked that he be held as a fugitive from justice. The Hartford police complied, and the defendant was arrested. Hartford police officers also sought and received a search warrant for the defendant's apartment. From his first encounter with Gustis until his arrest at the station, the defendant was never provided Miranda warnings.

b. Prior proceedings. The defendant was indicted on several charges related to the removal of human remains from the Worcester cemetery.¹ In November 2017, he filed a motion to suppress evidence and statements; after two evidentiary hearings, the motion was allowed in February 2018. A single justice of this court thereafter allowed the Commonwealth's petition to pursue an interlocutory appeal in the Appeals Court. In a lengthy unpublished opinion issued pursuant to its rule 1:28,² the Appeals Court reversed the order allowing the defendant's motion to suppress. Commonwealth v. Medina, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 1118, 126 N.E.3d 1038 (2019). We allowed the defendant's application for further appellate review.

The Commonwealth maintains that the motion judge erred by deciding that the defendant was in custody throughout his encounter with officers of the Hartford police department, and that his statements were involuntary.³ For the reasons that follow, we agree.

2. Discussion. a. Standard of review. "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of

fact absent clear error ‘but conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings and conclusions of law.’ " Commonwealth v. Cawthron, 479 Mass. 612, 616, 97 N.E.3d 671 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646, 801 N.E.2d 233 (2004).

b. Custody. Miranda warnings are required only where a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation. See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 390 Mass. 729, 736, 459 N.E.2d 792 (1984), citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). An interrogation becomes custodial when a suspect either is formally "in custody," or "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, supra at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The defendant bears the burden to establish the custodial nature of his or her encounter with police. Commonwealth v. Larkin, 429 Mass. 426, 432, 708 N.E.2d 674 (1999).

"Whether a suspect was subject to custodial interrogation is a question of Federal constitutional law." Id., citing Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 117, 123, 691 N.E.2d 566 (1998). Determining whether a suspect was "in custody," as the term is used here, requires two related inquiries: "first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995).

"Not all restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of Miranda." Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012). See Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 623, 97 N.E.3d 671, quoting Howes, supra ("Determining whether an individual's freedom of movement was curtailed ... is simply the first step in the analysis"). Outside a formal arrest, a suspect is in custody "if the officer detaining the suspect treats the suspect in a manner that a reasonable person would regard as involving an arrest for practical purposes" (quotations omitted). See 1 McCormick On Evid. § 151 (8th ed. 2020) (discussing applicability of Miranda, "custody," "interrogation," and exceptions).

When considering "how a suspect would have ‘gauge[d]’ his ‘freedom of movement,’ courts must examine ‘all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.’ " Howes, 565 U.S. at 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181, quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994). In Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 211–212, 755 N.E.2d 1224 (2001), we identified four factors that a court should consider when assessing the circumstances surrounding an interrogation. They are "(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the officers have conveyed to the person being questioned any belief or opinion that that person is a suspect; (3) the nature of the interrogation, including whether the interview was aggressive or, instead, informal and influenced in its contours by the person being interviewed; and (4) whether, at the time the incriminating statement was made, the person was free to end the interview by leaving the locus of the interrogation or by asking the interrogator to leave, as evidenced by whether the interview terminated with an arrest." Id.

In prior decisions, we occasionally have suggested that these four factors are the beginning and the...